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Introduction
Innovative activity is a key driver of economic growth and development as well as competi­
tiveness at a national, industry and firm level. Despite many popular examples, innovations 
rarely occur as by-products of other economic activities or as chance outcomes, but are 
most frequently the result of purposeful, directed undertakings. Furthermore, much of the 
innovative process takes place not in large organisations or companies but rather in smaller, 
more flexible and less risk-averse units such as, for example, the archetypal ‘entrepreneurial 
firm’. In general, these prime actors in the R&D process are cash-starved and have access 
to the required investment funds to cover their frequently sizeable research costs only in 
exceptional circumstances. Thus, the transfer and allocation of funds from investors to re­
search units plays a central role in the fostering of innovative activity and warrants the 
extensive attention that has been paid to it by economic theorists, empirical researchers 
and practitioners alike.
This thesis aims to contribute to our understanding of how innovative firms are best 
financed and organised. It focuses on a number of distinct, yet closely related, issues that 
are faced by many innovative firms. First, we examine the impact of weak property rights -
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ubiquitous in many industries at the forefront of modern technology - on financing arrange­
ments and research incentives, we then analyse the optimal design of venture capital funds 
and finally examine the optimal use of communication within a research unit in order to 
maximise research incentives. Before drawing together the common elements of our analyses 
of these issues, we will present a short summary of each chapter. Summaries of the related 
literature are contained in the introduction of each chapter and are not repeated here.
The paradigmatic R&D process results in an innovation that is protected by enforceable 
intellectual property rights such as a patent or a copyright. Yet frequently, and increasingly, 
these property rights are challenged in court, circumvented or are so difficult to obtain that 
property rights become ‘weak’. Chapter 2 assesses the impact of weak property rights on 
optimal financing arrangements and research incentives.
In particular, chapter 2 considers an investor who finances a portfolio of entrepreneurs 
and who can transfer weakly protected knowledge across portfolio projects in order to 
improve their R&D prospects. Such disclosure is not desirable to the entrepreneur holding 
a knowledge advantage but cannot always be prevented when property rights are absent or 
not always legally enforceable. As a result, the investor’s threat to disclose knowledge to 
product market rivals carries potency and may allow him to expropriate additional surplus 
from the entrepreneurs. In this setting, our analysis focuses on the entrepreneur’s incentives 
to prevent disclosure by renegotiating her financing contract so as to remove the investor’s 
incentives to disclose. Our results indicate that such renegotiation will always lead to the 
first-best disclosure rule, regardless of the strength of property rights.
The strength of property rights does, however, play an important role in determining the 
incentives to obtain transferable knowledge in the first place. Stronger intellectual property 
rights tend to increase effort incentives for a given financing contract as they reduce the
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probability that an entrepreneur’s knowledge advantage is dissipated. When the optimal 
financing contract is taken into account, however, stronger property rights may have a 
non-monotonous impact on the surplus of the R&D project. Thus, when (i) projects are 
very risky and require large up-front investments and (u) property rights are not too strong, 
strengthening property rights will reduce a researcher’s return from R&D. In all other cases, 
stronger property rights will increase the research project’s expected surplus. Furthermore, 
weakening perfect property rights by a small amount may impose a discontinuously large 
penalty on the entrepreneur in terms of expected surplus.
This analysis rejects simplistic accounts of the interaction between intellectual property 
rights and financing regimes and, if anything, argues that intermediate degrees of property 
rights protection are likely to be optimal in our setting.
In two extensions we consider the impact of the investor’s disclosure threat, accorded to 
him by weak property rights, on organisational choices. First, we examine the entrepreneur’s 
choice between a close or a distant financing relationship. The latter does not allow the 
investor sufficient access to research results to enable him to disclose it but also reduces his 
ability to provide productive advice during final research. Our intuitive conclusion is that 
weaker property rights and better advice capability on behalf of the distant investor induce 
the entrepreneur is to choose close investors less often.
Second, we analyse the investor’s optimal choice of portfolio size when a larger portfolio 
increases the potency of the disclosure threat while also rendering the incentivisation of 
entrepreneurs more difficult. We find that stronger property rights and lower ability to 
extract surplus at the initial financing stage will favour larger investment portfolios.
Chapter 3 steps away from the issue of property rights and knowledge transfer and con­
centrates on the optimal design of a venture capital fund. In particular, it argues that a
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commitment to ‘shallow pockets’ may improve an investor’s ability to deal with entrepre­
neurial agency problems.
When investment is committed in stages, renegotiations over extension finance create a 
hold-up problem which adversely affects entrepreneurial agency problems - whether they 
be of a moral-hazard or adverse-selection nature. While much of the existing hterature 
has been concerned with contractual solutions to these dilemmas, chapter 3 proposes a 
non-contractual solution. In particular, our analysis suggests that it may be beneficial for 
a venture capital fund to restrict the amount of investment funds that it initially raises. 
Such a restriction, i.e. a commitment to ‘shallow pockets’, creates competition between her 
portfoho entrepreneurs for cheap ‘informed’ (or ‘inside’) money at the refinancing stage. Al­
though competition among entrepreneurs increases the investor’s bargaining power during 
renegotiations, we find that competition may nevertheless enhance entrepreneurial effort 
incentives and allow the sorting of entrepreneurs according to their type. This arises from 
the fact that competition created by limited funds increases the responsiveness of the en­
trepreneur’s payoff to the profits generated by his project.
Chapter 3 lays out the conditions under which such an increase in responsiveness can be 
achieved through the non-contractual means of limited funds. When this is the case, the 
benefit of improved incentives may outweigh the costs of inefficient refinancing by the initial 
investor, e.g. the increased cost of refinancing through uninformed outside investors or the 
failure to receive funding for the second stage at all. We find that raising limited funds is 
an optimal strategy when the following two conditions hold: first, the probability that a 
given project fails at the interim stage is relatively high; second, the incremental returns 
from improving the project are relatively small compared to the absolute value of financial
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rewards if the project is a success. We show that this reasoning applies in both a moral 
hazard as well as in an adverse selection setting.
As a result, this chapter provides an endogenisation of a widespread phenomenon in
venture capital finance, namely, provisions that limit a venture capital fund’s size and make
it more difficult to attract further investors after the fund has been raised
Chapter 4 abstracts from the optimal financing of an innovative firm and turns to the issue 
of how to best organise R&D. In particular, it focuses on the communication policy between 
two competing researchers. In contrast to the existing literature, our analysis in chapter 3 
argues that it may be optimal to commit to communication in order to maximise research 
incentives, even though communication does not create spillovers. As such, it presents a 
strong argument for increasing transparency and knowledge flows within organisations.
The model set up in chapter 4 considers two researchers who form a partnership to re­
search an innovation and renegotiate their sharing rule once intermediate research results 
have been realised. In such a setting, communication of an agent’s intermediate know-how 
to her partner has two effects: first, it may improve the partnership’s ability to innovate, e.g. 
through spillovers, and thus increase the surplus to be distributed; second, it will strengthen 
her partner’s ability to conduct research outside the partnership and thus improve her part­
ner’s bargaining power during renegotiations. Traditionally, the literature has emphasised 
the first effect. Chapter 4 departs from this approach and focuses exclusively on the impli­
cations of the latter effect.
One immediate result is that, for given knowledge levels, communication by an agent 
will only ever weaken her bargaining position and reduce the surplus she can extract from 
renegotiations. As a result, an agent’s commitment to communicate at the intermediate 
stage is equivalent to a commitment to reduce her bargaining power. On the other hand.
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chapter 4 argues, such a commitment may also serve to increase her partner’s incentives to 
conduct research and acquire intermediate knowledge if the two partners’ research paths 
are sufficiently complementary. As a result, a commitment to communicate may increase 
ex ante surplus although it weakens the communicating agent’s bargaining position at the 
intermediate stage. As a result, our analysis provides a novel justification for open organi­
sational structures and for communication within firms that does not rely on exogenously 
postulated spillovers.
Finally, a few comments on themes and approaches shared by these chapters. On the 
most general level, all three chapters are concerned with interactions between researchers 
that compete in some sense, whether as a part of the investor’s portfolio or within an 
organisation in which surplus needs to be bargained over. Chapters 2 and 3, in particular, 
depart from the existing literature, which mainly concentrates on the bilateral relationship 
between an entrepreneur and her investor. Knowledge, its transfer through communication, 
and the resulting effect on research incentives are a themes common to both chapters 2 
and 4. In chapter 2, such communication is always involuntary from the entrepreneur’s 
perspective, while chapter 3 considers a setting with strong property rights and voluntary 
communication only. Finally, on a more technical level, a common theme of chapters 3 and 
4 is that they argue that actions that reduce an agent’s ex post bargaining power may 
nevertheless prove optimal from an ex ante perspective whenever they ameliorate agency 
problems.
Financing Innovative Firms in the Presence of 
Weak Property Rights
2.1 Introduction
When investors finance a portfolio of entrepreneurs, their aim is to maximise the return of 
their entire portfolio rather than that of a particular individual portfolio project. A conflict 
of interests exists between an investor and her portfolio entrepreneur if an action by the 
investor achieves the former but not the latter objective. We trace out the implications of 
this conflict of interests in a setting in which the entrepreneur generates interim knowledge 
in an R&D contest that the investor is able to transfer across her different portfolio projects. 
While such a transfer is never in the interest of the entrepreneur whose interim knowledge is 
disclosed, she cannot always prevent such a disclosure legally if intellectual property rights 
{IP R y  are weak.
This chapter focuses on her ability to prevent disclosure of interim knowledge through 
contractual means. In particular, we analyse the investor’s incentives to disclose interim 
knowledge once it has been created by the entrepreneur, as well as the entrepreneur’s in-
 ^Throughout this chapter, the term s ‘intellectual property rights’, ‘property rights’ and ‘IP R ’ are used 
synonymously.
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centives to renegotiate her original financing contract in order to prevent such disclosure. 
We characterise the resulting optimal contract between investor and entrepreneur as well 
its implications for entrepreneurial effort incentives (and thus the expected value of her 
project). Our main conclusions are that, firstly, the optimal contract induces the investor to 
disclose if, and only if, disclosure is socially efficient. Secondly, under the optimal contract 
the strength of property rights is an important determinant of entrepreneurial effort incen­
tives and project value, regardless of whether knowledge is transferred at the interim stage 
or not. We also find that the impact of the strength of property rights on the value of the 
entrepreneur’s project may be non-monotonously related to riskiness of the project and that 
weakening perfect property rights by a small amount may lead to a discontinuous penalty 
in terms of project value. In two extensions, we examine the impact of the investor’s threat 
to disclose on the entrepreneur’s choice between a close or distant financing relationship, as 
well as on the investor’s optimal size of portfolio.
More precisely, our model consists of a two-stage R&D contest between entrepreneurs 
that are financed by the same investor. Entrepreneurial effort determines the probability of 
obtaining research knowledge at the interim stage which, in turn, determines the likelihood 
of research success at the final stage. Payoffs depend on the two entrepreneurs’ relative 
research performance at the final stage. The investor learns any interim knowledge pro­
duced by the entrepreneurs so that he can transfer interim knowledge at the interim stage. 
The strength of IP R  determines the entrepreneur’s ability to legally prevent such interim 
knowledge disclosure.
We find that, in general, the investor prefers to disclose inefficiently often at the interim 
stage while the entrepreneur prefers to prevent disclosure inefficiently often. However, in­
terim renegotiations always induce socially efficient disclosure behaviour by the investor in
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equilibrium. When interim knowledge is very important in R&D, disclosure is not socially 
efficient and the entrepreneur will always find it optimal to renegotiate the initial financing 
contract in order to prevent disclosure. The investor will not disclose and may extract ad­
ditional surplus from the entrepreneur if the threat of disclosure is credible. When interim 
knowledge is not important in R&D, by contrast, disclosure is socially efficient and it is 
too expensive for the entrepreneur to prevent disclosure by ceding additional surplus to the 
investor. As a result, the investor will disclose whenever the entrepreneur cannot legally 
insist on her property rights.
This analysis has several implications for the role of the strength of property rights. 
First, the incidence of disclosure depends on the strength of IP R  only if disclosure is 
socially efficient. Moreover, our analysis suggests that, everything else being equal, stronger 
property rights reduce efficiency as they merely allow the entrepreneur to legally prevent 
efficient disclosure while not affecting the incidence of inefficient disclosure. By contrast, the 
second implication of our analysis holds that stronger property rights reduce the potency 
of the investor’s threat to disclose and thus the severity of the interim hold-up problem, so 
that effort incentives tend to be strengthened.
As a result, IPR strength affects expected surplus in two opposite directions. When 
disclosure is inefficient, i.e. when the research project is not very risky, this trade-off is 
resolved in favour of stronger property rights. In particular, expected surplus is strictly 
increasing in IPR strength when this is sufficiently low, but independent when IPR strength 
is sufficiently strong. Importantly, we find that weakening perfect property rights by a very 
small amount leads to a discontinuous loss in surplus.
When projects are risky so that disclosure is efficient, the above trade-off is not unambigu­
ous. We provide conditions under which stronger property rights in fact reduce expected
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surplus. The main implication is that the impact of IPR strength on project value may be 
non-monotonously related to the importance of interim knowledge: when interim knowledge 
is not important IP R  may reduce project value, otherwise they may increase project value.
We examine the impact of the investor’s threat to disclose on two organisational choices 
in our extensions. First, we extend the basic model to allow the entrepreneur to choose 
between a distant investor, who can commit not to disclose but is not a capable advisor, 
and a close investor, who cannot commit to not disclose but provides more productive 
advice. Our intuitive conclusion is that the distant investor will be chosen if (i) he induces 
higher effort than the close investor and (ii) his advice capability is not too low. This will 
be the case when effort is very important and when the threat of disclosure allows the close 
investor to extract a large part of the surplus, e.g. because property rights are weak.
Our second extension of the basic model considers the investor’s optimal choice of portfoho 
size. A larger portfolio endows the investor’s threat to disclose with more potency and 
allows him to extract more surplus. By the same token, a larger portfolio will render it 
more expensive to incentivise the entrepreneur. As a result, the investor will prefer a larger 
portfolio if (i) entrepreneurial effort is important relative to interim knowledge and (ii) the 
investor cannot extract too much surplus by threatening disclosure, e.g. because property 
rights are strong.
There is strong evidence that property rights are far from perfect because, for example, 
patents are difficult to obtain or undesirable or because they are difficult to enforce and 
easy to circumvent.^. This issue is particularly relevant for innovative firms. Lanjouw and 
Schankerman (2001), for example, find that the incidence of patent litigation is particularly
 ^Among many, Anton and Yao (1994, 2004), An and and G aletovic (2000b) and Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) 
provide evidence on these points.
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pronounced for IT, bio-technology and non-drug health patents as well as small firms. Sim­
ilarly, entrepreneurs face difficulties when trying to protect their proprietary knowledge via 
alternative means such as non-disclosure agreements^ or trade secret laws and no-compete 
agreements (Besen and Raskind (1991)).
When property rights are weak, the relationship between the entrepreneur and her in­
vestor suffers from the threat of expropriation. Chesbrough (2000), for example, argues 
that “For some entrepreneurs... the loss of control is no longer the biggest downside. ... 
Rather, i t ’s the fear that VC firms may compromise the ideas on which their companies 
are founded.” In the context of corporate venture capital. Block and MacMillan (1993) 
find that “Entrepreneurs harbor a fundamental distrust of large corporations. ... [They fear] 
that the corporation will steal their ideas.” Finally, Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) and 
Quindlen (2000) provide evidence that venture capitalists engage in ‘portfolio thinking’ by 
co-ordinating the strategies of their portfolio companies and transferring knowledge among 
them.^
The model presented in this chapter shares traits with a number of other contributions. 
Most obviously, the analysis conducted in this paper is related to that of Bhattacharya 
and Chiesa (1995) whose setting our model is based on. However, our model differs in sev­
eral important respects. Firstly, access to interim knowledge bestows additional bargaining 
power on the investor at the interim stage. This implies that the strength of property rights 
matters whether or not disclosure actually occurs. Secondly, we explicitly allow for varying 
degrees of IPR strength and argue that the impact of property rights on project value may
^See Anton and Yao (1994) and Severinov (2001) for empirical evidence on this point.
 ^Arping (2002) also provides evidence on the coordination of portfolio com panies’ product market strategies by 
venture capitalists.
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be non-monotonie. Finally, we consider the impact of weak property rights on the optimal 
size of the investor’s portfolio.
The analysis provided in Cestone and White (2003) also closely related as they consider 
a setting in which an entrepreneur can design a contract that induces an investor with (ex­
ogenously given) market power to not finance potential product market rivals. Our analysis 
differs in that it concentrates on a potentially non-exclusive and non-rival input, knowledge, 
as well as the role of the strength of property rights. Moreover, the investor’s threat of dis­
closure is not predicated on his exogenously given market power but arises endogenously in 
our setting. Finally, we consider the entrepreneur’s ex ante incentives to expose herself to 
this expropriation threat.
The literature on research joint ventures has focussed on the role of knowledge spillovers 
with a recent emphasis on the endogenous determination of knowledge transfers.^ Most 
closely related is Severinov (2001) who analyses a firm’s ability and incentives to regulate 
her employees’ knowledge exchange with employees of other firms in a setting in which 
employees are risk-averse, have no bargaining power and in which property rights do not 
exist.
Finally, a large literature on weak property rights has focussed on related issues.® Most 
closely related is Ueda (2004) who analyses the impact of an investor’s ability to steal an 
idea prior to the signature of contracts on the choice of investors. The focus of our analysis, 
by contrast, is on the impact of weak property rights after the initial contract has been 
signed.
®See, for exam ple, Gallini and Wright (1990), Gandal and Scotchmer (1993), Perez-Castrillo and Sandonis (1996), 
Rosenkranz and Schmitz (1999) and Pastor and Sandonis (2002).
^These issues include selling an imperfectly protected idea (Anton and Yao (1994, 2001) ), the structure of optim al 
licensing contracts ( Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983), Bhattacharya, Glazer, and Sappington (1992) and D ’Aspremont, 
Bhattacharya, and Gerard-Varet (2000)) and the optim al organisation of R&D (Anton and Yao (1995), Anand and 
G aletovic (2000b) and Baccara and Razin (2004)).
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Section 4.2 introduces the model while section 2.3 analyses the tension between ex ante 
and ex post efficient disclosure rules. Section 2.4 analyses the renegotiations over knowledge 
disclosure and characterises the ex post efficient contracts as well as the impact of the 
strength of property rights on contracts and effort incentives. Section 2.5 presents two 
extensions to this model and section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Model
There are two types of agents, entrepreneurs and investors,^ and three periods, which we 
denote by t =  0,1,2. For simpHcity we assume that all parties are risk neutral and do not 
discount future cash flows. Furthermore, there are more potential investors than entrepre­
neurs so that, ex ante, there is competition for entrepreneurs.® All entrepreneurs compete 
in the same industry and we assume that this industry consists of two entrepreneurs.®
2.2.1 Project Technologies
Entrepreneurs have zero wealth and are engaged in an R&D contest for cost-reducing inven­
tions in the product market. Each entrepreneur has an idea that is embedded in a project 
which requires an investment To > 0 at t =  0, and which can be extended at cost 7i > 0 
at t =  1 in a sense to be made more precise below. The entrepreneur is essential to the
^Throughout this chapter, we will follow the convention of using female pronouns for entrepreneurs and male 
pronouns for the investor.
®This assum ption is standard and not essential for our main results. Section 2.5.1 presents an extension in which 
it is relaxed.
®This assum ption merely reduces the com plexity of the analysis. An extension of our main mechanism to an 
industry w ith n  >  2 entrepreneurs is conceptually straightforward as long as entrepreneurs with lower costs earn 
higher profits than other entrepreneurs.
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project in that it cannot be continued without her presence. Further, we assume that the 
entrepreneurs’ projects are symmetric.
A project produces ‘interim’ (t = 1) and a ‘final’ {t = 2) research. Both research outcomes 
are observed by all market participants and we follow Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) in 
assuming that neither research output is verifiable and contractible. Final research takes 
the form of ‘success’ or ‘failure’ and the entrepreneur’s relative performance at final research 
determines the project’s payoffs at t =  2. An entrepreneur who is the only final research 
success earns a product market return of V > 7i +/o. If both entrepreneurs succeed at final 
research, Bertrand competition ensures that they earn zero profits. If final research fails, 
the entrepreneur does not earn any positive product market returns.
Final research success depends on interim knowledge and project extension. We denote 
interim knowledge produced by entrepreneur i aX t = 1 hy 6i and restrict it to be ‘high’ 
{9i =  0^) or low {Oi = 6^^ with 0 < < 1. If the project is extended at cost I\ at
t = 1, final research success will be obtained with probability Oi, where 1 > 9^ > 6^ >
If extension does not take place, final research will succeed with probability 6  ^ regardless 
of the degree of interim knowledge, where 9^ > 6  ^> 0.
An entrepreneur’s level of interim knowledge is, in turn, determined by the non-contractible 
effort exerted by her at t =  0. For simplicity, the entrepreneur acquires 9i = 9^  with prob­
ability Pi where p* = p > 0 if the entrepreneur exerts effort, and Pi = 0 o therw ise.T he 
cost of effort is given by c > 0. To streamline the exposition, let Of denote the expected 
probability of success at t = 0 : Of := 9^ pi (9^ — 9^) .
Firing the entepreneur and installing a new manager is assumed to incur prohibitive costs.
^^Our main results do not rely on the assumption of asym m etry (see also footnote 30).
^^The assumption of a binary effort choice is not crucial in our context but severely simplifies the analysis. Similarly, 
the assum ption that low effort is equal to zero merely represents a standardisation. It is relaxed in the extension  
presented in Section 2.5.1.
2.2 The Model 22
To summarise, the entrepreneur must exert non-contractible effort in order to produce 
interim knowledge which, in turn, will allow him to engage in final research. Relative per­
formance in final research determines final payoffs.
2.2.2 Financing
Each investor finances two entrepreneurs in the same industry. Investors compete to pro­
vide finance Iq to entrepreneurs at t =  0. At t =  1, the investor can decide whether to 
extend project i at cost Ii or not. If he refuses, entrepreneurs can approach alternative 
sources for extension finance. Since the realisation of interim research is observable by all, 
the entrepreneur has full bargaining power in the renegotiation game at t = 1 absent any 
further considerations^'^ and extension financing will be fairly priced.
During our main analysis, we assume that the investor automatically gains access to 
any interim knowledge produced by her portfolio entrepreneurs at t =  1 so that he can 
transfer it when desirable in the manner described in the next subsection. This assumption 
is relaxed in the extension presented in Section 2.5.1, where we allow the entrepreneur to 
choose whether to give the investor access to interim knowledge.
2.2.3 Property Rights and the Transfer of Knowledge
A central feature of our analysis is that interim knowledge can be transferred across agents. 
This feature rests on two assumptions.
^^The extension presented in Section 2.5.2 relaxes this assumption.
This setting can also be interpreted as one in which a corporation w ith a research unit invests in an entrepreneurial 
firm that threatens to enter a related product market. Such corporate venture capital financing is frequently observed  
and often justified on grounds of knowledge acquisition (see Block and MacMillan (1993) and Gompers and Lerner 
(2000)).
^^Note that this assumption also renders m oot any consideration of com m itting to a restriction on the funds available 
to  the investor. For an analysis o f the potential benefits of such a restriction in a different setting, see Chapter 3.
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First, we draw a distinction between observing and possessing knowledge, in the sense 
that the observation of an entrepreneur’s knowledge does not endow the observer with 
its possession.^® As a result, a transfer of high interim knowledge from, say, entrepreneur 
i to j  will improve j 's  productive ability if he does not possess high interim knowledge, 
although j  has already observed that i has produced high interim knowledge. Furthermore, 
interim knowledge can be transferred only by someone who possesses it and only a deliberate 
transmission can confer possession of knowledge to someone else. Possession, in the sense 
used in our analysis, should not be confused with any claims to property rights. It merely 
implies that the agent has a thorough understanding of a particular invention and can pass 
it on in a way that it can be used by a rival.
Second, we assume that interim knowledge, but not final research output, exhibits a degree 
of non-exclusivity. To put it differently, intellectual property rights over interim knowledge 
are weak or not well-defined.^® We denote the strength of property rights as ^ € [0,1] and 
interpret it as the probability with which an entrepreneur can verify that the investor has 
disclosed interim knowledge to her rival and thus legally prevent her from disclosure. We 
refer to knowledge disclosure by an investor as ‘successful’ if it was not prevented by the 
entrepreneur, and as ‘failed’ if it was prevented. In case of disclosure failure, entrepreneurs 
continue to research with their original ‘pre-disclosure’ knowledge levels,^ ®
clarify this d istinction, suppose that O is the set (of measure 1) of all possible states o f the world which are 
equally likely. The true state of the world w is unknown at t =  0 but revealed at t =  1. During interim research, the 
entrepreneur investigates the optimal final research path for a subset of measure p i of all possible states of the world. 
Her final research will work well (i.e. interim knowledge is high) if w is in the subset P i. In this setting, observing  
entrepreneur i 's  interim knowledge at t =  1 is equivalent to observing the subset pi that i  explores as well as the 
realisation of û  (i.e. whether it is in p, or not). Possessing i 's  interim knowledge im plies acquiring the optim al final 
research paths for subset p i.
^®See Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) for a similar assumption.
^^For exam ple, the strength of property rights j3 can be interpreted as the ease w ith which original inventorship can 
be proven so that rivals can be prevented from using a particular innovation.
^®What m atters here is that, when disclosure fails, the entrepreneur with the original knowledge advantage will 
earn higher expected returns as compared to when disclosure succeeds. This may be, for exam ple, because the receiver 
of a failed disclosure can be prevented from actually using this knowledge or because the investor as well as the 
entrepreneur can be sued for the expected loss in earnings. See Lerner (1994), Schankermann and Scotchmer (2001)
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Knowledge disclosure is observable and can be undertaken either by the entrepreneur, 
who produced the knowledge, or by her investor. We assume that licensing of interim or 
final knowledge is not possible^^ and that neither the investor nor the entrepreneur can 
commit themselves to not disclose interim knowledge.^^
Since knowledge is non-rival, a successful transfer of knowledge can only increase the 
knowledge level of the receiver but will never reduce the knowledge level of the sender. We 
assume that if both entrepreneurs have the same knowledge level, knowledge disclosure is 
ineffective and will not occur. Interim disclosure will be desirable only if on entrepreneur, 
say i, has high interim knowledge 6i = 6^  while j  has low interim knowledge, Oj = 6^. If 
disclosure is successful, it raises 9j to 6^  so that 6j = 9{ = 6^. If disclosure fails, we assume 
that 6i = 9^  and 9j =  9^.
2.2.4 Payoff A ssumptions
First, not that extension finance creates an incremental return of (9i — 9^) (1 — 9j) V  — I\ 
for entrepreneur i.
Assum ption 1: Extension finance is ex post efficient for all 9i E {9^,9^^  :
(9^ -9^)  { l - 9 ^ ) V > I i .
This assumption allows us to abstract from issues relating to efficient project extension.
and Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001, 2004) for an empirical analysis o f the incidence and determ inants of patent 
litigation.
^®This restriction allows us to focus on involuntary disclosure from the entrepreneur’s perspective. See Bhattacharya, 
Glazer, and Sappington (1992) for an analysis of knowledge-licensing contracts.
^°An alternative interpretation would be that entrepreneur and investor can contract on a disclosure rule but that 
such a contract can be enforced with probability /3 only.
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Next, let and denote the expected return at t =  0 of a project when disclosure 
does and does not occur, respectively:
yND  _  _  e^)) (1 -  { e ^ + p { e ^  -  e^)))  v
V® =  -  (1 - p f  0^^  ( i  -  (o«  -  (1 - p f  V.
A ssum ption 2; It is ex ante efficient to exert effort:
p{ 0H + p { e « - e ^ ) ) ) V  > cand 
p { i - p ) 6 ^ { i - 2 { e ^ + p { e ^ - e ^ ) ) ) v  > c;
and it is ex ante efficient to invest if and only if effort has been exerted:
min v ^ ]  >  i i  +  i o > e ^  { 1 - e^) v.
This assumption ensures that the severity of the entrepreneur’s moral hazard problem is a 
measure of the loss of efficiency generated by a particular financing contract and disclosure 
rule.
2.2.5 Contracts and Renegotiations
In our setting, the initial contract signed at t =  0 specifies a repayment R  in payoff state 
V  in return for initial investment Iq. The entrepreneur retains the residual cash flow. This 
contract is renegotiated to repayment r, defined analogously, at t =  1 whenever extension
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finance takes place^  ^ and whenever the investor can threaten to disclose interim knowledge. 
Repayments must fulfill the standard conditions of limited liability: R, r € [0, V ] .
This contract arises naturally out of the assumption that interim knowledge disclosure 
cannot be contracted on the original contract. We assume that agents cannot commit not 
to renegotiate at t = 1 so that renegotiations take place whenever extension finance needs 
to be committed.
At t =  1, the entrepreneur and the investor bargain over extension finance and knowledge 
disclosure. Bargaining takes place sequentially, that is, first over extension finance and then 
over knowledge transfer.^^
The entrepreneur can obtain extension finance from the original investor or firom al­
ternative sources. Since the reafisation of interim research is observed by all, alternative 
investors can provide extension financing at the same rate as the original investor so that 
the original investor will not be able to extract any of the incremental surplus created by 
extension finance. We specify that bargaining over extension financing occurs according to 
Nash bargaining with equal bargaining powers.
If the entrepreneur, say Ei, has an interim knowledge advantage over the other portfolio 
entrepreneur Ej,  the investor can threaten to disclose interim knowledge successfully with 
probability {1 — P ). Disclosure has the effect of terminating renegotiations with Ei. Since 
knowledge is a non-physical asset, the investor can also choose to disclose knowledge once
Our im plicit assumption, made for simplicity, is that extension financing is not contractible. Relaxing this assump­
tion would not affect our main results as these are driven by the non-contractibility o f interim knowledge disclosure. 
See also the discussion in the next footnote.
^^This rules out long-term contracts under which an investor would com m it funds /o  -|- / i  at t =  0 in return 
for repayment R i t  =  2. Such a restriction can be easily justified by an appeal to fraudulent investors (e.g. see 
chapter 3 for the use of a similar assum ption). Our main analysis, however, would not be affected if we allowed for 
long-term  financing contracts as these would also be renegotiated whenever the investor can threaten to disclose. See 
Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) for an analysis of the relative incentive m erits of short and long-term contracts.
^^This specification is for clarity only. The same payoffs would obtain if bargaining over extension finance and 
disclosure occured sim ultaneously since the entrepreneur would be able to  obtain fairly priced extension finance from 
outside investors if this bargaining broke down.
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bargaining has been successfully concluded. In this sense, the renegotiated contract has to 
be ex post incentive compatible.
Suppose that contract f* and fj  are those resulting from renegotiations over extensions 
finance. We specify that renegotiations over knowledge disclosure then proceed as follows:
t'=  1 : The investor and Ei bargain over disclosure. If negotiations with Ei are successful, 
repayment n  is replaced by new repayment r%.
t'=  2 : If negotiations at =  1 were successful, the investor decides whether to disclose to 
Ej given contractual payment fj. If negotiations at = 1 were unsuccessful, the investor 
decides whether to make a new offer to Ei so that the game returns to =  1 or whether to 
disclose to Ej given contractual payment rj.
t'=  3 : If the investor has decided to disclose to Ej, he bargains over the surplus from
disclosure given contracts Vi and rj.
Again, bargaining outcomes are determined by Nash bargaining with equal bargaining 
powers.
To summarise. Figure 2.1 depicts the timeline of our model.
2.3 Ex Ante vs. Ex Post Optimal Disclosure Incentives
This section establishes the ex ante as well as the ex post optimal disclosure rule from the 
entrepreneur’s perspective.
At t =  0, the total expected value of the entrepreneur’s project in the absence of disclosure 
is  6i (l — 6j) {V — Ri) — Iq  — Il for a given contract Ri. Disclosure from Ei to Ej increases 
9j from 6^ to 6^  whenever Ej suffers from an interim knowledge disadvantage and vice
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FIGURE 2.1. The Timeline, 
versa for Ei. The value of the project with disclosure is thus is given by
[et (1 -  et) + {e^ -  (i -  «) (i -  e«) -  r  (i -  p^ ) e"]] { v - R i ) - h -  h
A comparison of these two terms establishes that it is ex ante  optimal for the entrepreneur 
to disclose at t =  1 whenever pj (1 — pi) (l — 9^) > pi{l  — pj )6^  which, in equilibrium 
(pi =  Pj =  p ) , reduces to
If the entrepreneur could commit herself to a disclosure rule at t =  0, she would choose the 
ex ante  optimal disclosure rule. As in Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995), this disclosure rule 
is also the socially efficient one.^ '^^ ^
Disclosure when 9 ^  <  ^ is the ex ante  optim al disclosure rule for any R i, including R i =  0. Thus it is also the 
socially efficient ex ante disclosure rule. Similarly, it is easy to show that it is also the ex po st optim al disclosure rule.
Allowing for asym m etric projects does not change the substance of th is analysis. For exam ple, suppose that the 
setting is amnded such that the probability of interim knowledge discovery following eflFort exertion, 9 ^ ,  is such that 
7  ^9 ^ . Then interim knowledge disclosure is ex ante efficient and socially optim al whenever 9 ^  +  9 ^  <  1.
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By assumption, the entrepreneur cannot commit herself at t =  0 to a disclosure rule at 
t =  1 so that she will prefer disclosure if and only if it is ex post optimal. Since
0H (1  _  (y  (1  -  ( v - R i ) -  h
this is never the case so that ex ante and ex post disclosure incentives conflict whenever 
9^ < ^. This also implies that an entrepreneur would never voluntarily disclose at the 
interim stage so that we can restrict our attention to the investor as the only source of 
knowledge transfers at t =  1 .
In Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995), this conflict is resolved by allowing the entrepreneur 
to choose between multi-lateral and uni-lateral investors at t =  0 , where the latter serves 
as a commitment device to non-disclosure at i =  1 while the former investor will undertake 
disclosure according to the ex ante optimal disclosure rule. An important ingredient in 
their analysis is the assumption that both entrepreneurs are financed by the same two 
investors. As a result, the investors compete over the returns from knowledge disclosure 
during renegotiations and neither investor can use her disclosure threat to extract additional 
surplus.
Our analysis also considers multi-lateral finance in the sense that each investor finances 
a portfolio of two entrepreneurs. However, we assume that each entrepreneur is financed by 
one investor only so that the investor’s threat of disclosure increases his bargaining power.^®
^®What is crucial to our analysis is that the investor gains in bargaining power at the interim stage from having 
access to  interim knowledge. An alternative setting in which this is the case is one in which an entrepreneur has more 
than one investor but in which not all investors have access to interim knowledge. For exam ple, venture capital funds 
generally consist of general and limited partners, where the general partner is intim ately involved in the portfolio 
entrepreneur’s activity while limited partners are passive. Similarly, venture capital syndicates generally designate a 
lead VC who is responsible for the direct interaction with the entrepreneur. See Gompers and Lerner (2000) for more 
detail on the institutional aspects of venture capital finance.
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As a result, the next section argues, the ex post disclosure incentives of both entrepreneur 
and investor are affected and will depart from ex ante optimal disclosure incentives.
2.4 Ex Post Optimal Contracts
At i =  1 , the investor and her portfolio entrepreneurs will renegotiate the initial contract 
R  in response to the need to inject extension finance and whenever asymmetric interim 
knowledge creates disclosure opportunities. We first analyse the renegotiations over exten­
sion finance and then focus on interim knowledge disclosure in the subsequent sections.
At t =  1 , the investor and the entrepreneur engage in bilateral bargaining over extension 
finance. The original contract specifies repayment Ri. According to assumption 1 , exten­
sion finance will create a surplus of (9i — 6^) (1 — 9 j)V  — Ii > 0. The outside option in 
bargaining over extension finance are given by 6  ^{1 — 9j) {V — Ri) and 9  ^{1 — 9j) Ri for Ei 
and investor, respectively. Since the realisation of interim research is observable by all, the 
entrepreneur will appropriate the entire surplus. As a result, the entrepreneur will have a 
payoff of
ai t = 1, while the investor will earn expected gross returns of
2.4 Ex Post Optimal Contracts 31 
Denote by fi the renegotiated contract that is the outcome of bargaining over extensions 
finance at t =  1. It will be such that
= + (2 .1 )
Absent any disclosure considerations, the investor’s expected returns at t =  0 would be
(1  -  Ri
while the entrepreneur would earn an ex ante expected return of
(1 -  e^ ) [v-Ri)  + [e‘i -  «“) (1 -  9^ ) V -  h.
The total expected returns from an ex ante perspective depends on the incidence of dis­
closure at t =  1 so that we delegate their full analysis until after the next section, which 
examines the disclosure decision in more detail.
2.4-1 The Ex Post Optimal Disclosure Decision
The focus of this section is the ex post optimal disclosure rule at t =  1 from the point of view 
of the investor as well as that of the entrepreneur with an interim knowledge advantage. 
Since extension finance is ex post efficient, we assume it to have been committed by the 
original investor in return for a renegotiated contract r.
When both entrepreneurs possess the same level of interim knowledge, disclosure of in­
terim knowledge is ineffective and will not occur. In the remainder of this section, we assume
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that entrepreneur i initially possesses interim knowledge Oi = 6^  while entrepreneur f s  in­
terim research was not successful (6j = 6^).
Successful disclosure by the investor to Ej would raise her interim knowledge to 6j = 
6^  and her expected return from 6^ (l — 6^) (V — fj)  to 6^ (l — 6^) {V — f j ) . Similarly,
the expected return of the investor would change from 9^ (l — 6^) f j  -f 6^  (l — 6^) f{ to
6^  (l — 6^) {fj 4- fi) under disclosure. Let Sj be the expected surplus created within the 
relationship between investor and Ej  through successful disclosure:
Sj := (9^ -  9^) [(1 ~ 9 ^ ) V -  9^fi] . (2.2)
It includes the entire surplus created by disclosure for EjS project but only partially takes 
into account the effect of disclosure on Ei, namely through the contractual exposure of the 
investor to E'iS project, n .
The investor will consider disclosure to j  if and only if Sj > 0. The following lemma 
restates this result.
Lemma 1  Given contract fi, the investor will prefer disclosure a tt  = l if and only if 9^  
is not too large:
0H < e ^ ~  ^
V  + fi
9^  provides a measure of the probability that both entrepreneurs succeed given that 
disclosure has occurred. If 9^  is too high, the loss from simultaneous final research success 
outweighs the gain from sole success by entrepreneur j .  Hence, disclosure will be desirable for 
the investor if and only if its cost, as measured by 9^,  is sufficiently low. Since the investor 
does not take into account the entire adverse impact of disclosure on Ei, 9^ E (5 , 1 ) and
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the investor’s ex post optimal disclosure rule would lead to too much disclosure compared 
to the optimal ex ante rule. This result is in contrast to Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) 
where the investor always follows the ex ante optimal disclosure rule.
Next, consider Ei. Disclosure changes E'-s expected return from 9^  (l — 0^) {V — n) to 
9^ (l — 9^) (V  — f i ) . Denote by Si the expected surplus created by successful disclosure 
for entrepreneur i :
:= -  (9» -  $» {V -  fi) (2.3)
Given limited liability, the following result is immediate.
Lemma 2  Given any contract f*, entrepreneur i always prefers non-disclosure.
Lemma 2 extends the analysis of the entrepreneur’s ex post optimal disclosure rule of 
Section 2.3 to a setting in which contracts are renegotiated at t =  1. The conflict between 
Ei and her investor over optimal ex post disclosure exists whenever 9^ < 9^.
Since property rights are weak, the entrepreneur cannot prevent knowledge transfers with 
certainty. With probability {1-/3)  the investor will successfully disclose interim knowledge 
ai t = 1 iî 9^ < 9^. As a result, the entrepreneur must decide whether to ‘accommodate’ 
this behaviour or renegotiate her contract fi  in order to prevent disclosure. We now examine 
when it is in the entrepreneur’s interest to renegotiate contract f .  To do so, we first derive 
the surplus from bargaining over disclosure.
Suppose first that bargaining over disclosure between Ei and the investor has broken down 
at t =  1. Then interim disclosure will create a surplus of (1 — P) Sj for the investor and Ej  
so that bargaining will occur if and only if Sj > 0. The investor’s return from bargaining
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with the failed entrepreneur is 6^  (l — 6^) n  +  ^  (1  — /3) Sj. Next, we turn to the bargaining 
between Ei and her investor. The investor’s outside option is given by the payoff he can 
obtain with Ej. E[s payoff when disclosure is successful is given by 6^  (l — 9^^ (V — n) 4- 
(1 — /3) Si. If bargaining between the investor and Ei is successful, it creates a joint return 
of (l — 9^) V. Subtracting the sum of the outside options, the surplus from renegotiating 
over disclosure is given by
~  Ô ~ 3^^) +  9ffi] (2.4)
so that the entrepreneur will prefer disclosure prevention whenever Si + ^ Sj < 0. This result 
is restated in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Entrepreneur i will prefer to renegotiate in order to prevent disclosure whenever 
9 is sufficiently high:
eH > gp -
3 V - f i
The intuition for this condition is similar to that of Lemma 1. When 9^  is sufficiently high, 
disclosure is too likely to result in joint final research success, rendering disclosure prevention 
ex post optimal for the entrepreneur with interim knowledge advantage. However, since the 
investor does not appropriate the total surplus from disclosure to f s  project, the surplus 
that Ei and the investor bargain over does not take into account the full cost of preventing 
disclosure. As a result, the entrepreneur’s ex post optimal disclosure rule will lead to too 
much disclosure prevention relative to the ex ante optimal disclosure rule: 9^ E. (O, ^).
The following proposition summarises the preceding discussion.
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Proposition 1 Limited liability and assumption 2 imply that there exist two thresholds 6^ 
and 9^, with 0 < 6^ < ^ < 9^ < 1, such that 
(i) if 9^  6  [0 , 0 '^), it is ex post optimal for the investor to disclose and the entrepreneur 
will accommodate such disclosure;
(a) if 9^  G [9^,9^] , it is ex post optimal for the investor to disclose, while it is ex post 
optimal for the entrepreneur to prevent disclosure through contract renegotiations; and 
{in) if 9^ G (^'^,1], it is not ex post optimal for both the investor and the entrepreneur 
to not disclose at t = 1 .
This proposition establishes that the need to seek outside finance affects the disclosure 
discussed in section 2.3. In particular, outside finance implies that the investor inefficiently 
prefers disclosure when 9 > ^ while the entrepreneur’s reduced residual claim implies that 
her aversion to disclosure is tempered so that she would accommodate disclosure if 9^  is 
sufficiently low. The next sections examine whether disclosure in fact occurs in a particular 
region described in proposition 1 and how effort incentives are affected.
2.4-^ Accommodation of Disclosure
First, suppose that 9^  G [0,9^) so that the entrepreneur will not attempt to renegotiate 
contracts with the aim of preventing disclosure as it is sufficiently unlikely to result in joint 
final research success.
The impact of disclosure on expected returns at t =  0 can be decomposed into two 
components: the impact on expected returns in case of no extension finance and the impact 
on the expected incremental surplus created by extension finance.
2.4 Ex Post Optimal Contracts 36
First, when Ei does not receive extension finance, her expected return at t =  0 is given
by
(1 -  e? -  (1 -  ;8) (1 -  pj)pi (e« -  e^)) [V -  Ri)
which is unambiguously lower when disclosure is accommodated with probability 1 .
Second, the expected surplus created by extension finance is now given by
[{n -  e°) (1 -  ef) + (1 -  /3) (9" -  0 )^ [pj (1 -  Pi) { ! - $ » ) - Pi ( i - p j )  -a»)]] v - h .
The impact of disclosure on this surplus is a priori ambiguous.
Bargaining over extension finance will leave the entrepreneur with the entire surplus from 
extension finance so that total E-s total expected returns at t =  0 are given by
[0t (1 -  0]) +  (1 -  «  ( « "  -  0^ )  [pi (1 -  Pi) (1 -  e " )  -  P i (1 -  Pj) 0” ]] V  (2 .5 )
—0  ^(l ~  0j ~ (1 — ^) (1 ~ P j ) P i  {0^ — 0^)) Ri — Il
The resulting incentive compatibility constraint is
p [9^ -  6^ )  [(l -  6j)  -  (1 -  /3) {pj (l -  9^)  + (1 -  Pj) 9^)] V  (2.6)
+ 0 P ( 1 - 0 ) ( 1 - P j ) p  (0» - 0 ^ ) R i >  c.
Finally, the investor’s ex ante participation constraint is given by
9  ^(l — 9j — (1 — P) (1 — Pj)pi (9^ — 9^)) Ri > Iq. (2.7)
The equilibrium contract is characterised in the following lemma.
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Proposition 2 Suppose that 6^  G [0,0^). In equilibrium, disclosure will occur with proba­
bility (1  -  S) the initial contract specifies repayment Ri =  go ^ ^ ) ) '
The entrepreneur will receive financing a tt = O if
v [ i ~ e ‘ - { i - 0 ) { p ( i - e " )  + { i - p ) e ‘‘)]
{ i - 0 ) { i - p ) e P  ^  ^
+ :— z:— z— ----- ;—ttü— rrr-^o >
1 -  r  -  (1  -  ^) (1  -  p) p {e« - e ^ )  p '
Proof: In equilibrium, pi =  pj =  p. The investor’s participation constraint will hold 
with equality, determining the initial contract. The financing constraint is obtained by 
substituting for the equilibrium contract in the incentive compatibility constraint. ■
When disclosure is ex post optimal for the investor and 6^  is sufficiently low, the en­
trepreneur will accommodate disclosure. As a result, over this region the ex ante optimal 
disclosure rule is implemented. However, interim disclosure may lower effort incentives as it 
reduces the reward to high effort and increases the return to low effort.
Stronger property rights unambiguously lower expected returns for a given initial contract, 
that is, (2.5) is decreasing in fi since 6^ < \ .  This is because stronger property rights prevent 
ex ante optimal (and socially efficient) interim disclosure. The effect of stronger property 
rights on the incentive compatibility constraint is more complex. On the one hand, stronger 
property rights reduce the probability with which a knowledge advantage is dissipated and 
thus strengthens effort incentives. On the other hand, stronger property rights increase the 
probability that the repayment Ri must be made. The overall effect is ambiguous.Finally, 
stronger property rights reduce the repayment Ri agreed upon in the initial contract.
^^This am biguity remains if we relax the assum ption that the investor does not possess bargaining power over 
extension finance at the interim stage. If anything, according more bargaining power to the investor renders it more 
likely that stronger property rights reduce effort incentives.
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In our setting, it is not easy to evaluate the relative impact of these effects.^® However, 
we can establish the following result.
Proposition 3 When
6  ^ ( 1  — p) I q — (1 — 9^) (p (l — 6^) {1 — p) 6^ + p ( l — p) (9^ — 0^)) V
{p (l -  9^) +  (1  -  p) 9^) p (1  -  p) {9^ -  9^)
stronger property rights will increase the financing threshold in proposition 2. In this case, 
stronger property rights unambiguously reduce expected surplus.
Proof: Differentiate the financing threshold in proposition 2 with respect to /?. The 
condition in Proposition 3 determines when this derivative is negative. ■
Proposition 3 establishes a sufficient condition such that stronger property rights reduce 
expected surplus whenever 9^ < 9^. This condition is more likely to hold when property 
rights are weak, when the initial financing cost Iq is large compared to final returns V  and 
when p, the impact of effort on the likelihood of interim knowledge discovery, is small. For 
example, as p approaches 0 , the numerator will be positive l îV  {l — 9^^ 9 ^V  < 9^Iq, i.e. 
when 9^  is close to 9  ^ and V  is close to Iq, while the denominator approaches 0. In this case 
stronger property rights will unambiguously reduce expected returns of the entrepreneur 
because they reduce ex ante optimal disclosure and increase the financing threshold.
^®Such an evaluation would be possible, for exam ple, in an extension of our setting in which the parameter p, i.e. 
the ‘productivity param eter’ of effort in terms of likelihood of obtaining high interim knowledge, is drawn from a c.d .f 
G (p) prior to t =  0. Such a setting would preserve the moral hazard problem while allowing us to precisely specify 
the expected ex ante  impact of stronger property rights on the incentive com patibiliy constraint.
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2.4’3 Prevention of Disclosure
This section concentrates on the case in which 6^ E [6^, 6^^ so that the investor finds it ex 
post optimal to transfer interim knowledge across rivals. The entrepreneur with an interim 
knowledge advantage, by contrast, will prefer to renegotiate the extension finance contract 
, fj in order to prevent disclosure.
Let repayment rj be the outcome of bargaining between Ei and the investor over disclo­
sure. We begin by deriving the condition that ensures that rj is ex post incentive compatible 
for the investor, that is, that rj renders disclosure to Ej  suboptimal for the investor once 
bargaining between the investor and entrepreneur i has concluded. This will be the case if 
the incremental surplus from ex post disclosure is negative, i.e. if
> (1  -  e") V. (2.8)
We refer to this condition as the ex post incentive compatibility constraint. Any (renego­
tiated) contract that is intended to prevent disclosure at t = 1 must fulfill this condition. 
Recall that the contract that results from bargaining over extension finance is given by
9i
when Ei has an interim knowledge. Note that by substituting fj into the definition of 9^ 
in Lemma 1, it follows that 9^fi  < (l — 9^) V  when 9 < 9^ so that the contract resulting 
from bargaining over extension finance is never sufficient to prevent ex post disclosure. The 
following result can then be established.
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Lemma 4 Suppose that 9^ < ^. Then disclosure prevention through renegotiation a tt — l 
is not ex post compatible. The entrepreneur must accommodate disclosure and the optimal 
contract is that described in Proposition 2.
Suppose that ^ < 9^ < 9^. Then the investor will always prefer to disclose and the 
entrepreneur will renegotiate contract fi to prevent disclosure.
Proof: Suppose that 9^ < ^ and suppose that r* =  V. Then condition (2.8) does not 
hold. By contrast, when 9^ > ^ and n  =  V, condition (2.8) holds. As a result, it is feasible 
to write an ex post incentive compatible contract if and only if 9^ > ^. ■
When 9^ < ^, even pledging the entire project’s revenue is not sufficient to render the 
renegotiated contract ex post incentive compatible as disclosure is socially efficient. As a 
result, regardless of the contract ri agreed upon during bargaining over disclosure, the 
investor will disclose to Ej once bargaining has concluded. By contrast, when 9^ > 9 > 
the investor will disclose unless he is offered an ex post incentive compatible contract at 
t = 1 that prevents disclosure. We now concentrate on this case.
Recall that bargaining between entrepreneur i and her investor over disclosure at t =  1 
creates a surplus of — (1  — /3) [5i +  ^Sj] > 0 in this region. Successful bargaining between 
the investor and i will thus result in an expected return to the investor of 9^ (l — 9^^ fi + 
9^ (l — 9^) f j  +  — 5i] of which the investor will receive 9^ (l — 9^) f j  from Ej.
Thus, the disclosure-prevention contract must be designed such that
(2.9)
where ^  -  9^) [(l +  »") V  -  .
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The ex post incentive compatibility constraint and constraint (2.9) place differing de­
mands on the disclosure prevention contract r .^ Note, however, that the ex post incentive 
compatibility constraint (2.8) is independent of /3 since it merely weighs off gains against 
losses conditional on disclosure having been successful. Constraint (2.9), by contrast, is de­
creasing in 13 since minimum surplus appropriated by the investor depends on the severity 
of the threat to disclose, i.e. the probability that disclosure will be successful. This trade-off 
yields the following result.
Lemma 5 I f property rights are sufficiently strong, that is if
1 - 0 L  \  /  (1  _  ^^) y  _  \
P > p : = l - A
qH _  qLJ  I (1  +  61^ ) y  _  J  ‘
then the ex post incentive compatibility constraint is binding and the renegotiated contract 
is given by Otherwise inequality (2.9) is binding and the renegotiated contract
is given byri = fi + ^  { ^ T ^ )  - S r i  .
Proof: The threshold is obtained by comparing inequalities (2.8) and (2.9). The resulting 
optimal contracts result from the relevant investor participation constraints holding with 
equality. ■
We now investigate the ex post optimal contract and its effect on incentives for both of 
these cases.
P roperty  rights are relatively strong: P > ^ .
In this scenario, E^s expected return from bargaining at t = 1 will be 9i (1 — 6j) {V — n). 
At t — 0, the expected return from bargaining at t =  0  is thus 6^  (l — 6j) V — Ii —
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, where the last term represents the expected surplus ex­
tracted through the threat of disclosure. At t =  0 , the entrepreneur’s total expected returns
are
6  ^ (l -  6j) {V -  Ri)-\- (6f -  6^) (l - 6 f j V  - 1 \ -  pi (1 -  pj) (l -  6^) V  -  YITqL
The resulting incentive compatibility constraint is given by
p {9^ -  9^) { l - 9 j ) V  - p { l -  Pj) (l -  9^) V  - > c
while the investor’s participation constraint is given by
9^
reflecting the additional surplus extracted through the threat of disclosure. The equilibrium 
contract is characterised in the following lemma.
Proposition 4 Suppose that P > (3 and that 9^ € {^^9^]. Then, in equilibrium, disclosure
will not occur and the optimal initial contract is given by Ri = 
The entrepreneur will receive financing at t = 0 if
/o-p(i-p)
V  [p (ff" -  0^) (1 -  0‘) - p ( i - p ) ( i -  0B)] + > C.
Proof: Follows that of Proposition 2.
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The investor’s threat to disclose allows him to expropriate some of the entrepreneur’s 
surplus. The potency of this threat is not related to the strength of property rights which 
has two implications. First, the entrepreneur does not benefit from stronger property rights 
when P > p. Second, weakening perfect property rights (P = 1 ) by only a small amount will 
impose a discontinuous penalty in terms of expected surplus on the entrepreneur. This effect 
arises out of the need to remove disclosure incentives for the investor after the contract has 
been renegotiated (constraint (2 .8 ) must hold) so that, even P approaches 1 , the investor 
must be left with additional surplus that is bounded away from 0 .^ ®
Property rights are relatively weak; P  < p .
When the entrepreneur does not have an interim knowledge advantage, her expected re­
turn from bargaining at t =  1 is given by Oi (1 — Oj) {V — fi) = Oi{l — Oj) V —0^  (1  — Oj) Ri ­
ll  since When the Ei does have an interim knowledge advantage, how­
ever, her expected return from bargaining at t =  1 is given by
OH (1 _ (y _ n) =  0 ^ ( 1 -  0^) V - 0 ^  { l - 0 ^ ) R i - h
l - p {0^ -  0^) ( i + e ' ^ ) y - 3  + h
(1  -
since n  = fi + ^  and fi = ^ R i  + eUi-Oj)' ^  ^ result, the
entrepreneur’s expected returns at t =  0  are given by
(1 -  ( v - R i )  +  (ef -  9") (1 -  e‘) v - h
-  Pi (1  -  Pj) -  6^) (i +  e ^ ) y - 3 - 3 1 +
( i - «  )
^®This also im plies that this effect is independent of the binary structure of our m odel and would survive if effort 
choice and interim knowledge were m odelled as continuous variables.
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yielding an incentive compatibility constraint of
p -  e^) (1 -  ef) V
(l + 0 " ) V - 3 l  û°Ri + h
(1  -  e^)
>  C.
The investor’s participation constraint is given by
(1  -  0^) (1  +  0 ^) y  -  3 e^Ri +
(1  -  e^) >Io
which allows us to obtain the following result.
Proposition 5 Suppose that P  < P,  6 ^  E. (^,0^], Then, in equilibrium, interim disclosure
■11 J. 1- i • I, r»will not occur and the optimal initial contract is given byRi =  g o —
The entrepreneur will receive financing at t = 0 if
v l ( i - r ) - ( i - p ) i ^ ( i  +  e")  >
'  - h i - p ) H - 0 ) ( i +  l P i i - P ) ( i - 0 ) ( e ‘^ - e ^ )
p {e^ -  e^) 4
h
[(1  -  e^) + | p  (1  -  p) (1 -  p) (e^ -  0^)] j U i -  e^) + /o
Proof: Follows that of Proposition 2.
Again, weak property rights allow the investor to threaten disclosure at t =  1 and ex­
propriate surplus. As a result, effort incentives are weakened. In contrast to proposition 4, 
the strength of property rights reduces effort incentives. Weaker property rights result in 
a stronger adverse impact on effort incentives and, as a result, fewer projects will receive 
financing at i =  0 .
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2.4-4 Non-disclosure
Finally, we turn to the region 6^  € 1] for which it is not ex post optimal for either
investor or entrepreneur to disclose at t =  1. In this case, the entrepreneur’s expected 
returns at t =  0  are given by
(1  -  { V - R i )  + {et -  e )^ ( i  -  e^ ) v - h
yielding an incentive compatibility constraint of pi {d^ — 6^) (l — 0^ ) V >c.  The investor’s 
participation constraint is given hy 9  ^ — 9^  ^Ri > Iq which allows us to obtain the fol­
lowing result.
Proposition 6 When 9 >  9 ^ ,  then disclosure will not occur in equilibrium. The initial 
contract specifies a repayment Ri = and entrepreneurs will receive finance at t =  0
When the probabihty of final research success is very high, disclosure is so damaging 
that the investor will not undertake it. As a result, disclosure does not occur and there is 
no departure from ex ante efficiency. The strength of property rights is irrelevant over this 
region.
2.4’5 Discussion
This section has analysed the ex post incentives of the entrepreneur and her investor to 
engage in interim knowledge disclosure and has characterised the ex post optimal contracts 
that result from their bargaining over disclosure. We have argued that renegotiations over 
interim disclosure lead to the ex ante optimal disclosure rule: in equilibrium, the investor will
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disclose if and only li 6^ < ^ . Weak property rights ensure that this disclosure is successful 
with probability (1  — /?) only. As a result, weak property rights have an ambiguous effect on 
overall surplus when 6^ < ^ . On the one hand, weak property rights ensure that disclosure 
does occur with some probability although it is ex post suboptimal for the entrepreneur. In 
this respect, weaker property rights increase ex ante surplus. On the other hand, weaker 
property rights tend to reduce entrepreneurial effort incentives exactly because of disclosure. 
As a result, ex ante efficiency may be reduced. Proposition 3 argues that weaker property 
rights may well increase expected surplus when the impact of effort is small and start-up 
costs are high relative to possible returns.^^
A second result of this section is that weak property rights may impose costs even though 
disclosure does not occur in equilibrium. When 6^ > 9^ > ^, the entrepreneur will find it ex 
post optimal to prevent disclosure through renegotiation. As a result, the threat of disclosure 
allows the investor to extract additional surplus, thus reducing ex ante effort incentives and 
hence ex ante efficiency. We find that weak property rights have a non-continuous impact on 
this cost: when /3 is relatively low, strengthening property rights imposes an adverse effect 
on effort incentives. By contrast, when P is high (but not equal to one) the cost in terms of 
effort incentives is not affected by the strengths of property rights. In this sense, introducing 
a small amount of weakness in property rights may lead to a discontinuous impact on ex 
ante efficiency. In this context, the result of Proposition 3 also implies that the impact of
Allowing for asymmetric projects would not affect the main results of this analysis but would allow for a more 
differentiated analysis that is not the focus of the current chapter.
Suppose, for exam ple, that the two projects differ in their productivity of high interim knowledge, e.g. that 6 f  7  ^6 ^ .  
Then the investor would prefer to disclose more often from the less productive entrepreneur to the more productive 
entrepreneur and vice-versa. Further, the more productive entrepreneur would have lower incentives to prevent knowl­
edge disclosure since disclosure lowers his expected surplus by (relatively) less. On the other hand, this entrepreneur 
would also be able to prevent disclosure over a greater range of parameters since the expected surplus to be bargained 
over during disclosure renegotiations would be greater. The behaviour of a less productive entrepreneur would be 
affected in the opposite manner.
More asymmetric projects would also tend to render strong property rights less efficient since they would allow the 
less productive entrepreneur to prevent socially efficient disclosure more often.
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IPR strength on expected returns may be non-monotonic in project’s riskiness as measured
2.5 Extensions
In this section, we present two simple extensions to the model presented above. In the first 
extension, we allow the entrepreneur to choose between two different types of investors, one 
which can commit not to disclose at t =  1 and one which cannot (as in the previous section). 
This choice can be interpreted as one between disclosure prevention through institutional 
choice and through contractual means. In the second extension, we investigate the impact 
of weak property rights on the optimal size of the investor’s portfolio. A larger portfolio of 
entrepreneurs allows the investor to extract more surplus at t =  1 as the threat of disclosure 
is more potent but imposes a cost in terms of effort provision.
In both extensions, we focus on the case in which 6^  G (5 ,^^] so that disclosure is 
not ex ante optimal and will not occur in equilibrium.^^ The investor’s threat to disclose 
nevertheless allows him to extract surplus and the main aim of this section will be to 
investigate the impact of this threat on the choices outlined above.
To simplify notation, we will denote by D the amount of surplus extracted by the investor 
at t =  1 from an entrepreneur with interim knowledge advantage:
^  (2 .10)
otherwise
^^The analysis for the case in which 0 ^  <  ^ is conceptually similar, except that the trade-offs considered in this 
section would be uniformly resolved in favour of the option that allows disclosure as it is ex ante  efficient.
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2.5.1 Different Investor Relationships
In this extension, we allow the entrepreneur to choose the type of financing relationship 
she has with their investor, A financing relationship is characterised by whether or not the 
investor also possesses any interim knowledge produced by the entrepreneur and by the 
productive advice that is provided by the investor during final research.
To keep the analysis as succinct as possible we impose three assumptions. First, we allow 
the entrepreneur to choose between only two types of investors at t =  0 , a ‘close’ and a 
‘distant’ investor. The close investor is that of the preceding analysis, i.e. an investor who 
is intimately involved in the running of the business and is consequently exposed to any 
research output. In our parlance, the investor acquires any interim research produced. As 
a result, the close investor can threaten to disclose interim knowledge and we assume, as 
before, that he cannot commit at t =  0 not to disclose. The distant investor., by contrast, 
is not intimately involved in entrepreneur’s business. The advantage of this distance is that 
he does not acquire any interim knowledge and cannot threaten to disclose.
The second simplification arises insofar as we do not explicitly model the investor’s deci­
sion to provide advice to the entrepreneur after interim knowledge has been created.^^ With 
a distant investor, interim knowledge Oi will result in final research success with probability 
7^1 where 7  G (0 , 1 ), whereas with a close investor, final success will be obtained with prob­
ability Oi. In this sense, (1 — 7 ) captures the advantage that access to interim knowledge
M odelling this choice explicitly is straightforward but lengthy, and would not add qualitatively to our result as 
long as close involvem ent with an investor (i) enables him to observe the daily operation of a project and, as a result, 
{a )  allows him to give more focussed and specific advice that increases the project’s prospects. See C asam atta (2003), 
Inderst and Mueller (2004) and Repullo and Suarez (2004) for theoretical analyses of this dimension in the context of 
venture capital finance, as well as Gompers and Lerner (2000) and Hellmann and Puri (2002) for empirical support.
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bestows on the close investor’s ability to advise. Note that probability of final success when 
extension finance is not obtained remains at 6  ^ regardless of the financing relationship.^^
Finally, both entrepreneurs in the industry are financed by the same investor who is 
chosen by entrepreneur
The resulting trade-off faced by entrepreneur i in choosing a close investor is one between 
higher productivity of interim knowledge and the adverse effect of the investor’s threat of 
disclosure on incentives. To make this trade-off as explicit as possible, we depart from the 
setting introduced in section 4.2 by assuming that if the entrepreneur does not exert effort, 
the probability of obtaining high interim knowledge 6^  is remains positive, i.e. pi = q, 
where 0 < q < p, when entrepreneurial effort is zero. Furthermore, to abstract from issues 
of inefficient investment, we amend assumption 2 .
A ssum ption 2 ': The net present value of the entrepreneur’s project at t = 0 is positive 
given low effort and given distant financing: 7  [6^ + q (6^ — 6^)) [l — ^  [9  ^+ q (9^ — 9^)]) V  > 
Iq Ii-
Finally, we impose the following assumption.
Assum ption 3: The expected probability of interim and final research success is suffi­
ciently small: p < ^ and 9^ +p (9^ — 9^) <
This assumption is intuitive as it ensures that increasing effort from p to q also increases 
a project’s expected returns.
^^This assumption is for sim plicity and implies that the closeness of the entrepreneur-investor relationship does not 
m atter if interim knowledge is not used in the production of final research. Relaxing this assumption would not change 
our main results.
^■*This assumption may seem intuitive in a setting in which the entrepreneurs search for investors sequentially and 
in which an existing financing relationship in an industry confers a strong first-mover advantages on an investor.
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The optimal contract with the close investor was characterised in the Propositions 4 and 
5. In the amended setting of this section, the entrepreneur earns expected returns of
(1  -  e<j) { n v  -  (pRi) _  / i  -  Pi (1  -  pj) D,
where D is given by (3.22), and will exert high effort if
q ) ( e ^ - n
while the investor offers an initial contract of Ri = D. We now describe
the optimal contract for a distant investor. The expected return at t =  0 of the entrepreneur 
is given by
The entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility constraint is 7  (l — j6j) V > • The
distant investor’s participation constraint is given by 6  ^ (l — -yOj) R i >  Iq so that the equi­
librium initial contract specifies repayment Ri =
Consider first the case in which both types of investors induce the same level of effort. 
Upon substitution of the optimal contract, the entrepreneur always prefers the close investor 
in this case. At t =  0, the optimal contract is designed such that the expected repayments 
are the same under either financing relationship. The close investor is better placed to offer 
advice and Assumption 3 ensures that this translates into a higher expected surplus to 
the entrepreneur at t =  0. Next, if a close financing relationship resulted in superior effort 
incentives to the entrepreneur, an entrepreneur would find the close investor an even more 
profitable proposition at t =  0 .
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As a result, we focus on the case in which a distant financing relationship induces more 
effort than a close one. This case will arise when the close investor’s threat of disclosure is 
particularly potent;
1 - g
(2 .11)
This case will exist if 7  is sufficiently large:
7 > 1 _  ( 1  _ 4 [ e ^ + p { 9 ^ - e^)] [1  -  [e^+p{0‘^ - e^)] -
(2.12)
Suppose that conditions (2.11) and (2.12) hold. Then we can establish the following result.
Proposition 7 Suppose close investors induce low effort and distant investors induce high 
effort. Then the éntrepreneur will choose the close investor if and only if
1 -  I 1 -  4 b  (1  -  g)] V, )  _
where D is defined by (3.22).
Proof: The condition follows from comparing the entrepreneur’s expected payoff from a 
distant and close investor and solving the resulting quadratic equation in 7  for 7  for the 
upper and lower boundary on 7 . Note that, by assumption 3, the upper boundary is larger 
than 1 . Since 7  < 1 , it can be safely omitted. ■
The result in Proposition 7 is intuitive. The higher the productivity of interim knowledge 
under the distant investor, or, conversely, the less important the advice provided by the
2.5 Extensions 52
close investor, the more likely it is that the distant investor is chosen and the larger the 
interval of cost parameters over which this will be the case. Similarly, the more important 
effort is in interim research (high p and low g), the more often the entrepreneur will choose 
the distant investor. Finally, the more surplus can be extracted by the close investor from 
the entrepreneur if she has an interim knowledge advantage (if ^  is high), the more often 
the entrepreneur will choose the distant investor. This also implies that as long as (3 < P, 
an increase in the strength of property rights will lead the entrepreneur to choose close 
investors more often. This conclusion is consistent with the well-documented increase of 
venture capital financing in the U.S. after patenting laws were strengthened in the early 
1990s (e.g. Kortum and Lerner (1998)) as well as the importance of legal origins on financing 
arrangements (e.g. Lerner and Schoar (forthcoming)).
2.5.2 The Size of the Investor's Portfolio
In this section, we allow the investor to decide whether to finance a small portfolio (one 
entrepreneur) or a large portfolio (two entrepreneurs) at t =  0 .^  ^ A larger portfolio allows 
the investor to extract more surplus at the interim stage because he can threaten to disclose 
information across entrepreneurs. The disadvantage of a larger portfolio is that the threat 
of disclosure renders the incentivisation of the entrepreneur more difficult. This trade-off 
will determine the optimal size of the portfolio.
To investigate this trade-off, we return to the model as described in Section 4.2, with 
the exception that ex ante competition between investors no longer ensures that they earn 
zero expected profits at t =  0. Rather, we assume that there are not more investors than
^®The subsequent analysis can be extended to a setting with more than two entrepreneurs which requires a more 
complex bargaining model. As long as the bargaining structure is such that a larger portfolio of entrepreneurs allows 
the investor to extract more surplus by threatening disclosure, the qualitative im plications o f our analysis are not 
affected by relaxing this assumption.
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entrepreneurs and that the investor appropriates a share ji of the entrepreneur’s expected 
surplus at t = 0.^ ® Furthermore, we assume that if bargaining with the original investor over 
extension finance at t =  1 breaks down the entrepreneur cannot receive outside financing.^^ 
As a result, the entrepreneur and the investor receive an equal share of the surplus created 
through extension finance when bargaining at t =  1 .
Consider first the case in which the investor finances a single entrepreneur. With the 
amended bargaining structure, the equilibrium outcomes are described in the following 
lemma.
Lemma 6  When the bargaining structure is changed as described above and the investor 
finances a single entrepreneur, the expected returns a t t  = 0 are given by
Investor : y. (l - e f ) V -  /»] +  [(9‘ -  g°) (l - 8 ) ) V -  /i] (2.13)
2
Entrepreneur : (1 -  //) [9“ (l ~ e ^ ) V -  /q] +  [(^  -  8°) (l - 8 I ) V -  /i](2.14)
As a result, the entrepreneur will exert effort in equilibrium if
{8^ - 8 ^ )  ( I - 8 ‘) V > c .  (2.15)
Proof: Bargaining over extension finance at t =  1 creates a surplus {fii — 9^) (1 — 6j) V  — 
I\ which is shared equally between entrepreneur and investor. As a result, the surplus that
^®This specification can be seen as a reduced-form model of a more com plicated setting in which the demand and 
supply for investm ent funds determ ines the investors’ and entrepreneurs’ relative bargaining power, such as Inderst 
and Mueller (2004).
^^This assum ption is consistent w ith the observation that, in equilibrium, the original investors also provide extension  
finance. As a result, when there are not more investors than entrepreneurs, all available funds are com m itted in 
equilibrium. A breakdown of bargaining will then result in the entrepreneur not receiving extension finance. Our 
results are not affected if this assum ption is dropped.
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is shared according to bargaining weights fj, and (1  — //) is given by 6^  {l — — /q +
 ^ [(^ * — 0^) (l — 6j ) V  — /i] , i.e. the total surplus minus the share that will be expropri­
ated at t =  1 by the investor. Expressions (2.13) and (2.14) follow, while the incentive 
compatibility constraint is obtained from (2.14). ■
Consider now the case in which the investor finances two entrepreneurs. In the absence 
of disclosure considerations (e.g. if 0^ > 6^), payoffs remain the same as above and the 
choice between the two portfolio sizes is indeterminate. When 9^ < 9^, payoffs are those 
given in the following lemma.
Lemma 7 Suppose that 9^ > 9^ > ^ and that the investor finances two entrepreneurs. 
Then expected returns a tt  = Q are
Investor: (l -  V + [{fl‘ -  9") (l -  SJ) V -  /,] +  (1  -  /j) (1  -  pj) D + h  + Io
Entrepreneur: (1 -  p.) (l -  S f ) V  + {1 -  p) i  [(#' -  (l - 6 f j V  -  /j] - p i ( l - p j ) D
where D is given by (3.22). ^45 a result, the entrepreneur will exert effort in equilibrium if
> c. (2.16)
Proof: The proof follows along similar lines as that of the preceding lemma. The only 
significant departure stems from the fact that at t = 1 , the investor has expected returns 
\  [(^ * — (l — ^j) y  — h] + Pi (1 — Pj) D. As a result, the surplus bargained over at t = 
0 is given by 9  ^{ l -  9 f j V  + \  [(#* -  0°) (l - 9 f j V  -  7i] — p i { l — pf) D, which is shared
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according to bargaining powers (j, and (1 — /x). The incentive constraint follows from the 
entrepreneur’s expected return. ■
When comparing the expected returns for a given entrepreneurial effort, it is obvious that 
the investor will prefer the larger portfolio as it allows him to appropriate additional surplus 
of (1  — —p)D.  Consider instead the situation in which (2.15) but not (2.16) holds,
i.e. when the threat of disclosure lowers the effort exerted in a larger portfolio. Then the 
investor with a large portfolio would have to leave additional surplus to the entrepreneur to 
incentivise her, thus reducing her expected returns. The following proposition analyses the 
effect of this trade-off on ex ante returns and characterises the equilibrium choice of fund 
size.
Proposition 8 Suppose that (2.15) but not (2.16) holds. Then, in equilibrium, the investor 
will choose to the large investment portfolio (two entrepreneurs) whenever
£ L : £ < _ L z £ - I _____________ E___________  (217)
p r  ~ 2 { l - p ) D  p { e ^ - 0 ^ ) { l - p ) { l - p ) D   ^ ' ’
where the right-hand side of this inequality is positive.
Proof; It is useful to write the entrepreneur’s expected return at t =  1 as
( l  — ( y  — Ri)  =  (1 “  / )^ ( l  — ^j) V + (1  — f )^ 2 ~ ^ j ) ^  ~  ~ P i i ^ ~  Pj)  ^
where Ri represents the payment to the investor in case of sole final research success and 
6f (l — 9j) Ri the share of expected surplus appropriated by the investor. The incentive 
compatibility constraint can then be written as p (6^ — 9^) (l — 9j) (V — Ri) < c. Denote
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by (j) the surplus that would have to be left to the entrepreneur in case of success in order 
to induce effort
p{e^  - e ^ )  {I - e^)(j) = c -  {1 - p ) p { e ^ - Ç - ^ v - { i - p) d ^ .
Then, in equihbrium, the investor will prefer a large portfolio to a small portfolio if 6^  (1 — 6^ )(j) < 
{1 — p)p{l  — p) D which can be rearranged into condition (2.17). Note that the right hand 
side of (2.17) is positive as long as (2.15) holds. ■
Inspection of condition (2.17) reveals the following comparative statics results. First, if 
effort is important relative to interim knowledge in producing final research success (p > 0 ®), 
then the investor will always choose a large portfolio. This result is intuitive since p is a 
measure of the likelihood that the investor can threaten Ei with disclosure while 6^  is a 
measure of the probability with which he will have to leave additional surplus to incentivise 
Ei. When p < 6 ,^ the investor is more likely to choose the large portfolio the lower the cost of 
effort c and the higher the incremental return to effort of a entrepreneur in a small portfolio. 
When amount of surplus expropriated through disclosure D is smaller, e.g. because property 
rights are relatively strong, the investor is more likely to choose a large portfolio since the 
surplus to be given up to incentivise the entrepreneur is small. Finally, the lower the ex ante 
bargaining power of the investor, the more likely it is that he will finance a large portfolio.
Our analysis implies that venture capitalist portfolios will be larger in times in which 
there is a strong demand for entrepreneurial skills rather than investment funds and when 
property rights are strong.
2.6 Conclusion 57
2.6 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to analyse the impact of weak property rights on the financing 
arrangements of entrepreneurs with their investors when investors finance a portfolios of 
projects. Our main conclusions are that, firstly, the entrepreneur will attempt to substitute 
for weak property rights by designing a contract that prevents knowledge disclosure and 
that this contract induces the efficient disclosure rule by the investor.
Secondly, we find that stronger property rights reduce the threat of expropriation by the 
investor and increase effort incentives. As a result, the impact of the strength of property 
rights on expected surplus may be non-monotonic, depending on whether disclosure is ex 
ante optimal or not. We provide conditions under which stronger property rights reduce 
expected surplus when the project is very risky but increase expected surplus otherwise. 
Furthermore, our analysis shows that a small departure from perfectly strong property 
rights may impose a discontinuous loss in expected surplus.
Finally, we relate the strength of the investor’s disclosure threat to several organisational 
choices. We find that the entrepreneur is more likely to choose a distant investor when 
property rights are weak and that the investor is more likely to fund a larger portfolio of 
entrepreneurs when property rights are strong.
The Benefits of Shallow Pockets
3.1 Introduction
Venture capital finance frequently taJces place in an environment in which informational 
problems are severe. Not only is it difficult for venture capitalists to assess the quality and 
potential of business plans submitted to them for funding, but once initial funding has taken 
place, entrepreneurs must be given adequate incentives and must be monitored (see, for 
instance, Gompers and Lerner (2000)). Much of the recent theoretical literature on venture 
capital finance has considered these issues as central to the provision and characteristics of 
venture capital funding. Contributions by Gompers (1995), Hellmann (1998) and Schmidt 
(2003) as well as Repullo and Suarez (1999), Inderst and Mueller (2004) and Casamatta 
(2003), for example, have concentrated on contractual means to mitigate agency problems.^ 
This chapter departs from the existing literature by considering non-contractual instru­
ments to control agency problems, namely the initial size of the investor’s funds. Limiting 
the funds available to the investor creates competition between her portfolio entrepreneurs
’ For an empirical analysis of venture capital contracts see Sahlman (1990) as well as Kaplan and Stromberg (2003).
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for cheap ‘informed’ (or ‘inside’) money at the refinancing stage. Although competition 
among entrepreneurs increases the investor’s bargaining power during renegotiations, we 
find that competition may nevertheless enhance entrepreneurial effort incentives and allow 
the sorting of entrepreneurs according to their type. This, our main insight, arises from the 
fact that competition created by limited funds increases the responsiveness of the entrepre­
neur’s payoff to the profits generated by his project.
We derive conditions under which such an increase in responsiveness can be achieved 
through the non-contractual means of limited funds. When this is the case, the benefit of 
improved incentives may outweigh the costs of inefficient refinancing by the initial investor, 
e.g. the increased cost of refinancing through uninformed outside investors or the failure of 
receiving funding for the second stage at all. We find that raising limited funds is an optimal 
strategy when the following two conditions hold: first, the probabihty that a given project 
fails at the interim stage is relatively high; second, the incremental returns from improving 
the project are relatively small compared to the absolute value of financial rewards if the 
project is a success. Intuitively, if the probability of failure is high this reduces the expected 
allocational inefficiency implied by limited funds. Similarly, when the incremental project 
payoff from an improvement is small compared to the overall payoff of a successful project, 
standard incentive contracts are relative weak in providing incentives. In this situation, 
creating competition through limited funds may provide more powerful incentives since even 
a small change in performance (due to the correct action) may be crucial in determining 
whether refinancing is obtained, and the (relatively large) financial rewards associated with 
it are reaped. These two conditions, i.e. the high failure rate and the high rewards in case of
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having the ‘right idea’ as opposed to some incremental improvements, may apply to some 
of the projects financed by venture capital.^
While the above discussion was clothed in terms of entrepreneurial moral hazard, we 
show that it is easily extended to an adverse selection setting. In particular, we show that 
separation between entrepreneurs is not possible when all entrepreneurs borrow from in­
vestors with deep pockets. When the two conditions described above are met and shallow 
pockets provide more responsiveness, limited funds can be used to separate entrepreneurs 
by type. Good entrepreneurs can separate themselves from bad entrepreneurs by exposing 
themselves to the risk of not receiving continuation finance when borrowing from an investor 
with shallow pockets - a risk that bad entrepreneurs are unwilling to take.
Venture capital funds and the partnership agreements governing them have several char­
acteristics that suggest the relevance of a mechanism to create competition between a port- 
foho’s projects. Most obviously, venture capital funds are generally close-ended so that, 
once raised, they cannot be easily augmented by taking on additional funds. This limits the 
size of the fund from an ex ante perspective. Moreover, partnership agreements very often 
contain covenants that reduce a venture capitalist’s ability to raise further ‘informed’ funds 
and hence render the commitment to ex post competition more credible.^
There is also substantial evidence that venture capitalists are forced to engage in portfolio 
management, i.e. in decisions about which project to concentrate funds on, which implies
^The notion, for example, that venture capitalists are in the business of funding very risky projects with a high 
probability o f failure is explicitly recognized in its alternative nomer ‘risk capita l’. Evidence of the low frequency 
with which truly successful projects are funded abounds and venture capitalists explicitly acknowledge that they ‘go 
for the homerun’ in order to offset the large number of failures in their portfolio. (See, for exam ple. Bygrave and 
Tim m ons (1992) and Quindlen (2000).) Practitioners, in turn, frequently attest to the overruling im portance of a 
project’s ‘fundam entals’, i.e. what might be loosely described as having the ‘right idea’, a good business plan, and a 
sufficient target market size (See, e.g. Bygrave (1999) or Quindlen (2000)).
^See Bartlett (1995), Gompers and Lerner (2000), and Brooks (1999) for a more in-depth discussion of venture 
capital partnership agreements. These covenants include those that restrict the co-investment of different funds run 
by the same general partner in a particular project or the requirement that realized gains are im m ediately paid out to  
limited partners rather than re-invested into the fund. Such characteristics enable a venture capital fund to credibly 
com mit to a given size ex ante.
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that portfolio projects are engaged in exactly the kind of competition that is at the centre 
of our chapter. Silver (1985), for example, describes this paradox in detail and argues that 
"... The need for greater amounts of venture capital, frequently not cited in the business 
plan, occurs sooner than expected. Because the Murphy’s Law affliction attacks most venture 
capital portfolios, there arises a serious need for portfolio management. ”
Related Literature
As noted above, existing papers on agency problems in venture capital financing have 
focused exclusively on contractual solutions. Instead, we focus on a non-contractual solution, 
i.e. the creation of competition by limiting the amount of initially raised funds. Instead of 
dealing with one entrepreneur in isolation, as is thé case with the existing literature, this 
also requires considering the interaction between a venture capitalist’s portfolio projects.
Gompers and Lerner (2000) and Lerner and Schoar (2002) provide an in-depth descrip­
tion of the characteristics of venture capital fund partnership agreements and argue that 
their purpose is to ameliorate agency problems between the general and limited partners 
of a venture capital fund. Our analysis is complementary as we point towards the impli­
cations of partnership agreements for the agency problems between the fund and portfolio 
entrepreneurs.^
Our chapter also contributes to the literature on how competition between different 
projects, or divisions in a Conglomerate, affects incentives. This literature has considered the 
effect of an internal capital market on incentives to gather information about investment 
opportunities (Stein (2002)), to create cash flows (Brusco and Panunzi (2002)), or to cre-
^The related issue of what determ ines the optim al number of projects in a venture capital fund’s portfolio is 
addressed in Kanniainen and K euschnigg (2003), where the lim ited management capacity of the venture capitalist 
determines the optim al span.
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ate new growth opportunities (Inderst and Laux (2001)).^ These papers focus on whether 
a firm’s divisions should be granted discretion over the use of their initially allocated or 
internally generated funds. In our setting, by contrast, investors compete to attract entre­
preneurs and use the size of their initial funds as the main instrument to overcome agency 
problems.
Finally, our use of an ex ante commitment to stop refinancing, or to force refinancing 
through more expensive outside capital when a project is relatively worse, shares a certain 
familiarity with the soft-budget constraint literature, e.g. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995). 
In this literature, an investor with few funds can commit to ex post inefiicient project 
abandonment when the borrower undertakes an opportunistic action, something which an 
investor with more funds cannot credibly achieve. Crucially, this mechanism relies on the 
assumption that the opportunistic action requires additional ex post funding relative to 
the desired action. In our setting, by contrast, it is the ‘good action’ which is rewarded by 
additional funding once we introduce competition for inside money.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3.3 
analyzes when constrained finance increases the responsiveness of entrepreneurs’ payoffs to 
the profitability of their project. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 embed this analysis in a moral hazard 
and adverse selection setting respectively. Section 3.6 considers the robustness of our results 
by discussing various changes to the model presented in Section 3.2. Section 3.7 concludes.
®In a related earlier contribution, Rotemberg and Saloner (1994) show how the joint incorporation of two projects 
can undermine the incentives from a promised (cash) payment that is m ade only if a generated research idea is realized.
3.2 The Model 63
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Project Technologies
There axe two types of agents, entrepreneurs and investors, and three periods, which we 
denote by t =  0,1,2. For simplicity we assume that all parties are risk neutral and do not 
discount future cash flows. Furthermore, there are more potential investors than entrepre­
neurs so that, ex ante, there is competition for entrepreneurs.®
Entrepreneurs have zero wealth and are risk neutral. Each entrepreneur has an idea that 
is embedded in a project which requires an investment 7i > 0  at t =  0  and can be refinanced 
at cost / 2  > 0 at t =  1.  ^ Refinancing is best understood as an extension of the project. 
Projects that are not refinanced continue on a smaller scale in a sense made precise below. 
The entrepreneur’s project creates a verifiable return of either R > 0 or 0 at t =  2. The 
ex ante probability of either return is determined by two factors: the quality of the idea, 
i.e. the project’s fundamentals, and the entrepreneur’s type. Below we discuss two scenarios 
where the entrepreneur can either influence his type (moral hazard) or where his exogenous 
type is his private information (adverse selection).
Our specification of the project technology, to which we turn next, is meant to capture 
some of the salient features of risk capital financing. This comprises, in particular, the high 
failure rate and the importance of the right project ‘fundamentals’. We have more to say 
on this when interpreting our main results in Sections 3 and 4.
®We do not m odel subsequent product market com petition between portfolio entrepreneurs. See Hellmann (2000) 
for an empirical description of the im pact of venture capital finance on product market com petition.
^Undertaking a project in stages has been justified on the basis o f trading-off entrepreneurial moral hazard against 
investor monitoring costs (Gompers (1995)), lim iting the entrepreneur’s hold-up power in contract renegotiations 
(Neher (1999)), and allowing entrepreneurs to create a reputation for repayment (Egli, Ongena and Smith (2002)). 
Adm ati and Pfleiderer (1994) and Cornelli and Yosha (2003) trace out the im plications of agency problems created by 
stage-financing on financial contract design. We make the realistic assum ption that the project requires more than one 
injection of capital over tim e. We argue below that pre-com m itting I i  - ) - 1 2  right at the outset is not optim al due to 
agency problems even under unconstrained financing, where sufficient funds are raised initially. In case o f constrained  
financing, the aspect of stage-financing (w ithout pre-com m itting funds) is a vital ingredient in the mechanism that 
creates com petition.
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We denote a project’s interim type at t =  1 by -0 e {n, l,h}. With probability 1 — r, the 
idea turns out to be a failure at t = 1 and the project returns 0 with certainty. This state 
corresponds to interim type ijj = n. With probability r , the idea turns out to be successful, in 
which case the project will create a positive return. This state corresponds to interim types 
■0 6  The size of the (positive) final return depends on whether the project receives
additional funding and on how successful the idea was, i.e. whether the interim type is 
'ip =  I OT 'ip = h. Precisely, the probability of payoff R  is given by when refinancing takes 
place. Let := p^R — I2 denote the expected net return from refinancing at t =  1. When 
refinancing does not take place, the success probability becomes po irrespective of whether 
the interim type is Z or /i. Denote the expected return without refinancing hy RP := pqR.^ 
Hence, the incremental expected return to refinancing a project with interim type 'ip 6  {/, h} 
is given by := R^ —
Assum ption 1: Refinancing a project of interim type 'ip € {l,h} is ex post efficient and 
creates positive incremental returns that are strictly higher for ip = h: rh > ri > 0.
Ex-ante, i.e. at t =  0, the entrepreneur’s project can be of two types, 6 € {b,g}. When 
the entrepreneur is ‘good’ {6 = g ) , his project has a higher probability of being of interim 
type h and a lower probability of being of interim type I than when the entrepreneur is 
‘bad’ (9 = b). We denote by qe the conditional probability that a project is of type ip = h 
given that it was successful at the interim stage.
Assum ption 2. A good entrepreneur has a higher probability of obtaining a project with 
high interim type: qg >
®We argue in footnote 23 below that changes in this specification do not affect our results.
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Before summarizing the specification of the project technology, our choices warrant some 
comments. Below we will show that creating competition by constraining finance is beneficial 
if r, the probability of success, is not too high and if r/, the low return under success, is not 
too small compared to the incremental return — r;. By the first condition, we attempt to 
capture the high failure rate of start-ups. By the second condition, we attempt to capture 
the notion that a ‘good idea’ is key and of relative more importance than achieving an 
incremental improvement.
Figure 3.1 summarizes the preceding discussion of the project technology.
t= 0 t= l t= 2
( l - T )
R ealisation  o f  
P r o je c t’s 
Interim  Type cp
C hoice o f  
E ’s Type (j) F inal Returns
FIGURE 3.1. The Project Technology
Finally, we assume that providing start-up finance I\ is ex ante efficient and feasible. In 
Section 3.4.2, we will investigate in detail when financing is feasible, i.e. when investors can 
break even. We postpone a statement of the precise conditions until then.
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Note that under Assumptions 1 and 2 , an entrepreneur of type g has a project with a 
higher ex ante net present value than that of entrepreneur b if refinancing takes place. In 
this chapter, we consider two ways in which the entrepreneur’s type 6 is determined. In the 
adverse selection setting, the entrepreneur’s type is chosen by nature prior to t =  0 , and is 
known only to the entrepreneur. In the moral hazard setting, by contrast, the entrepreneur 
himself chooses his type after having received financing at i =  0. This choice is his private 
information. Choosing type 6 confers private benefits Bg on the entrepreneur at t = 2, 
where we assume that = B > Bg = 0.  ^ These benefits are only obtained if the project 
is a success, but they cannot be enjoyed if -0 =  We also assume that 6 = g is socially 
more efficient, i.e. that {qg — qb){rh ~ h ) > B.
3.2.2 Financing
Investors compete at f =  0 to provide finance to entrepreneurs. They can raise finance at a 
fixed interest, which we normalize to zero. At t =  1 , the initial investor observes (with the 
entrepreneur) the project’s interim type tp, while outside investors are not able to do so. 
This creates an informational advantage of the original investor over any outside investor 
that is crucial for our results. Investors can initially raise sufficient funds such that it 
would not be necessary to raise additional funds at some later point of time. The central 
claim of this chapter, however, is that the ratio of funds raised ex ante to projects financed 
at the first stage is important in addressing agency problems.
® W ithout qualitatively changing results, we could likewise choose a specification where choosing 0 =  g  involves 
costly effort.
W hile this specification allows us to stream line the exposition, our qualitative results do not hinge on it.
The underlying assumption here is that the financing relationship between entrepreneur and investor allows the 
investor a superior insight into the quality of the project and creates an informational advajitage vis-à-vis  outside 
investors.
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We specify that each investor optimally provides start-up finance to two entrepreneurs,^^ 
Our analysis then concentrates on the issue of how much funds a venture capitalist raises at 
t = 0. Importantly, we do not preclude the investor from raising additional funds at t =  1 
or approaching other outside investors for funds at that date. However, the asymmetric 
information between the inside and outside investors at t =  1 will render such financing 
more expensive.
The investors’ crucial choice is then between what we term ‘unconstrained finance’ (or 
deep pockets) and ‘constrained finance’ (or shallow pockets). This financing choice is ob­
servable by entrepreneurs. Under unconstrained finance, investors raise sufficient funds at 
t =  0 to be able to refinance both portfolio projects at t = 1, i.e. 2I\ -I- 2 / 2 - Under con­
strained finance, in contrast, investors only raise 2Ii -1- 72 at t =  0  so that they are not 
able to refinance both projects with certainty at t In this case, constrained finance
will create competition (or a tournament) for inside money between the entrepreneurs.^®
3.2.3 Contracts and Negotiations
In our setting, the initial contract specifies for entrepreneur i a share si of the final verifiable 
return R  that accrues to the entrepreneur, with the investor receiving the remaining share 
1 — Si. This sharing rule is renegotiated whenever refinancing takes place at t =  1.
managing more than two projects, which represents the optim al span of the fund, the venture capitalist would  
spread him self to  thin in the im portant start-up phase.
^^Here, we assume that the project is non-divisible, i.e. if  refinanced, it m ust be refinanced in its entirety. Relaxing  
this assum ption, e.g. introducing a scalable project, does not affect the main insights of our model.
^^We specify that the investor m ust invest I2 in either o f the two projects and that he cannot decide to invest ^  
in each of his portfolio investm ents. T his restriction rules out syndicated investm ents in the model presented here but 
merely represents a sim plification. Such syndication will not enable the investor to signal the projects interim type  
in a more com plex m odel, in which type n  has probability pn  of obtaining positive final payoffs so that the investor 
must invest a m inimum stake I2 to  signal type I or h. In such a setting, constrained finance would consist of raising 
investm ent funds 27i -f Î 2  at the initial stage thus restricting the investor’s ability to signal through syndication. 
Consistent with this characterisation. An and and Galetovic (2000a) provide evidence that between 36% and 49% of 
a syndicate’s members drop out in a given financing round.
^®For an econom ic analysis of tournam ents, beginning with the seminal work of Lazear and Rosen (1981), see 
M cLaughlin (1988) and Prendergast (1999). To the best of our knowledge, the tournam ent literature has not addressed 
the issues raised in th is paper.
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This specification of contracts and (re-)negotiations rests on three restrictions. First, the 
investor cannot transfer any funds in excess of the initial investment I\ for her share 1 — 
(Or, in the words of contracting theory, up-front payments are not feasible.) Secondly, the 
entrepreneur cannot receive more than the cash flow realization of the project at t =  2 . 
Finally, the refinancing decision is not part of the original contract.
It is the third of these restrictions that is truly important as it creates a bilateral hold­
up problem that forces the entrepreneur and the investor to newly negotiate at t =  1 . 
As we argue next, the restriction is quite realistic and, furthermore, follows from standard 
assumptions in the contracting literature. We then comment on the less important first and 
second restrictions.
To begin with, we assume that it is impossible for the agents to commit themselves not to 
renegotiate. This raises the question of where the agents’ bargaining power emanates from 
in renegotiations. In case of the entrepreneur, his bargaining power simply stems from his 
ability to withdraw his inalienable and essential human capital from the project. That is, 
the entrepreneur is essential in order to continue the refinanced version of the project. The 
investor, by contrast, possesses bargaining power only to the degree that she has discretion 
over the refinancing decision. Such discretion arises as an endogenous characteristic of the 
contract when we allow for a large pool of fraudulent entrepreneurs that do not possess a 
real project (see Raj an (1992) for a similar use of this assumption). If the entrepreneur were 
to be given any say in the refinancing of the project, a fraudulent entrepreneur would be 
able to extract rents at the interim stage.
During the renegotiations in t = 1, both sides can therefore threaten to withhold their 
essential assets: financial and human capital, respectively.^® In case of disagreement (or
^®0f course, this story could be easily enriched by assum ing that the in itial investor also has to contribute her 
human capital at the refinancing stage.
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break-down), the project can only continue at the small size and the expected payoflF is 
shared as initially agreed (sf). Hence, while renegotiations take place at t = 1, the initial 
contract is not meaningless. The initial contract determines both the outside options in the 
renegotiation game at t =  1 and how returns are split if refinancing does not take place.
We discuss next the other restrictions on contracts. The first restriction of not allowing up­
front transfers can be similarly justified through the existence of fraudulent entrepreneurs. 
Any up-front transfers would attract fraudulent entrepreneurs and are thus not optimal 
for the investor. Finally, relaxing the assumption that the entrepreneur cannot be paid 
more than the realized cash flow of his project would not impact on our central results. 
Such additional payments would only affect the outside option in the renegotiation game 
and would not afreet the incentive or sorting problem. They would, however, allow the 
entrepreneur to keep the investor to zero expected profits when the simple sharing rule 
would not be sufficient, e.g. when the initial investment is very small compared to the NPV 
of the project. In Section 3.4.2, we will specify parameters for which we can impose this 
realistic restriction without loss of generality.
To summarize, the timeline or our model is presented in Figure 3.2.
would still be possible to specify at t =  0 two sharing rules contingent on whether refinancing occurs or not, say 
s f  and , respectively. As either side has the ability to  block the successful continuation of the larger project, the 
sharing rule for refinancing, a f ,  would always be renegotiated and only the sharing rule w ithout refinancing, s ^ ,  would 
be relevant as an outside option. N ote that any ‘penalties’ that would render it costly for the investor to renegotiate 
s f  are ruled out by appeal to  a pool o f fraudulent entrepreneurs. Finally, it could be argued that s f  should still 
be relevant as the entrepreneur could sim ply refuse to renegotiate the contract, knowing that the investor would be 
better off providing finance under s f  than continuing only with the small project. But such an argument defies the  
whole principle o f (re-)negotiations and is not supported by standard models of the bargaining game (as considered  
in detail in A ppendix B ) . W hile the investor may be better off by im plem enting the original agreement instead of not 
refinancing at all, she is still better off by proposing another and more profitable offer, which the entrepreneur accepts 
to  avoid risk of breakdown or delay.
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3.3 Refinancing and Renegotiation
3.3.1 Sources of Finance
At t = 1, the entrepreneur can obtain refinancing either from the informed inside investor 
or the uninformed outside investor. Under Assumption 1 , refinancing is ex post efficient 
whenever the project has interim type I or h and is inefficient when the interim type is n.
Outside investors cannot infer the interim type of the entrepreneur. As projects of interim 
type n have zero success probability, investors and entrepreneurs do not strictly profit from 
luring an outside investor into refinancing an unsuccessful project. We assume, however, 
that this indifference is resolved in favor of seeking finance from outside investors.A s a 
result, outside investors are faced with a lemon’s problem at t =  1 since they do not know 
the interim type of the project for which they are to provide funds. In particular, when r, 
the probability of a project being of type I or h, is low, this lemon’s problem is suflaciently 
strong to prevent outside investors from providing continuation finance to entrepreneurs.^^ 
In what follows, we assume that r  is sufficiently low such that outside finance is always too 
costly. In Section 3.6.2 we derive the precise conditions for when this is the case. There, 
we also relax this assumption and show that our qualitative results carry over to the case 
where projects are always refinanced, albeit sometimes with more costly outside finance.
3.3.2 Renegotiations at t  = 1
This section characterizes the renegotiation game that arises out of the hold-up problem at 
t = 1 whenever a project is of interim type I or h. Importantly, we assume that renegotiations
^®Note that this indifference is turned into a strict preference as soon as we were to  introduce small private benefits 
from continuation or having a project that is ‘in operation’, for exam ple.
^®The inside investor could solve the adverse selection problem faced by the outside investors by raising additional 
funds A  <  / 2  at t =  0 and by investing them  in interim projects o f type / or h as a signal to outside investors. As 
will become more apparent below, raising ex ante  A  +  7i is not in the investor’s interest as it undermines the use of 
constrained finance as an incentive or sorting device.
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a tt = 1 are unstructured in the sense that it is not possible to commit at t =  0  to a particular 
renegotiation game at t =  1. Hence, we do not consider the optimal ex ante design of the 
bargaining game at t =  1. Instead, the renegotiation game used here is simply one that we 
consider natural in such an unstructured environment.
Renegotiations at t =  1 proceed in the following way:
t '=  1  : The investor picks entrepreneur Ei and negotiates with him over refinancing by 
investing I2. If negotiations with Ei are successful, Ei receives funds I2 in return for a 
renegotiated share of final cash flows.
t'=  2  : The investor next negotiates with the other entrepreneur, E j . Under unconstrained 
flnance, the investor negotiates with Ej over refinancing irrespective of the outcome at =  1 , 
Under constrained flnance, the investor can only renegotiate over refinancing if negotiations 
with Ei were unsuccessful. If refinancing is feasible and renegotiations are successful, Ej 
receives funds I2 in return for a renegotiated share of final cash flows.
Bargaining outcomes are determined by Nash bargaining with equal bargaining powers. 
The robustness of our results to changes in the bargaining procedure is discussed in Section 
3.6.1. There we also show how the outcome of our bargaining procedure can be generated 
as an equilibrium of a fully non-cooperative bargaining game with open time horizon.
3.3.3 Unconstrained Finance
Under unconstrained finance, the investor has raised sufficient funds ex ante to refinance 
all worthwhile projects. As a result, the investor cannot credibly threaten not to provide 
refinance to a project with interim type ijj € {I, h} , irrespective of the type of the other 
portfolio project. As a result, the refinancing decision and the renegotiated payoffs for 
a particular entrepreneur are independent of the interim type of his competitor in the
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portfolio. In the renegotiations at t = 1, entrepreneur Ei and investor have outside options 
of SiR^ and {1 — Si)RP, respectively. Given interim type ■0^ , the surplus to be bargained 
over is r^.. As a result, the ex post payoflF to entrepreneur i given his interim type 0j is 
SiF^ +  i.e. the sum of his outside option, SiRP, and half of the net surplus, r^,. The 
ex ante payoff resulting from these ex post returns is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Under unconstrained finance, the expected payoff to entrepreneur i at t = 0, 
given initial contract Si and entrepreneurial type 9i, is
while the investor’s expected payoff is
| ( 1  -  Si) +  ^ [ri + Ç0 . {rh -  r /) ] | -  h
per portfolio entrepreneur?^
Proof. At t =  0, the probability of interim type 0  ^ = I or 0^ = h r  {1 — qef) and T%., 
respectively. Hence, the entrepreneur’s expected payoff is Tqe^{siRP + ^ rh)+T{\ — qe^){siRP-\- 
\ri) and the investor’s expected payoff is TqQ^ {{l -  + r ( l  -  g^J((l -  Si)R° +
\ri) — I\, which transform to the respective payoffs. Q.E.D.
3 .3 .4  Constrained Finance
In contrast to unconstrained finance, the investor can now credibly threaten to use all 
funds for the other portfolio project if current negotiations fail. As a result, the outcome of
Without loss of  generality, we concentrate on the in ves to r ’s profit per portfolio entrepreneur fo r  the remainder  
of  the paper.
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renegotiations between Ei and the investor at t =  1 under constrained finance are dependent 
on the interim type of the other portfolio company, namely for two reasons: firstly, the 
interim type of Ej  (the other entrepreneur) determines which entrepreneur is picked first to 
be bargained with; secondly, it also determines the investor’s outside option in the bargaining 
game and hence the surplus to be bargained over.
Suppose that E'^s interim type is n, i.e. there is no profitable refinancing opportunity. 
Then negotiations with Ei are identical to those under unconstrained finance. Consider 
next the case where both entrepreneurs are of interim type I or h. We will now derive 
the bargaining outcome by analyzing the sequential bargaining game backwards. Suppose 
that Ej with il)j ^  n is the last entrepreneur to be bargained with. If the limited funds 
have already been used up for E{, the entrepreneur will only realize sjBP while the investor 
reahzes (1 — sj) JF^  from this project. Alternatively, if funds are still available, we can apply 
results from the case with unconstrained finance and obtain that Ej realizes sjBP + 
while the investor realizes (1 — Sj) BP +
Turn next to negotiations with Ei, who is picked first. In case of a breakdown, Ei receives 
just SiR^. Using our previous calculations, we know that in this case the investor’s payoff 
is the sum of (1 — 5%) and {1 — Sj) RP In case they reach an agreement, their
joint surplus is the sum of R^. and {1 — sj) R^. Given that their net surplus is therefore 
just — ^r^p. which is then split equally, we obtain that Ei receives a payoff of SiRP +
We can now sum up these results.
^^Note that the Nash bargaining solution assumes that both sides have the sam e information on the values of the 
surplus and of their outside options. In Section 3.6.1 we analyze a sim pler version of the bargaining game which does 
not require that one entrepreneur knows the profitability o f the other project. There, we obtain qualitatively similar 
results.
^^The outside options in the bargaining game between Ei  and the investor are SiBP and (1 — Si)BP  +  (1 — Sj) EP +  
, respectively. Also recall that r,p. =  R ^ .  — RP. Hence, the total surplus to be bargained over between Ei  and 
the investor equals +  (1 — S j ) E °  — +  (1 -  St) # °  +  ( l -  S j ) E °  +  } , which is .
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Lemma 3. Take the case with constrained finance. I f at least one project is of type n, then 
payoffs are as in Lemma 2. I f both projects are successful, i. e. if 'ijji ^  n and 'ij)j ^  n, and 
if the investor picks Ei to bargain with first, the payoffs are as follows: 
i) SiB? + \  r ^ . -  \r^ . for Ef, 
a) SjBP for Ej]
in) and (1 — Si) BP (1 — Sj) BP ^ investor.
Next, consider the issue of who is chosen first to be bargained with. First of all, note 
that the initial sharing rules, Sf, do not affect the investor’s preference for either of the 
two projects. When interim types are not identical, the investor will then prefer to bargain 
first with the better interim type. When interim types are identical, we stipulate that the 
investor chooses each of the two entrepreneurs with equal probability. Lemma 4 summarizes 
the resulting ex post payoffs.
Lemma 4. Under constrained finance, E[s payoff at t = 1 is 
i) SiBP +  if both projects are of interim type h]
a) S il^  + è ~ in ]  if E[s and EjS projects are of interim type h and I, respectively; 
Hi) SiBP if E[s and EjS projects are of interim type I and h, respectively;
iv) SiBP +  if both projects are of interim type I;
v) 0 if i ’s project is of interim type n, regardless of the interim type of EjS project;
vi) SiB^ +  if EjS project is of interim type n and E[s project is of interim type I or 
h.
As the final step of this analysis, we now derive the ex ante payoff for Ei. Note that this 
will depend on both entrepreneurs’ interim types as their realizations will determine who is
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picked first. Given the ex post payoffs in the preceding lemma, the ex ante payoffs are then 
easily calculated.^^
Lemma 5. Under constrained finance, E[s expected payoff at t = 0 given entrepreneurial 
types 9i,9j € {b,g} and initial contract Si is
T ^ h  + qsi {rh -  r /) ] | ~  y  (3 -  qOi +  % ) +  3%^ %^  {rh -  n)} .
The investor earns
r  I(1  -  Si) + i [ri +  qe- {rh -  r/)] j "  ^ n  + qe.qOj {rh - n ) } - I i .
Proof. Recall that the ex ante probabilities of interim states n, I, and h are 1—r, t  (1  — qg) , 
and rqe, respectively. The asserted payoffs follow then immediately from substitution from 
Lemma 4. Q.E.D.
3.3.5 The Responsiveness Condition
The responsiveness of the entrepreneur’s payoff to his type will be crucial in solving his 
agency problem, whether it be in a moral hazard or an adverse selection setting. The 
more responsive the entrepreneur’s payoff is to his type, the easier it is to provide effort 
incentives or to induce self-selection. We now analyze how constrained and unconstrained 
finance compare in terms of the responsiveness they induce in the entrepreneur’s payoff.
^^Note that since BP is type-independent, the change in E [s  payoff due to a change in his type is independent 
of Si (and R^).  Importantly, this implies that the initial contract cannot be used for sorting or incentive purposes. 
This feature is robust to  the introduction of a type-dependent payoff as long as In such an extended
setting, the responsiveness of E'^s payoff to  his type i/'i increases in s*. As a result, the optim al contract would involve 
setting Si as large as possible, subject to  the investor’s participation constraint. This is, however, exactly how Sj is 
determ ined in our simpler setting. Hence, although introducing type-dependency of RP would change the particular 
form of equation (3.1) it would not qualitatively affect results.
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The responsiveness under unconstrained finance is easily derived from Lemma 2, Sub­
tracting the entrepreneur’s payoff ioi 6 = h from that for 0 = g, we obtain
{Qg -  Qb) {rh -  r i). (3.1)
Importantly, the responsiveness does not correspond to the full difference in project value 
as the hold-up problem at t =  1 allows the investor to extract half of the increase in value.
Under constrained finance, by contrast, entrepreneurs compete for scarce inside money. As 
a result, for a given sharing rule, the investor will extract more from a funded entrepreneur 
whenever the other type has a profitable refinancing opportunity (i.e. of interim type I or 
h). In other words, constrained finance embodies the investor with more bargaining power 
when entrepreneurs are forced to compete. Our key insight is that constrained finance can 
nevertheless increase the responsiveness of the entrepreneur’s payoff to his type. Although 
the entrepreneur’s total payoff is reduced (for a given type 6 and sharing rule s) the difference 
in payoff across types b and g can be increased.
Under constrained finance, E[s payoff depends on the type of Ej as well as on his own. In 
what follows, we are interested in the case where, under constrained finance, both types will 
he 6 = g. Hence, set 6j = g. The responsiveness for constrained finance, i.e. the difference 
in payoffs for Ei iî 6i = g rather than 9i = b, is then given by
^ (Qg -  %) T { {vh - r i )  + j  [n -  3% {rh -  n)]} (3.2)
according to Lemma 5. Subtracting expression (3.1) from expression (3.2) then allows us to 
establish the following proposition.
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Proposition 1 . The responsiveness of the entrepreneur’s ex ante payoff is higher under 
constrained finance if and only if
r h ~ n  (3.3)oqg
We will subsequently refer to condition (3.3) as the 'Responsiveness Condition’, It is at 
the core of our analysis and describes the circumstances under which constrained finance is 
more adept at dealing with agency problems than unconstrained finance. In Section 3.6 we 
show how the responsiveness condition extends to alternative bargaining procedures.
The responsiveness condition captures the trade-off between two effects of competition 
for inside money that is introduced through constrained finance:
Competition Effect: Under constrained finance, not being picked first to be bargained 
with implies that the entrepreneur will not receive refinancing in equilibrium, in contrast to 
unconstrained finance. As a result, competition introduces an additional incremental return 
to being first to be bargained with, making the payoff more responsive to the entrepreneur’s 
type.
Bargaining Power Effect: Under constrained finance, entrepreneurs compete for inside 
money and an investor can threaten to refinance the other entrepreneur when bargaining 
with her first pick. This creates additional bargaining power for the investor. As a result, 
the return to being refinanced is reduced and the responsiveness is lowered.
Unconstrained finance provides responsiveness through the difference in final project pay- 
ofiFs: rh — ri. Constrained finance, by contrast, creates responsiveness through an artificial 
‘jump’ in payoffs induced by competition for refinancing funds. As a result, the above 
trade-oflF can be summarized as follows. If rh — n  is high, then incentives under constrained
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finance are already substantial and competition for inside money mainly allows the investor 
to extract more surplus. Unconstrained finance provides more responsiveness. In contrast, 
if rh — ri is low, the jump in payoffs created through the threat of no refinancing implies 
that unconstrained finance dominates constrained finance in responsiveness terms.
This interpretation is illustrated in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. (For simplicity, we deviate some­
what from our previous set-up and notation in these figures.)
Return to E
E ’s  expected return schedule 
under u nconstra ined  finance
E 's  expected return schedule 
under constra ined  finance
FIGURE 3.3. Situation in which the responsiveness condition holds.
In Figure 3.3, the line through points C and D represents the ex ante payoff under uncon­
strained finance as a function of r^ . The line through points A and B, by contrast, represents 
expected payoffs under constrained finance. Importantly, this payoff is not continuous in 
but jumps as soon as it exceeds a ‘threshold’ vj, i.e. the rival’s prospects. This discontinuity 
captures the competition effect. It is very strong relative to the responsiveness provided by 
unconstrained finance when r/j — vi is very small and these payoffs are grouped around the 
threshold, i.e. when ri is large. Furthermore, to the right of the discontinuity, the payoff 
profile under constrained finance is below that of unconstrained finance, albeit with the
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FIGURE 3.4. Situation in which the responsiveness condition does not hold.
same slope. This shift downwards in payoffs captures the bargaining power effect. When 
this effect is small, the responsiveness condition is more likely to hold.
Figure 3.4, by contrast, exhibits a setting in which the responsiveness of unconstrained 
finance outweighs that of constrained finance. Here, rh — ri is too large relative to the 
competition effect and constrained finance cannot provide sufficient responsiveness.
Below, when completing the analysis of the model for the cases of moral hazard and 
adverse selection, we will describe in more detail the implications of Proposition 1 for the 
case of venture capital financing.
3.4 Moral Hazard
In the previous section, we established when constrained finance dominates unconstrained 
finance in terms of responsiveness. In this section, we will investigate when this increased 
responsiveness outweighs the negative impact of increased investor bargaining power and
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inefficient project continuation so that constrained finance dominates unconstrained finance 
from an ex ante point of view.
Recall that, in the moral hazard setting, the entrepreneur chooses her type 9 6  {&, g} at 
t = 0. The choice of ^ & will result in private benefits at t =  2 in case the project has
success. Furthermore, we assumed that the good action 9 = g is socially desirable.
3.4-i  Unconstrained vs. Constrained Finance
Because of the hold-up problem at t =  1, the entrepreneur is not a residual claimant to the 
entire incremental surplus of his choice of action. As a result, he will not choose the good 
action if
Ô (% -  i'^ h - r i ) < B  (3.4)
and the hold-up problem will lead to a suboptimal effort choice when this inequality is 
fulfilled. In what follows, we assume that the hold-up problem is sufficiently strong for this 
to be the case, so that the entrepreneur chooses the bad action under unconstrained finance.
We now assume that the project is financially viable. Hence, its expected NPV at t =  0 
is positive and, what is more, there exists a sharing rule s for i =  1 , 2  such that the investor 
can break even. In Section 3.4.2, we discuss in more detail the issue of financial viability and 
how this can be influenced by the choice between constrained and unconstrained financing. 
Under unconstrained financing, the project is financially viable if and only if
h  < tBP 4- i r  {n 4- % {rh -  n)) • (3.5)
As is easily seen, the right-hand side of (3.5) represents the investor’s expected payoff if 
Si =  0 and if the entrepreneur chooses the bad action. (Recall that the choice of Si does
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not affect the choice oîOi.) Furthermore, we assume that adjusting Si is sufficient to extract 
all profits from the investor, i.e. that investors compete themselves down to zero profits at 
t =  0. In analogy to (3.5) this is the case if
h  > (n +  Qb {rh -  n ) ) , (3.6)
where the right-hand side of (3.6) now represents the investor’s expected payoff if Si =
We will now take (3.5) and (3.6) as given.
The equilibrium contract for each project i = 1,2 specifies now the sharing rule Si which 
allows investors to just break even.
Lemma 6 . With moral hazard, the equilibrium contract under unconstrained financing 
specifies the sharing rule
1  ^ f  n + qb{rh- n) \  h
which leaves the investor with zero profits and the entrepreneur with the expected payoff
r + n-{-qb {rh -  n) + B] -  h.
Proof. Condition (3.4) implies that 6i = 6 . From Lemma 2, the investor’s expected payoff 
is zero if
|(1  -  Si) +  ^[n + qb {rh -  n)] j -  A = 0,
case (3.6) does not hold, investors would have to make an up-front transfer to the entrepreneur in order to 
receive only zero profits. Applying standard arguments from the contracting literature, we ruled out the feasibility 
of such transfers. However, even if investors made positive profits our results would be qualitatively unchanged. The  
only difference this would make is that we would have to introduce an additional case distinction when determining  
the equilibrium contract.
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which we can solve for Si. As the investor just breaks even, the payoff of Ei is just the sum 
of net profits and B. Q.E.D.
When unconstrained finance cannot provide sufficient incentives for the good action but 
the responsiveness condition does not hold, constrained finance clearly cannot induce the 
good action, either. When both forms of finance lead to the same action, however, uncon­
strained finance always dominates as it does not suffer from the allocational inefficiency 
created by constrained finance - namely, its failure to provide refinancing to all projects of 
interim type I or h.
We assume now that the responsiveness condition (3.3) holds. If the additional incentives 
provided through constrained finance are sufldcient, in particular when
^ {Qg -  Qb) (rh ~ n) +  [n -  3% (r* -  n)] > B, (3.7)
then both entrepreneurs will find it strictly optimal to choose action 9i = g. In other 
words, inequality (3.7) ensures that there exists a unique, symmetric pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium where both projects are of the good type.^^ In what follows, we assume that 
inequality (3.7) holds.
Regarding financial viability, we must now assume in analogy to (3.5) that the original 
investment is not too large. It is easily established that this is the case if
h  < tR^ +  {ri + Qb {rh -  n)) -  ^  (n 4- {rh -  n)) . (3.8)
^®This follows im m ediately from Lem m a 5, which reveals that it was also strictly optim al for Ei  to  choose 6i =  g 
if the E j  chose 6j = b. For
Be (Çlg -  Qb) (rh -  n )  -  [n -  3qg (r^ -  n ) ] , (% -  %) (r^ -  n )  -  [rj -  3% {rh ~  n )j
there exist two equilibria in asym m etric pure strategies and one equilibrium in mixed strategies. For reasons of brevity, 
we do not consider this region.
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Moreover, to ensure that giving investors a sufficiently low initial share of cash flow rights 
is sufficient to bring them down to zero profits, we must assume in analogy to (3.6) that
h  < (n + qb {rh -  n)) -  y  (n + {rh ~  n ) ) . (3.9)
Again we take (3,8) and (3.9) as given. We then have the following result.
Lemma 7. With moral hazard, the equilibrium contract under constrained financing specifies 
the sharing rule
S i
which leaves the investor with zero profits and the entrepreneur with the expected payoff
r 2
T -\-ri +  qg {rh -  n)] -  /i -  — [n + q^  {rh -  n)]
Proof. Given conditions (3.3) and (3.7), 6i = 9j = g holds under constrained finance. From 
Lemma 5, the investor’s expected payoff is zero when
r |( 1  -  Si) 72° +  i  [r/ +  % {rh -  r /)]| -  y  (n  +  q^  {rh -  n ) }  -  h  =  0,
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which we can solve for Si. Prom Lemma 5, E'^s expected payoff under constrained finance 
and with 6i = 9j = g is
r ^ [n +  Qg {rh  -  r /)] | -  y  {3r/ +  (r/, -  n ) }
= r[R^ + ri + Qg {rh -  n)] -  7i -  y  [r/ + {rh -  n)] .
Q.E.D.
Comparing the payoffs under unconstrained finance and constrained finance, we can fi­
nally establish the following result.
Proposition 2. Suppose the following conditions hold in the case with moral hazard. First, 
the responsiveness condition (3.3) is fulfilled, implying that constrained financing is better 
at creating incentives. Second, (3.4) o.nd (3.7) hold, implying that constrained financing 
is also necessary to create sufficient incentives. Then constrained finance will dominate 
unconstrained finance ex ante, i. e. it will he the equilibrium choice of all investors, if and 
only if
r  < (3.10)
n  +  {rh -  r M
Proof. Under conditions (3.3), (3.4) and (3.7), constrained finance will dominate uncon­
strained finance if the entrepreneur’s payoff from Lemma 7 is larger than that from Lemma 
6:
2
r  [bP + ri + qg {rh -  n)] -  /i  -  y  [n -f q  ^{rh -  n)] > r  [iü° -f r/ -f- % {rh -  n) +  B] -  7i, 
which transforms to (3.10). Q.E.D.
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Condition (3.10) is intuitive as constrained finance, ceteris paribus, is more likely to 
dominate if the allocational inefficiency it induces is relatively small in expected terms. 
This is the case when r, the probability of having a successful idea, is small.^® As we have 
argued in the Introduction, this condition may well apply to the venture capital industry, 
where the likelihood that a project returns positive profits is widely acknowledged to be 
small.
In determining the optimality of constrained financing. Proposition 2 is complemented by 
the responsiveness condition of Proposition I. This condition requires that the incremental 
return rh — n  is relatively small compared to r/. If this were not the case, incentives based 
on the differential in project returns across actions would be sufficient to elicit the correct 
effort. When rh — n  is small, however, these incentives are small. Here, i.e. where the 
potential of incremental improvements is relatively low compared to the absolute level of 
returns when successful, constrained finance increases responsiveness by ensuring that the 
loser of a competition for limited funds is not refinanced. Our results may go some way 
towards explaining some of the features related to financial constraints in venture capital 
funds, which we mentioned in the introduction.
3.4-2 Financial Viability
Until now we have assumed that the investor can break even. Clearly, this need not be true, 
in which case the project would not be financed ex ante. Recall now that the investor’s 
return depends on the initial contract, the project’s interim type, and her bargaining power 
in the negotiations for refinancing. Importantly, as we have seen in the previous sections.
^®This effect is further accentuated by the presence of the term in the denominator o f the right-hand side, which 
captures the likelihood w ith  which constrained finance will create this allocational inefficiency once both projects are 
successful at t =  1. Clearly, the lower q^, the less restrictive the condition in Proposition 2.
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the investor’s ex post bargaining power may be increased under constrained finance relative 
to unconstrained finance. When this increase in bargaining power is sufficient to outweigh 
the loss of ex ante returns due to inefficient refinancing, constrained finance will render 
projects financially viable that would not have been financed under unconstrained finance.
To make this intuition more precise, we compare the respective conditions when projects 
are financially viable under the two financing regimes, i.e. conditions (3.5) and (3.8). We 
obtain the following result.
Proposition 3. Constrained finance allows the investor to appropriate a larger absolute 
amount of expected returns during renegotiations than unconstrained finance when
T < (3.11)
n  +{rh -  ri)
Proof. From conditions (3.5) and (3.8), the investor’s expected payoff is greater under 
constrained finance than unconstrained finance if
i  (n +  Qb {rh -  ri)) - y  ( n  + Qg {rh ~  n ) ) - h  > r  ^  ( n  + 96 {rh ~ n)) -h,2
which transforms to (3.11). 
Q.E.D.
As in Proposition 2 , this condition is more likely to be fulfilled if the probability of 
incurring the allocational inefficiency generated by constrained finance is low, i.e. if both r  
and Qg are low. While constrained finance certainly implies that the investor appropriates a 
larger share of a given amount of ex post returns, its impact on the size of ex ante returns
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is ambiguous - inefficient project continuation lowers expected returns for a given level of 
effort while improved effort incentives increase expected returns.
In case condition (3.11) holds, there is a strictly positive wedge between the two conditions 
(3.5) and (3.8). Then, for intermediate values of 7i, it is only possible to finance the projects 
with constrained financing. For lower values of 7i, where both conditions hold, both modes 
of financing are feasible, while for higher values, where condition (3.8) no longer holds either, 
it is not possible at all to finance the projects.
Note, furthermore, that the condition on r  in Proposition 3 is less strict than that on r  in 
Proposition 2. This implies that, over a range of values, the entrepreneur would have pre­
ferred unconstrained finance if financial viability had not been an issue. When unconstrained 
financing is, however, not feasible, the entrepreneur has no choice but to seek funding from 
a constrained investor.
3.5 Adverse Selection and Constrained Finance
In this section, the entrepreneur’s type 9 is chosen by nature just prior to t =  0. With 
probability a, nature chooses the good type 6 = g while the likelihood oî 9 = h is (1 — a ) . 
As investors do not observe individual types, investors face an adverse selection problem at 
t =  0. It is now helpful to briefly recall the game played by investors in t =  0. We consider a 
large pool of potential investors, i.e. it is (the entrepreneurs’) ideas that are in short supply. 
Investors raise funds of value 27i -f 272 or 2I\ -f I2 and try to attract entrepreneurs by 
offering sharing rules, s. Each successful investor finances exactly two projects.^^
Formally, we could imagine that entrepreneurs can shop around between different investors whose offers, Si, are 
made conditional on the fact that they can finance two entrepreneurs.
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Suppose first that all entrepreneurs are financed by financially unconstrained investors. 
Then the following result is immediate.^®
Lemma 8 . Suppose all investors are financially unconstrained. Then the unique equilibrium 
is a pooling equilibrium where all entrepreneurs, regardless of their type, receive the same 
contract s. Entrepreneurs of types 9 = g and 9 = b are randomly matched in the investors ’ 
funds.
We now argue that allowing investors to choose between constrained and unconstrained 
finance may enable them to separate type 9 = g from type 9 = b entrepreneurs.
Consider thus the case of constrained finance. As stated above, initial sharing rules Si 
do not affect the investor’s preferences regarding which project she would like to refinance. 
Consequently, separation between types 9 = g and 9 = b can not be achieved by offer­
ing a menu of initial sharing rules. Each type will strictly prefer the highest sharing rule. 
Recall next from Proposition 1 that when responsiveness condition (3.3) holds, the payoff 
differential across types is larger under constrained than unconstrained finance. This estab­
lishes that condition (3.3) is a necessary - albeit not yet sufficient - condition for separation 
across entrepreneurial types. To allow for separation, the difference in responsiveness across 
financing regimes must be large enough so that separation can be achieved at sufficiently 
favourable terms îoi 9 = g. Additionally, the allocational inefficiency created by constrained 
finance cannot be too large. Otherwise the constrained investor will be unable to offer a 
mutually profitable contract that achieves separation.
In addition to these conditions, we have the standard condition arising in screening models 
of this type that the ex ante probability a  of being 9 = g cannot be too high. Otherwise,
^®Note that we assume throughout this section that projects are always financially viable under both forms of 
financing.
^®Note that in this m odel we do not have a continuous and unbounded sorting variable that would allow separation  
at some point while ensuring that the constrained investor’s participation constraint always holds with equality.
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a pooling equilibrium offers financial terms that are not sufficiently worse than those in a 
separating equilibrium and would be preferred hy 9 = g.
The following proposition establishes conditions under which these requirements are 
jointly met and separation is achieved.
Proposition 4. Consider the following separating equilibrium: type 6 = b receives uncon­
strained finance, while 6 = g receives constrained finance. Suppose that the responsiveness 
condition (3.3) holds. Then this separating equilibrium exists and is the unique pure-strategy 
equilibrium if
{Qg -  Qb) (rh -  ri) 
n +  qj {rh -  ri)
and if
a < min r r i -  3qg {rh -  n) 1 A _  ^ H + gg {rh -  n) 
8  r h - n  ’ 2  I {qg -  qb) {rh -  n)
Proof. See Appendix A.
3.6 Robustness of the Responsiveness Condition
3.6.1 Alternative Bargaining Procedures
In Section 3.3, we found that responsiveness can increase under constrained finance. Even 
though constrained finance accords more bargaining power to the investor, which, at first 
glance, only seems to worsen the hold-up problem, what matters in terms of responsiveness 
are not absolute returns but the difference in returns across entrepreneurial types.
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We now argue that these results are robust to changes in the bargaining procedure. We 
proceed as follows. We first present a much simplified bargaining procedure. Subsequently, 
we set up a fully non-cooperative framework with an open time horizon.
A simpler bargaining procedure
Consider the following bargaining procedure:
t/ =  1 : The investor picks entrepreneur Ei for refinancing.
tf = 2 : The investor negotiates separately with each entrepreneur, Ei and E j. If the investor 
has constrained funds and if negotiations with Ei fail, it is too late to use the funds to 
refinance Ej instead.
In this bargaining game neither of the two entrepreneurs needs information about the 
profitabihty of the other entrepreneur. In the case of unconstrained finance it is immediate 
that the outcome is identical to that of our previous bargaining game. If the investor’s funds 
are constrained, we can also use previous results and obtain that the chosen entrepreneur 
Ei realizes payoff SiR^ -I- for tpi ^  n. The other entrepreneur just realizes in this 
case, provided of course that ij)j ^  n. Consequently, the responsiveness condition becomes 
now
r h ~ n < — - (3.12)
%
Note that condition (3.12) is less strict that the original condition (3.3).
A bargaining procedure w ith open tim e horizon
The renegotiation procedures that we presented so far are relatively simple but not open- 
ended in the sense that the investor cannot infinitely ‘shuttle’ back and forth between 
entrepreneurs and play them against each other ad infinitum. Clearly, merely positing such 
a game is a short-cut. Suppose instead that we have the following bargaining game:
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tf = 1 : The investor picks an entrepreneur, say Ei, and makes him an offer of I 2 in return 
for a share of the final payoff.
t/ =  2 : It is up to Ei to decide on the offer. If Ei accepts, then further negotiations proceed 
only between the investor and the other entrepreneur, Ej.  In this case, we return to = 1 
in the next period, with the restriction that the investor must then choose Ej.  If Ei  rejects, 
then he can make a counter-offer. In this case we proceed to t' = 3.
t/ =  3 : It is now up to the investor to respond to the offer of Ei. If she accepts, then further 
negotiations proceed only between the investor and Ej.  In this case, we return to f  =  1 in 
the next period, with the restriction that the investor must then choose Ej.  If the investor 
rejects, we return to period t' = 1, where the investor can now still choose between both 
entrepreneurs.
To make coming to an immediate agreement attractive in this setting, we introduce some 
frictions. We suppose that there is an exogenous risk of negotiations breaking down. Let 
1 — 5 denote the probability with which negotiations will break down when either of the 
parties rejects an offer. (The break-down only affects the two parties which are currently 
negotiating.) We show in Appendix B that this bargaining game has an equilibrium in which 
we obtain immediate agreement and where, as (5 — 1 , equilibrium payoffs are the same as 
those derived in the previous sections.
This may, at first, seem surprising. In particular, in case both entrepreneurs are of the 
same type, say V'l — one may ask why the investor does not deviate and go to the
other entrepreneur who would be eager to be financed even under less favorable conditions. 
However, the other entrepreneur, say Ej,  would optimally not accept any offer that makes 
him just a little better off than without refinancing. Instead, he would reject such an offer
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and use the opportunity to propose to the investor a new contract that makes the investor 
just as well off as when going back to Ei.^^
D eterm in a n ts  o f  resp o n siv en ess
If the investor starts to bargain with Ei under constrained financing, the other entre­
preneur’s project still represents a valuable outside option in our basic bargaining model 
studied in Section 3. This limits the payoff that can be extracted by the ‘winner’, Ei. In 
contrast, in the simple bargaining procedure introduced at the beginning of this section the 
alternative project represents no longer a viable opportunity once the investor has picked 
the winning project. Intuitively, in the latter case payoffs are more sensitive to entrepre­
neurs’ types, which is captured by a less stringent responsiveness condition. The opposite 
extreme would be the case where the investor could ‘line up’ the two entrepreneurs and en­
gage them in open competition for the limited funds. It is straightforward that this would 
sharply reduce the responsiveness.^^
In total, the responsiveness under constrained financing is higher the less the investor can 
manage to play entrepreneurs against each other in order to extract a better deal from the 
entrepreneur who finally receives refinancing. The bargaining game analyzed in Section 3 
represents a ‘middle ground’ between the extreme case of ‘Bertrand competition’ between 
entrepreneurs and the case where the presence of the other entrepreneur does not improve 
at all the investor’s bargaining position, which was the case with the procedure introduced 
at the beginning of this section.^^
^°The investor’s outside option is even worse in the simple procedure studied at the beginning of this section, where 
we assumed that the investor can not (re-)allocate her lim ited funds to the other entrepreneur once she has failed to  
come to an agreement with her first choice. It can be shown that an equilibrium of the game with open time horizon  
generates the same responsiveness (3.12) if frictions are due to im patience, i.e., if  5 is the discount factor used by 
all parties. (However, in general we do not recoup the exact payoffs as in the one-shot gam e.) This extreme result is 
a refiection of the ‘outside option principle’ in alternating-offer gam es w ith  discounting (Binmore, Rubinstein, and 
Wolinsky (1986)).
Formally, this could be captured by allowing the investor to make an offer sim ultaneously to the two entrepreneurs.
W hile it would be useful to  have som e guidance which bargaining procedure was more realistic in certain circum­
stances, this m ust ultim ately remain a futile task. In m ost economic situations people sim ply do not move according
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3.6.2 Outside Finance
In this section, we relax the condition in Lemma 1, which ensures that the lemon’s problem 
for outside finance at t =  1 was sufficiently strong such that projects could only be profitably 
refinanced by the inside investor. We now show that our main insights extend to the case 
where outside financing is feasible. Intuitively, what now drives our results is no longer the 
impossibility to refinance the project but, instead, the higher costs of doing so by drawing 
on fresh outside funds. Recall that outside funds are more expensive as new investors are 
uninformed about the interim type of the project, •0. As unsuccessful projects (0 =  n) will 
also seek fresh funds, successful projects (0 = Z or 0  =  h) will be pooled with these inferior 
projects, leading to a dilution of the insiders’ ownership stakes.
Suppose then that, under constrained finance, a project with interim type 0  = Z or 
0  =  /i did not receive refinancing from the inside investor, although this would be ex post 
profitable. In contrast to our previous analysis, we now assume that the lemon’s problem 
is sufficiently small so that an equilibrium exists in which both interim types 0  = Z and 
0  =  Zi find it profitable to be refinanced by outside investors. This is the case if projects 
are sufficiently likely to succeed, i.e. if r  is sufficiently large. (Precise conditions are derived 
in the proof of the following proposition).^^ The detailed derivation of this threshold is 
delegated to Proposition 5.
Outside investors will now charge all three interim types the same conditions for receiving 
I2. This is merely a refiection of the fact that outside investors cannot observe the interim
to a well-specified game form. The strength of the postulated com petition effect m ust, therefore, remain an empirical 
issue.
^^But even in this case there still exists an equilibrium where no outside financing is raised. This is the case if any 
attem pt to raise fresh funds is interpreted by outside investors as a signal that =  n. Similarly, there may exist an 
equilibrium in which only ip =  n  and - provided that both projects are successful - ip =  h, who has more to gain from 
refinancing, will receive outside financing. Such a m ultiplicity of equilibria is standard in games of signaling. For the 
purpose of our robustness analysis, we can conveniently ignore these issues.
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type. We denote the repayment requirement by outside investors by D. As outside investors 
compete themselves down to zero profits, D is determined by their requirement to break 
even. '^  ^ A formal derivation of D is relegated to the proof of the following Proposition.
The repayment that must be made to the outside investor, D, reduces what the original 
investor and the entrepreneur can share. Again, we assume that the two ‘insiders’ will 
equally share the gains from refinancing.^^ The net surplus to inside investors from securing 
outside refinancing is then simply
:= Pip{R — D) — .
Recall that the net surplus from refinancing with inside funds is := p^R — — I2.
As is immediate, the high interim type will always face a lemon’s premium, i.e. rh > Xh- 
For the low interim type this depends on the relation between r, the overall probability 
of success, and qg, the conditional probability oî 'ip = h. It is reasonable to assume that 
the first effect still dominates. As we show in the proof of the following Proposition, this 
assumption is compatible with assuming that both successful interim types, I and h, prefer 
outside finance to not refinancing at all. The following Proposition then establishes the 
equivalent of condition (3.3) in the presence of outside refinancing.
Proposition  5. In an equilibrium where outside financing is preferred by all interim types 
to not refinancing at all, the responsiveness is higher under constrained finance if and only
®^The precise game we have in mind for the refinancing stage with outside investors at t =  1 is one where projects 
first express their need for outside funding and where there is, subsequently, com petition by investors for providing 
the required funds, h -
^®In other words, the investor and the entrepreneur have joint ownership and control rights over the project. 
T his represents a realistic specification for the case of venture capital finance. Our insights on the robustness of 
the responsiveness condition extend, however, to the case where the entrepreneur could decide unilaterally to  obtain  
outside finance in order to expand the project. In this case, the entrepreneur would have to leave the investor only 
w ith claim s of value (1 — s) BP.
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if
{I'h — ^h) — (n — M) < — -• (3.13)oqg
Proof. See Appendix A.
The responsiveness condition is now expressed in terms of the lemon premium — 
since the entrepreneur and inside investor bargain over the cost differential between 
inside and outside refinancing in this setting. However, it retains its fundamental structure 
from Proposition 1. This reveals the crucial driver behind the responsiveness condition: not 
obtaining refinancing from the insider is costly. Whether this cost is incurred because of a 
loss in surplus due to a lemon’s premium in the outside market or due to non-continuation 
is irrelevant for the central mechanism of our model.
3.7 Conclusion
Much of the literature on the financing of entrepreneurial firms is concerned with the design 
of contracts to mitigate entrepreneurial agency problems. This chapter, by contrast, concen­
trates on a non-contractual solution. When an investor funds a portfolio of entrepreneurs,
we show that this investor can use the depth of his financial pockets to overcome entre­
preneurial agency problems. Limiting the amount of funds raised ex ante credibly conunits 
the investor to induce a tournament among portfolio projects for (cheaper) inside funds. 
Interestingly, although this tournament increases the investor’s ex post bargaining power, 
we show that it can also increase entrepreneurial effort incentives or allow investors to screen 
out bad entrepreneurs when contracts cannot achieve either. As a result, shallow pockets 
may improve on the second-best outcome despite creating an allocational inefficiency in the 
form of inefficient project continuation.
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The main mechanism at work in this result is the fact that shallow pockets (‘constrained 
finance’) are able to render the entrepreneur’s expected returns more sensitive to the payoff 
from his project than deep pockets (‘unconstrained finance’). When the increase in effort 
incentives induced by this superior ‘responsiveness’ is sufficient to outweigh the allocational 
inefficiency created by constrained finance, investors will choose shallow pockets.
In an adverse selection setting, the increased responsiveness of entrepreneurial payoff to 
type under shallow pockets is shown to create a single-crossing property that is absent 
when the investor has deep pockets. As a result, shallow pockets allow good entrepreneurs 
to separate themselves from bad entrepreneurs by exposing themselves to competition for 
refinancing.
Furthermore, the model presented in this chapter could be extended to a setting which 
includes both moral hazard and adverse selection. In such a setting, our model would suggest 
the same solution, namely shallow pockets, to solve both agency problems - in contrast to 
some recent contributions in which moral hazard and adverse selection problems require 
conflicting actions by the principal (see, for example, Morrison and White (forthcoming)).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the mechanism presented in this chapter plays a role 
in the design of venture capital funds. These are typically close-ended and governed by 
covenants that render additional fund-raising at a later life-cycle stage of a fund difficult. So- 
called ‘down-rounds’, in which the worst-performing start-ups must raise additional funds at 
reduced valuations from outside investors are a testimony to the fact that venture capitalists 
‘manage’ their portfolio and distribute funds according to performance.
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3. A Proofs
3.A.1 Proof of Proposition 4
Let sc  and su denote the equilibrium contracts offered by unconstrained and constrained 
investors, respectively. A separating equilibrium in which type 9 = g borrows from con­
strained investors and type 9 = b borrows from unconstrained investors will exist if, firstly, 
sc  and su are incentive compatible, secondly, participation constraints for investors and en­
trepreneurs are fulfilled, and thirdly, there are no other contracts with which investors could 
make more (i.e. strictly positive) profits. We will now consider each of these constraints in 
turn.
First, consider incentive compatibility. In equilibrium, the unconstrained investor attracts 
9 — b only and her participation constraint must be binding so that, proceeding as for 
Lemma 6 , we obtain
I I " )
Now consider sc- Incentive compatibility for type 9 = b implies that the constrained 
investor offers sc  such that type 9 = b weakly prefers unconstrained finance:
r  ^ [n +  Qb {rh -  n ) l  I
>tI^scR^+ ^[ri + q b { r h - r i ) ] ^ - Y { { ^ - Q b  + qg)ri + 3qgqb{rh-n)},  
which transforms to
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where su  is defined in equation (3.14).
Incentive compatibility for type 6 = g, in turn, implies that type g weakly prefers sc'-
T  |sc-R° +  ^ h  + qg (Vh -  -  y  {3n + ^Qg {rh ~  n)}
> r  ^ h  + Qg {rh -  n)] I ,
which transforms to
r  3r/ +  3 (3.16)
Note that these incentive compatibility conditions (3.15) and (3.16) are compatible with 
each other if and only if ^  — r/, i.e. if and only if the responsiveness condition holds.
Consider next participation constraints. Entrepreneurs always realize non-negative pay­
offs, while the construction of sjj ensures that unconstrained investors break even. Finally, 
the constrained investor’s expected payoff is non-negative if
r  |(1  -  sc) ^ h  +  Qg {rh ~  n ) ] |  "  y  “  n)} -  A > 0,
which transforms to
«C < sy 4- ^ kb -  -- i r, +  "  n) (3 .1 7 )
Condition (3.17) is compatible with the incentive compatibility constraint foi 9 = g (3.16)
if
, l(%-%)(rh-n) Tri + ql(r^~n) , t 3n + 3qj {rh -  n)
" ^ + 2 '  W ------------ 8 -------- % -------- - " " + 8 ----------15----------'
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which transforms to
T < (3.18)
n  +  {rh -  ri)
Finally, the existence of the separating equilibrium requires that investors cannot make 
strictly positive profits from another offer. As we have argued that a self-selecting menu of
contracts is not feasible, the other feasible offer is a pooling contract to all entrepreneurs.
The zero-profit pooling offer is given by
1 , I n  + {aqg + {1 -  a) qb) {vh -  ri) h
"^ =  ^ + 2 ----------------- ^ --------------------- 7 ^
For type g  to prefer s c  (and constrained finance) to sp (and unconstrained finance) it must 
hold that
r ^ i'f'h -  {3r/ +  3qg {vh -  n )}  > r ^ s p B P  +  ^ h  +  Qg {^h ~  n ) ] | ,
which transforms to
T Sri + 3q^ {rh -  ri) 
s c > s p  +  --------- ------------B9
This condition is compatible with (3.15) if
, T  (3 +  %  -  % )  n  +  Z q g q t  ( r f t  -  r j )  t  3r ;  +  3q j  { r h  -  n )
" ' " + 8 ----------------- ^ ------------------ - * ^ + 8 ----------«5---------
which transforms to
a  < r n - 3 q g ( r h - r ,)  
8 r h - r i
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and with the zeroprofit constraint (3.17) if
,  ^ {Qg -  Qb) {rh -  n) rr i + q‘^ { rh - r i)  r  Sn + {rh -  n)
* " ' + 2  Â5 8 ------- % -------- - * ^ + 8 ----------------------
which transforms to
n +  î |  (»•(, -  rj)
(3.20)
(% -  ?t) {rh -  n)
We can now sum up conditions. Firstly, if the responsiveness condition together with 
(3.18) hold, there exists an offer made by constrained investors such that (i) only type g 
prefers this offer to that made by unconstrained investors to type b and (ii) constrained 
investors break even. Secondly, if (3.19) and (3.20) jointly hold, the separating equilibrium 
cannot be destabilized by a (more profitable) pooling offer.
3. A .2 Proof of Proposition 5
In this proof we also state the exact conditions such that any equilibrium prescribes that 
both successful interim types will not seek outside finance in case of constrained finance. 
This was the case analyzed in Section 3.
We first describe more formally the operation of the market for outside finance. Projects, 
represented by the respective entrepreneurs and the original investor, first express their 
willingness to seek outside financing and investors subsequently compete to provide funds 
I2 in return for being paid D < R m  case of success. Because of their lack of information, 
outside investors cannot condition D on the project’s interim type. Our equilibrium concept 
is that of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, where investors rationally anticipate which projects 
seek outside finance. Given these shared beliefs, investors compete themselves down to zero 
profits.
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We further assume that ownership of the project is jointly held by the entrepreneur and 
the inside investor, so that surplus net of the repayment to outside investors is shared 
equally between them. This specification is not crucial to our model, although it seems 
characteristic of venture capital financing,^®
We already know that unsuccessful types, — n, will always seek outside finance. As 
outside investors have rational beliefs, it is then immediate that in equilibrium successful 
types, i.e. ip = I and ip = h, have a strict preference for using inside funds in case of 
unconstrained financing.
Turn now to the case of constrained finance. Suppose that some entrepreneur has not 
received inside money. (We turn later to the question which entrepreneur is chosen.) Recall 
that without refinancing both ip = I and ip = h realize BP > 0. It is only weakly optimal to 
obtain outside finance in case
[ R - D ] - I ^ >  0. (3.21)
A necessary condition for (3.21) to hold is D < R. Given R — D > 0  and ph > Pi, it is then 
immediate that ip = h prefers outside finance strictly whenever ip =  I only prefers it weakly.
This implies that we only have the following equilibrium candidates: (i) no successful type
is refinanced with outside money; (ii) only ip = h and ip = n are refinanced with outside 
funds; and (iii) both successful types - and also ip = n - are refinanced with outside funds.^^
Note next that by ph > pi and as outside investors must break even, ip = h is sure to 
pay a lemon’s premium under outside finance. If / also pays a lemon’s premium as r  
is sufficiently low, this premium is nevertheless strictly smaller than that for ip = h. This 
strengthens the argument in Section 3 by which the investor will choose ip = h over ip = I
^®In an alternative setting, in which the entrepreneur retains all ownership, he must leave the inside investor with  
(1 — Si) R° .  Our qualitative results extend also to  this setting.
^^We restrict attention to pure-strategy equilibria.
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if both projects are successful. We are now in a position to consider the various equilibrium 
candidates.
Equilibrium where no successful project is refinanced by outside investors
This is trivially always an equilibrium. If outside investors believe that no successful types 
seek outside finance the market for outside finance shuts down completely.
Equilibrium where all successful projects are refinanced by outside investors
We next characterize the equilibrium beliefs of outside investors, which we denote by 
7t('0 ). With probability both projects are of type h, in which case also the project
seeking outside finance is h: 7r{h) = r^qeiqoj- The project seeking outside finance is of type 
n whenever at least one project is unsuccessful such that 7r(n) =  1 — With the residual 
probability 7t(/) =  r^(l — outside investors believe that the project is of type Z. To
break even D must satisfy
DlT^ qOiQejPh +  T^(l -  q9iq9j)pi\ = (3.22)
To validate that we have characterized an equilibrium, we must verify that both successful 
types weakly prefer outside finance and that (3.22) generates a value D < R .’Ey our previous 
arguments we know that out of these three conditions the incentives for ^  =  Z generate the 
most stringent requirements. Prom (3.21) and (3.22) it must hold that
Pi R - r^q9iq9jPh + 7-2(1 -  %%)pz >RP,
which transforms to
case V’i =  "tpj =  n  we specify that the inside investor proposes only one project to  outside investors as they  
could otherwise im mediately conclude that both projects are unsuccessful. (N ote that in this case the inside investor 
would ask for outside finance even though she has still I2  in her coffers.)
r 2 > r h  1 1
_PiR-R?_ .qeiQOjPh +  (1 -
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(3.23)
Before proceeding to the analysis of the remaining equilibrium candidate, we turn to the 
assertion that, for low values of r  that are still compatible with (3.23), -0 =  I also has to 
pay a lemon’s premium. This is the case if piR — I2 exceeds pi [R — D], where we have to 
substitute D from (3,22). Reorganizing terms, we obtain from
Pi R - h+ t 2(1 -  qeiq9j)pi. < piR — 12
the requirement
r 2 < Pi (3.24)
QeiQOjPh + -  q0iq9j)pi'
As I2 < PiR — RP, which must hold by r/ > 0, (3.23) and (3.24) are jointly satisfied for 
intermediate values of r.
Equilibrium where only 'ip = n and ip = h are refinanced by outside investors
1—The outside investors’ beliefs are now given by 7t(Z) =  0, 7r(n) =  , and
7r(h) = vi Jsw iyi -- . To break even, D must solve
D- = h- (3.25)
( 1 -  r 2) +
Substituting (3.25) into (3.21), type h weakly prefers outside finance at these conditions
if
Ph R - I 2
( 1 -  T )^ +
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which transforms to
r ^ > r h  1 1
[p h R -R ^ \ [ Q9i qoj + ( 1 qoi %  ) J
(3.26)
For our purposes, i.e. as we merely want to rule out this equilibrium candidate, it is 
sufficient to stop here.
Having characterized all candidate equilibria, it remains to show that for all sufficiently 
low values of r  the only equilibrium is that without outside finance. This follows from 
conditions (3.23) and (3.26).
The responsiveness condition with outside finance
Suppose now that condition (3.23) holds, so that all interim types -0 E {n, Z, h} can 
seek refinancing from outside investors if inside funds are not available. We now derive 
responsiveness condition (3.13).
First, we turn to the entrepreneur’s payoff from negotiating refinancing with the inside 
investor. If E'^s interim type is n, negotiations with Ei are identical to those under uncon­
strained finance.^® Suppose instead that both entrepreneurs are of interim type I or h and 
that Ej  with ^  n is the last entrepreneur to be bargained with. If the limited funds have 
already been used for E{, the entrepreneur will only realize sjBP 4 - while the investor 
realizes {1 — sj) BP + ^A^ .^ from this project.
Alternatively, if the funds are still available, Ej  and the investor bargain over the cost 
savings from internal finance r^. — A  ^ so that Ej  realizes the sum of sjBP 4 - A^^ .^ and 
~  which transforms to sjBP 4- . The investor, on the other side, realizes the
Recall that the success probability o f n  is zero. We assumed that continuing the project (with outside finance) 
generates arbitrarily sm all private benefits, implying that owners of a type-n  project are no longer indifferent between  
seeking outside finance or not.
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sum of (1 — Sj) and  ^ — A^ ^^ J, which transforms to {1 — sj) HP \r^ .. Turn
next to negotiations with Ei who was picked first. In case of breakdown of the negotiations 
for inside funds, Ei receives SiR^ 4 - ^A^., while the investor’s payoff is equal to the sum of 
( 1 — Si) +  ^A .^ and (1 — sj) RP + In case they reach agreement, the joint surplus
is R^. +  (1 — Sj) iî® +  ^A^j. Subtracting the outside options of the two sides yields the net 
surplus r^. -  A .^ -  \  (r^. -  A^_). As Ei gets half of it, his payoff is the sum of SiR^ + 
and \[r^. -  A^ . -  \{r^. -  A^ .^)], which becomes SiRP 4- ^[r^. -  \  ~  Ar/,^ .)!-
Using this and the payoff SjRP 4- ^A^  ^ for £ j, we can next calculate the resulting ex 
post payoffs. When both entrepreneurs are of type h, Ei is picked first with probability 
implying that his payoff equals SiRP 4- — ^(r/i — A/i)] with probability  ^ and SiR^ +
with probability which adds up to SiF  ^+ +  3A/i). When ipi =  h and tpj =  Z, then
Ei receives inside refinancing for sure and earns SiR^ + ^[f'h — — A/)]. When ipi = I
and tpj = h, by contrast, Ei has to go to the outside market where he will earn SiR^ 4- ^Af. 
Finally, when both entrepreneurs are of type I, Ei is again picked first with probability  ^
and we obtain for his payoff SiR^ 4- | ( n  4- 3A/).
Finally, we turn to ex ante payoffs. Substitution of ex post payoffs yields E'^ s ex ante 
payoff:
%  {rh -  n ) ]
2
— s" (3  — Q9i 4- qOj) 4- 3qg.gg .^ [rh — Aft, — {ri  — A/)]]
^°An alternative scenario would be where the break-down of negotiations is ‘com plete’, im plying that the two sides 
also cannot agree to obtain outside finance. However, this does not affect our results as the entrepreneur’s payoff from  
negotiating with the inside investor would remain unchanged at SiR°  -t- )].
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Now, let 6i = g. The responsiveness of E[s payoff to his project’s profitability under 
constrained finance is then
1
2 '^  {^9 ~ Qb) {f'h “  ~ “g" (^ 5 “  %) [3% {rh — ^h ~  in  — Az)) -  (n -  A/)].
This exceeds the responsiveness under unconstrained finance if and only if condition (3.13) 
holds. Q.E.D.
3.B Bargaining Procedures with Open Time Horizon
In this section, we formulate and solve the bargaining game with an open time horizon. 
To save space we focus on the case with constrained finance. The case with unconstrained 
finance is similar but more immediate. It also convenient to introduce the following addi­
tional notation. If there is no refinancing of project i, denote the respective payoffs by yi 
for the investor and by for Ei, i.e. yi := (1 — Si)BP and z* ;= siRP. If there is refinancing 
their joint surplus from project i is denoted by Vi, i.e. Vi := R^. — / 2 - The respective net 
surplus is denoted hy W i:=Vi~ {yi + Zi).
Recall next the bargaining procedure. First, the investor picks an entrepreneur, Ei, and 
makes an offer x. In the next period Ei can respond, lî Ei accepts, the bargaining game ends 
as there are no funds available for Ej.  If Ei  rejects he can make a counter-offer, to which 
the investor can respond in the following period. If the investor rejects the counter-offer, 
she can pick again one of the two entrepreneurs and make a (new) offer etc..
Recall also that we capture bargaining frictions as follows. Suppose the investor currently 
negotiates with Ei. If Ei rejects the offer and makes a counter-offer, this offer will only be 
received by the investor with probability S. With probability Ô negotiations between the two
3.B Bargaining Procedures with Open Time Horizon 108 
parties break down, in which case project i will not be expanded. Note that a break-down 
of negotiations with Ei  does not affect the possibility of negotiating with Ej.  Also, the same 
risk of break-down exists if the investor reacts to the offer of Ei.^^
We now analyze the bargaining game. Our aim is to characterize a (subgame perfect) 
equilibrium that generates the payoffs used in the main text as J 1. We start with 
histories where there has been breakdown with one entrepreneur, say entrepreneur j . A sa 
consequence, only Ei remains and there are still funds for refinancing. The characterization 
of equilibrium strategies is standard. For the sake of completeness, we specify strategies in 
some detail. We characterize an offer by the payoff X  it leaves to Ei. If it is the investor’s 
turn, she always makes the offer X(. If she has to respond, she accepts any X  satisfying
Vi — X  > (1 — 0)yi + 5{vi — Xf) .  (3.27)
Ei always makes the offer X f  and accepts any X  satisfying
A > (1 -  0)zi 4 - ÔXf.  (3.28)
X- and x f '  are determined by using equalities in (3.27) and (3.28) and substituting X  = X f  
into (3.27) and X  = X[  into (3.28). In other words, the proposer extracts the maximum
feasible payoff while still ensuring acceptance. We then obtain that the investor offers
M odelling bargaining frictions by a risk of break-down is standard. In contrast to  the case w ith  delay, it ensures 
that the two sides’ outside options are always of relevance. That bargaining with the risk of break-down, but not 
bargaining with delay, can support the axiom atic Nash bargaining solution with threatpoints has been shown by 
Binmore, R ubinstein, and W olinsky (1986).
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which is accepted immediately by Ei,
Turn now to histories where there has not yet been any brealc-down. We specify that 
the investor always makes an offer to the entrepreneur with the highest net surplus, Wi. In 
case of indifference, we make the following specification. In the very first period, t' = 1, 
the invesor randomizes with equal probability. Later, he will always pick with probability 
one this particular entrepreneur Ei.^ "^  The investor now makes the offer xf and accepts any 
counter-offer x by Ei satisfying
{vi — rr) -f Uj > (1 — 5) [yi -f- (vj — Xj)] -I- 6{vi — x f + yj).
Observe that after break-down, which happens with probability 1 —J, the investor realizes 
the outside option yi with Ei and continues to bargain with Ej. In this case we know that 
she has to leave Ej with Xj  and, thereby, realizes Vj — Xj .  If no break-up occurs, we work 
again with the assumption that the investor’s next offer to Ei, i.e. xf,  will be accepted for 
sure. We will check below that it is optimal for the investor to again approach Ei and for 
Ei to accept.
Ei now always makes the offer x f  and accepts any x satisfying^^
x > { \  — S)zi 4- 5xf,
■*^This specification for resolving the investor’s indifference is only for convenience. Letting the investor randomize 
w ith equal probability in all future rounds would not change results as 5 —> 1.
^^Note that this is identical to the condition that we employed for analyzing histories with break-down. This follows 
as the entrepreneur rightly expects that the investor will approach him again next tim e, provided there was no 
break-down. We have more to say on the investor’s option to  approach a different entrepreneur below.
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Proceeding in the standard way, i.e. by choosing x( and x f  to make the respective re­
sponder just indifferent, we obtain
(vi — x f )  + yj = (1 — (^ ) [vi + {vj — Xj ) ]  + S{vi — x( + yj),
x \ = (1 -  5)zi 4- 5xf,
and after substitution
T Z i - \ - 5 v i  + 5 y j  — 5 { y i - \ - V j  — X j )  r Z i - \ - v i  +  y j  — yi  — Vj +  X f
X,  =  with h m x f = --------------------2------------------
Hence, for 5 —> 1 the entrepreneur who is chosen first, Ei, realizes
1
4  = i^ + 2 2/2) -  k '  -  X j  -  yj) ] .
Substituting
v l  '^ 3 3^ ~ Vj 1 , \\-  ^ 3  -  % = -  - — j — -  -  Vj = g k  -  k  + %)),
we obtain
1
W i  -  - W j
This matches our result in the main text for the ‘reduced’ bargaining procedure.
By construction of the offers, to confirm that we have characterized an equilibrium we 
only have to consider histories where (i) both entrepreneurs are still around and (ii) where 
the investor deviates and makes an offer to the non-preferred entrepreneur j.  For these 
histories, we make the following specifications. The investor offers Xj and accepts from Ej
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any x  satisfying
{vj — x) + y i > { \  — 5){yj +  {yi — X/)) +  5{vi — x \ + yj).
Note that this inequality takes into account that the investor will switch back to Ei in case
she rejects the offer of Ej. Ej makes the offer x f  and accepts any x satisfying
X > (1 — ô)zj + Sxf.
Making the responders again indifferent, we obtain
( v j - x f )  + yi = { l -0) {y j  + { v i - X ( ) ) - \ - 0 { v i - x l +  yj),
X j  =  (1 -  Ô)Zj +  ôxf ,  ,
yielding
Xj = {1 — 0)zj +  6 [vj +  7/i — (1 — 6){yj +  {vi — X- )) — 6{vi — x j yj)] .
Recall that we want to confirm that, given these payoffs, the investor does not find it 
profitable to deviate and make an offer to j  if no break-down has yet occurred with Ei. If 
the investor does not deviate she obtains (uf — xj) yj. If she does deviate the payoff is 
{vj — Xj) + yi. Hence we need to show that
{vi - x j )  + y j >  {vj - X j )  + yi. (3.29)
3.B Bargaining Procedures with Open Time Horizon 112 
Substituting for xf  and xj, requirement (3.29) transforms to {wi — W j ) { l  — <^) > 0, which 
holds by assumption.
There is an indirect and more intuitive way to see that (3.29) must hold. Recall first that 
xf  and Xj axe determined just to ensure acceptance by the respective entrepreneur, i.e., 
we have xf  = {1 — 5)zi -f ô x f  and xj =  (1 — S)zj +  ôxf .  Likewise, recall that x f  and x f  
are chosen such that the investor is just indifferent between accepting and rejecting. As, 
following rejection, the investor returns to bargaining with Ei in both cases, we have that
V i  -  x f  + y j  = V j  -  x f  + y i ,  implying xj -  xj =  ( z i  — Z j )  ô { w i  -  W j ) .  Substituting this 
into (3.29) yields again the requirement { w i  — W j ) { l  — Ô) > 0.
Communication as an Incentive Device
4.1 Introduction
Communication of knowledge, ideas, and research results have played a central role in the 
recent literature on partnerships and joint ventures^, on the optimal organisation of R&D^ 
as well as in the literature on “learning organisations” A feature common to these models 
is that communication creates spillovers that alter the production function of a firm, joint 
venture, or researcher, and allow them to use inputs more productively, for example, by co­
ordinating research tasks among difiFerent researchers (Combs (1993)), by allowing experts to 
screen new ideas (Biais and Perotti (2003)) or by allowing workers to specialise in knowledge 
acquisition within an organisation (Garicano (2000)).
By contrast, the model presented in this chapter offers a rationale for conimunication and 
knowledge exchange, even though communication does not create spillovers and does not
^See, for exam ple, Gallini and Wright (1990), Bhattacharya, Glazer, and Sappington (1992), Combs (1993), Cassi- 
man, Perez-Castrillo, and Veugelers (2002), Jansen (2001), Navaretti, Bussoli, Graevenitz, and Ulph (1999) and Pastor  
and Sandonis (2002). For seminal work on research joint ventures see K atz (1986) and D ’Aspremont and Jacquemin  
(1988) as well as De Bondt (1996) for a survey of the resulting literature.
^See, for exam ple, Anton and Yao (1994, 1995), Anand and G aletovic (2000b), C ans and Stern (2000, 2002), 
Rosenkranz and Schmitz (1999, 2003) and Biais and Perotti (2003).
^See, for exam ple, Senge (1994) and Garicano (2000).
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per se increase the surplus that can be created within an organization. In our model, two 
agents form a partnership that creates interim knowledge which is then used to create final 
research output. When partners in a research joint venture face a hold-up problem at the 
interim stage, communication merely affects their relative bargaining power as it influences 
their ability to conduct research outside the partnership. However, in contrast to the existing 
literature, communication does not allow the partnership to use interim knowledge more 
productively in final research. In particular, communicating knowledge to another agent 
increases the recipient’s bargaining power at the interim stage and consequently lowers that 
of the sender. As a result, communication lowers the share of surplus appropriated by the 
sender. Nevertheless, an agent may find it optimal to commit to communication at the 
ex ante stage as it increases the recipient’s incentives to create interim knowledge, thus 
increasing the size of the expected surplus.
We find that the benefits of communication as an ex ante incentive device outweighs its 
costs in terms of ex post loss of bargaining power when there are sufficiently strong increasing 
returns to knowledge, when communication is not too perfect and when the agents’ ex ante 
moral hazard problem is neither too weak nor too severe.
The analysis most closely related to ours is that of Rosenkranz and Schmitz (1999) and 
Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2003) who also consider the impact of knowledge disclosure in a 
model with interim hold-up. Their focus, however, is on the optimal allocation of property 
rights. In their model, the amount of communicable knowledge is fixed so that communica­
tion will occur if and only if it increases the sender’s share of the surplus created. Moreover, 
the impact of communication on the collaborative surplus is critical in determining the op­
timality of communication. In our model, by contrast, communication will occur even if it
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reduces the share of the surplus appropriated by an agent during renegotiations as long as 
it provides sufficient additional effort incentives to the other agent.
4.2 The Model
Two symmetric agents, indexed by i 6  {A, B } , can each pursue a research project, either 
each on their own or both joined together in what we term a “partnership”. In this chapter, 
a “partnership” is simply defined by the fact that the two agent’s enter into a profit-sharing 
agreement.^
In the following, we assume that the profit sharing agreement the two agents enter into 
when forming a partnership consists of a sharing rule that is contingent on the existence of 
the partnership. In particular, this characterisation rules out the inclusion of clauses into 
the partnership agreement that govern that agents’ behaviour after the partnership has 
broken down.^
The research project undertaken either by the two agents separately or by the partnership 
formed by them consists of two stages. In the first stage, agents can acquire knowledge that 
can then be used to produce final research during the second stage. Final research success, 
in turn, determines payoffs.
^Thus, we do not consider the additional organisational or contractual characteristics frequently associated with  
this nomer. See, for exam ple, Hansraann (1996) for an overview of the form and function of business organisations 
w ith a particular focus on the structure of private partnerships and other producer cooperatives.
®This, for exam ple, specifically rules out the consideration of non-com pete clauses that restrict com petition between  
agents in case of a break down of the partnership. Allowing for such clauses, it might be argued, may reduce the efficacy 
of the mechanism proposed in this chapter in improving the agents’ effort incentives, as any knowledge com municated  
during the lifetim e of the partnership would be unproductive for the duration of the non-com pete clause.
However, allowing for non-com pete clauses will not crucially affect our analysis for two reasons. First, as, for 
example, Anton and Yao (1994) argue, there are severe legal lim its on the enforceability o f such contracts and thus 
on their ability to restrict ex post  com petition. Secondly, and more importantly, it is precisely the main argument of 
this chapter that, in som e circum stances, agents in a partnership benefit ex ante  from stronger ex post  com petition  
outside the partnership.
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4.2.1 The First Stage {t =  0)
At t =  0, agents A and B  decide whether to form a partnership.® An agent can then acquire 
knowledge, denoted by hi, for executing a particular research task. For simplicity, knowledge 
can be either high (hi = h) or low (hi = 0). Knowledge acquisition is stochastic and the 
probability that hi = h is given by the effort 6^  exerted by agent i. The effort choice 6’^ is 
not observable, and hence not contractible. Effort is binary^ - 6^ E {0,9 + 0} , 6 + Ô E (0,1) 
- and associated with the following cost function c
c if  0^  = 9+ 5 
^~^^0i î9^ = 9
Knowledge hi is observable but not verifiable and embedded in the agent. As a result, 
contracts cannot be made contingent on knowledge realisations and the agent can decide to 
withdraw her knowledge from the research partnership.
As argued in chapter 2 , there exists a difference between observing and possessing knowl­
edge. An agent’s observation that another agent has a particular knowledge level hi does 
not translate into an ability to use that knowledge productively. Productive use or, in our 
parlance, possession of knowledge can be achieved only by a deliberate transfer from an­
other agent who possesses that knowledge. In contrast to chapter 2, the model presented in 
this chapter assumes that property rights are well defined so that an agent will transfer her 
knowledge if and only if it is in her interest.®
C o m m u n ica tio n
®We could allow for agents to  form a partnership at a later stage. W hat is crucial for our results is that com muni­
cation, as described in this section, is not feasible unless a partnership has been formed.
^Allowing for a continuous effort choice would not affect the central intuition behind our results but reduce 
notational clarity.
®See Anton and Yao (1994) and Anand and Galetovic (2000b) for an analysis of the optim al organisation of R&D  
when property rights are not perfect.
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We label such a transfer of knowledge as ‘communication’ by the agent. It can only 
occur when a partnership has been formed. The focus of our analysis will be the agents’ 
choice of communication policy, denoted by Tri. For the purposes of this paper, we interpret 
7Ti as the probability with which agent i's knowledge is communicated to agent j  and let 
TTj G {0, 7t} By definition, communication can only take place once knowledge acquisition 
has occurred. However, it is questionable that an agent will have incentives to communicate 
at that s t a g e . A s  a result, we will concentrate on the agents’ choice of communication 
policy at t =  0. In this sense, we talk of conimunication policy as a commitment at t = 0 
to communicate at a later stage. Such a commitment to communicate may, for example, 
be created through a company’s internal organisation^^ or through the physical location 
of the research act ivi tyal though we remain agnostic throughout the analysis on the 
precise means of achieving this. In this sense, communication policy may be thought of as 
a commitment to ‘exposure’ of research results to another agent.
Communication matters as it may increase the knowledge level of an agent at t = 1. 
To this end, we distinguish between the pre-communication knowledge, /ij, and the post­
communication level of knowledge, which we denote by Hi. Suppose that agent i commits to 
a communication policy 7r* and creates knowledge hi at the end of t = 0. Then if communica­
tion is successful, agent j  will possess post-communication knowledge Hj = hj-{-hi at t = 1. 
If communication is unsuccessful, Hj = hj. Since knowledge is non-rival, communication by 
i does not deplete i's knowledge level.
® An alternative interpretation would be one in which TPj represents the share o f knowledge that is communicated. 
This interpretation would require a more complicated payoff structure and would, given risk neutrality, not affect our 
results.
^°See, for exam ple, the analysis contained in Chapter 1.
^^For exam ple, the company may insist on regular m eetings between the agents to  coordinate and present research 
results or it may impose a joint supervisor who m ay play a similar intermediary role in terms of knowledge transmission 
as that o f the investor analysed in Chapter 1.
A gents could be forced to undertake research in physically distant locations, thus minim ising the likelihood of 
involuntary spillover. Alternatively, when research is conducted in the sam e laboratory, for exam ple, agents are likely 
to learn a lot about each other’s research progress.
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4.2.2 The Seœnd Stage {t =  I)
At the second stage, post-communication knowledge Ha and Hb is used to conduct final 
research. Since knowledge is embedded in an agent, agents can decide to continue research 
on their own. As a result, both agent’s have hold-up power and A  and B  will renegotiate 
contract terms at this stage.
Payoffs: What matters to our analysis are an agent’s expected returns at t =  1. As a 
result, we do not model final payoffs explicitly, although Appendix A provides a detailed 
example in which final payoffs are modelled exphcitly.
Expected returns from research at t = 1 depend on the knowledge held by both agents.
To be more precise, expected returns depend on both the distribution of pre-communication 
and post-communication knowledge levels and on whether research is conducted within the 
partnership or separately (i.e. whether renegotiations at t =  1 were successful or not).
In general, we denote by V (Ha , hs] Ha ., Hb ) the expected value of the research project at 
t = l when it is conducted within the partnership of A  and B. By contrast, let (Ha , hB] Ha , Hb ) 
denote the expected value of the research project at t =  1 to agent i when research is con­
ducted separately. We impose several assumptions on this payoff structure.
A ppendix A  presents a simple extensive-form  model of final stage interactions between the agents w ith expected  
returns that fulfill these assumptions. The interpretation put forward there is the following:
At t =  0, agents A  and B  can acquire expertise h at differing research research tasks. At f =  1, each research task  
must be concluded successfully to generate a positive payoff at t =  2. Communication of, say, B 's  expertise in task  
B  to agent A  enables A  to  undertake task B  and vice-versa. However, there are no returns to scale to both agents 
working on a particular research task in a partnership.
W hen A  and B  work in a partnership, each agent concentrates on her task. A s a result, pre-com munication knowledge 
levels m atter for expected returns while post-com m unicatjon payoffs are irrelevant. W hen A  and B  sp lit at t =  1, 
each agent engages in both research tasks simultaneously. A s a result, post-com m unication knowledge levels m atter.
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Assum ption 1 : The expected returns within a partnership depend only on pre-communication 
knowledge levels
V {Ha , hB\Ha  ^Hb ) =  V {Ha , /ig) and 
V{h,h) = V > V  {h, 0) = V{0,h) = v > V  (0,0) =  0.
This assumption implies that communication cannot improve returns within the partner­
ship and distinguishes our analysis from the literature that emphasises payoff complemen­
tarities realised through communication (see, for example, Combs (1993), Rosenkranz and 
Schmitz (1999) and Ulph and Katsoulacos (1999)). Assumption 1 would rule out any role 
for communication in this literature.
A ssum ption 2 : An agent’s expected returns outside the partnership depend only on 
post-communication knowledge levels:
{Ha , hB’, Ha , Hb ) = {Ha , Hb ) for agent A
{Ha , hB', Ha , Hb ) = {Ha , Hb ) for agent B
Furthermore, it is {i) decreasing in the other agent’s knowledge
w^ (', 0) > (•, h) > (', 2h) for agent A
(0, •) > w^ {h,-) > {2h, •) for agent B
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and {ii) increasing in the agent’s own knowledge advantage
w"^  {2h, h) > {h, h) and w"^  {h, 0) > w (0,0) =  0 for agent A
{h, 2h) > w^ {h, h) and (0, h) > w (0,0) =  0 for agent B
This specification clarifies to role of communication in this model. Communication does 
not affect the partnerships ability to generate surplus at t =  2. Rather, communication 
affects the agents’ ability to conduct research outside the partnership and influences their 
bargaining power in renegotiations over final returns at t =  1. More precisely, Assumption 
2 implies that communication by A to R will increase B's post-communication knowledge 
with the consequence that A's payoff from separate research is reduced while B's payoff 
is increased. Hence, communication from A to B  improves B's but worsens A's relative 
knowledge position ceteris paribus.
Figure 4.1 summarises the timing of the game as presented above:
4-2.3 Renegotiation
To the degree that both agents possess knowledge at t = 1 and can undertake research 
independently, they possess hold-up and thus bargaining power. We assume that agents 
cannot commit at t =  0 to not renegotiate at t =  1. Furthermore, as knowledge levels 
are observable, there is no asymmetric information at t =  1. Bargaining over the expected 
surplus at t =  1 is then assumed to take place according to Nash bargaining with equal 
bargaining powers.
Agent i decides on effort 6^  &{0,G-¥ Ô}
FIGURE 4.1. The Timeline.
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Agent i has pre-communication knowledge hi and post-communication knowledge Hi.
Given Assumptions 1 and 2, the surplus from renegotiation is V {hi,hj) — {Hi,Hj) — 
up Let S'^  {hi,hj]Hi,Hj) be defined as the surplus appropriated by agent i
through renegotiations at t =  1 :
(hi, hy, Hi, Hj) := i  [V (hi, hj) + w* (H , Hj) -  (Hi, Hj)] (4.1)
It is, by assumption 2 , increasing in the agent’s own knowledge advantage as well as
decreasing in the other agent’s knowledge. To simplify the subsequent analysis, we impose 
the following natural assumption:
Assum ption 3; An agent without knowledge does not œntribute to the surplus created 
within a partnership:
(0, •) =  (•, 0) =  0 .
This assumption states that a partnership creates an incremental value over separate re­
search if and only if both agents have knowledge. It also implies that (h, 0) =  (0, h) =
V ,  so that the sole agent with knowledge appropriates the entire surplus while the agent 
without any knowledge earns zero returns from a partnership
5^ (0 , h] 0 , h) = {h, 0 ; h, 0 ) =  0  and (/i, 0 ; h, 0 ) =  (0 , h\ 0 , h) = v.
^^Note that any sharing rule agreed upon by the agents at t =  0 will be renegotiated at t =  1. Moreover, since 
the enforcement of such a sharing rule is contingent on the partnership’s continuation, it does not influence outside 
options nor the surplus bargained over.
A ssum ption 3 is merely a normalisation that simplifies notation. Our main results are unaffected if it is relaxed.
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To streamline the subsequent analysis, let W  denote the expected return to agent i at 
t = 0 :
qAqB^^a ]^ b^ ^ a 2Ji^  2h) + (l — 7T )^ 5 ^ (h, h\ h, 2 h)]
+ (l -  TT^ ) {h, h\ 2h, h) + (l -  tt^) 5^ {h, h; h, h)] )
■^9^ { l -  9^) {h, 0 ; h, /i) +  (l — tt^) (h, 0 ; /i, 0 )]
+  (1  -  0 ^) 9^ [7t^5^ (0 , h; h, h) + (1  -  7T^ ) 5"^  (0 , h; 0 , h)]
and
r B e^9^{7r^ {h, h- 2h, 2h) +  (l -  tt^ ) {h, h; 2h, h)]
+  (l -  7T^) (h, h; h, 2h) 4- (l — 'k ^) {h, h\ h, h)] )
+  (1 -  9^) (0, h; h, h) +  (1 -  7T^ ) (0, h; 0, h)]
+  ( l  -  9^) 9  ^ ( / i ,  0 ; h ,  / i )  +  ( l  -  tt"^) 5 “® ( h ,  0 ;  / i ,  0 ) ]
Finally, define
{2h, h) — (2/i, h)
: = w ^(h ,2h) — w^{h,2h)
as the difference in payoffs between the agents in the case in which one agent possess both 
agents’ knowledge while the other only possesses one agent’s knowledge and in which the 
agents have separated at t =  1. Symmetry between the agents then implies that =  A^so 
that the subsequent discussion will use A := A^ =  A^ for simplicity.
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4.3 Analysis of Constrained Optimal Communication Policy
In this section, we first derive expected returns at t =  0 and then examine incentives to 
exert effort. Finally, we derive the optimal communication policy.
4-3.1 Expected Returns
We first focus on the surplus from renegotiation at t =  1, as given by definition (4.1). 
Pre-communication knowledge levels Ha and Hb determine the gross surplus created in a 
partnership while post-communication knowledge levels Ha and Hb determine the outside 
options of a particular agent and hence her net returns.
In general, we can discern two cases: either both agents have the same level of post- 
communication knowledge {Ha = Hb ) or not {Ha Hb ) ■
First, suppose Ha = Hb - Then both agents have the same outside option when bargaining 
at t =  1 so that both agents will extract the same net surplus during renegotiations. By 
(4.1), expected returns will then depend solely on pre-communication knowledge levels, Ha 
and hB-
Post-communication knowledge levels will be the same if both agents possessed pre­
communication knowledge and either both communicated successfully or both failed to com­
municate. In this case, an agent’s expected return is 5* {h, h\ h, h) = 5  ^(/i, h\ 2h, 2h) = 
Alternatively, post-communication knowledge levels will be the same if an agent with pre­
communication knowledge communicated it to an agent whose knowledge acquisition at 
t = 0 failed. In this case, expected payoffs are S'^  {h, 0; A, h) = 5  ^(0, A; A, A) =  \v.
Second, suppose Ha ^  Hb -Ïo. this case, the agent with more post-communication knowl­
edge will appropriate more of the surplus generated by the partnership because of her su-
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perior outside option. Post-communication knowledge levels may differ either because both 
agents had pre-communication knowledge h but only one communicated successfully or be­
cause one agent had superior pre-communication knowledge and did not communicate it. 
Suppose that Ha > Hb - If Ha = h and Hb = 0 , then by Assumption 3 5^ (h, 0 ; h,0) = v 
and {h, 0; h, 0 ) =  0 . If Ha =  2 h and Hb = h, then 5^ (h, h; 2h, h) =  ^(F  + A) and 
(/i,/i;2 h,/i) =  ^ ( F - A ) .
As these payoffs indicate, it is not obvious that the surplus from continuing the part­
nership is positive. If Ha = Hb  = 2h, the agents will renegotiate to continue the part­
nership if and only if F  > it;* (2h, 2h) 4 - (2h, 2h). If Ha = Hb = h this requires
V >w^ {h, h) + vP {h, h). Finally, if Ha = 2h and Hb  =  h or if Ha = h and Hb =  2/i, agents 
will continue the partnership if and only if F  > A. In this section, we restrict ourselves to 
the case in which the surplus from continuing the partnership is always positive by imposing 
the following assumption.
A ssu m p tio n  4: F  > 2u and F  > A.
Appendix B provides conditions under which our results are unaffected when F  < 2u and 
F  < A so that the surplus from continuing the partnership is negative at t = 1 and both 
agents conduct final research on their own.
Given assumption 4, the expected return to the partnership at f =  0 is given by
qAqBv  + [qA e^)] v - c  {9^) -  c {9^) (4.2)
Note that assumption 4 implies that the marginal social return to effort by either agent is 
positive.
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Consider agent Her expected return can now be w ritten as
ûB
v-\- —  { y  — 2v) ’A.—A |  + Ç ( A - ) -  c (e^) 
(4.3)
Agent A's expected return consists of three components. The first term is independent of 
the communication policies chosen and consists of the expected surplus created through A’s 
knowledge - 6^v - plus half the expected incremental surplus from combining both agents’ 
knowledge - (V — 2v). The second term captures the effect of A's own communica­
tion policy: it lowers A's expected return by — when A possesses knowledge and 
by — 7T^  (A — v) when both possess knowledge. Finally, the third term represents the
impact of B's communication policy. It raises A's expected return by when B  has
knowledge and by (A — v) when both possess knowledge.
For given effort choices, communication from A to B  reduces A's payoff because it in­
creases B's post-communication knowledge at t =  1 , thus increasing B's outside option 
and simultaneously lowering A's outside option. Since communication does not affect the 
gross surplus created within the partnership, A's expected return is reduced. By the same 
reasoning, communication from B to A increases A's expected return as it improves A's 
bargaining position and worsens that of B.
The main implication of this discussion is that, if effort choices were fixed, an agent 
does not have an incentive to communicate as it would merely erode her surplus. To put it 
differently, communication lowers ex post bargaining power so that, ceteris paribus, there are 
no incentives to communicate. The remainder of this paper is dedicated to demonstrating
’The analysis for agent B  is analogous since the agent’s are sym m etric.
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that, ceteris non paribus, this intuition may not hold any longer. To this end, we first derive 
the optimal choice of effort and then analyse the optimal communication policy.
Before proceeding, we quickly establish that it is indeed in the agents’ interest to form
a partnership at t =  0. The expected return of agent A  when no partnership is formed at
t =  0  is given by
(h, ft) +  (1 -  0^) v ] - c  (0^) (4.4)
so that we can establish the following result.
Lemma 1  In equilibrium, agents will always prefer to form a partnership at t = 0.
Proof: For agent A, the lemma follows from a comparison of (4.3) and (4.4) as well as 
the fact that strategies will be symmetric in equilibrium. Ex ante symmetry between agents 
A and B  also implies that B  will prefer the partnership at t =  0. ■
As a result, we proceed under the assumption that the agents have formed a partnership.
4>3.2 Choice of Effort
The agent chooses her effort after communication policies have been committed to. Assump­
tion 4 implies the existence of a moral hazard problem as the return of the partnership is 
increasing in either agent’s effort.
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Consider now agent Prom (4.3), the incremental return to her effort, given commu­
nication policies 7T^  and is
and consists of three components. The first factor - v + 6^ - is independent of
communication and captures the incremental return to A!s knowledge when B  does not have 
any knowledge, v, as well as the impact of B's acquisition of knowledge on A's incremental 
return, namely . B's acquisition of knowledge increases the partnership’s expected 
return from v to V  but lowers A's bargaining power so that she can only extract half of 
the surplus. The net effect is positive when V > 2v, a situation we refer to as increasing 
returns to knowledge.
The second and third component capture the impact of communication on incremental 
returns to effort. Recall that communication by B  improves A's post-communication knowl­
edge and A's bargaining power and vice versa. Hence, the second component - -
is a measure of how much communication by B  contributes to A's incremental return: if B  
has knowledge, but does not communicate, then A's incremental return is y ; when B  does 
communicate, her incremental return is As a result, communication affects A's
incremental return by If this effect is positive, we refer to it as increasing returns to 
communication.
Finally, the third component captures the effect of A's communication on her effort 
incentives. As expected, own communication reduces effort incentives, because it dissipates 
returns of sole possession of knowledge from u to |  and because it depletes surplus when
A gain, ex ante  sym m etry between agents A  and B  implies that the analysis for B  proceeds analogously.
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both possess knowledge by strengthening B's bargaining power when there are increasing 
returns to communication.
Note that A's incremental return to effort depends positively on B's effort if + 
(tt-® — 7T"^ ) > 0 , e.g. when there are increasing returns to knowledge and to communi­
cation. In this case, effort choices are strategic complements.
To conclude, agent A  will exert effort if
A — V
> -l (4.6)
for a given pair of communication policies, and tt^, as well as given B's effort level 6^. 
To streamline the following exposition, let
denote the incremental return to effort to an agent when no communication occurs (tt"^  =  tt"® = O) 
and when the other agent exerts low effort.
As a result, we can write agent A's incentive compatibility constraint (4.6) as
V - 2 v(/)> — (9 —6)    h 7T B n B A — V
Since agents are ex ante symmetric, inspection of (4.6) allows us to draw the following 
conclusions.
Lemma 2  An agent’s incremental return to effort is decreasing in her own communica­
tion. It is increasing in the other agent’s communication if there are increasing returns to
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communication (A > v). If there are increasing returns to knowledge (V > 2v) , the agents’ 
effort levels are strategic complements given a symmetric communication policy.
4 .3.3 Choice of Communication Policy
First, consider the socially optimal communication policy. Recall that the ex ante returns 
of the partnership are given by equation (4.2). Since the communication policies and 
7T^  do not enter the overall return of the project directly, the implication is that the first- 
best communication policy is not uniquely defined in our setting in the absence of an 
entrepreneurial agency problem.
Consider then the optimal communication pohcy in the presence of the entrepreneurial 
moral hazard problem. Assumption 4 implies that high effort by either agent increases total 
surplus, so that communication will be socially optimal whenever it induces high effort by 
either or both of the agents. We now turn to an analysis of the agents’ private incentives to 
communicate.
Agent A's communication policy has a direct negative impact on A's surplus as it reduces 
her bargaining position at t =  1 relative to B. Because it changes relative bargaining 
positions, it also has an impact on each agent’s effort incentives. In particular, for a given 
level of effort by B, communication reduces A's effort incentives. The effect on B's effort 
incentives, by contrast, depends on the returns to communication. Additionally, when, as 
per assumption 4, the agent’s effort choices are strategic complements, there is also an 
‘indirect’ effect, as an increase in B's effort will improve A's incremental return. The optimal 
communication policy trades off these effects against each other.
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One immediate implication of this discussion is that a necessary condition for communi­
cation to improve A's surplus is that communication increases B's effort choice. As Lemma 
2  indicates, this will be the case if and only if there are increasing returns to communication, 
i.e. if A > u.
Suppose then that A > v so that communication increases B's incremental return to 
effort. When this increase is insufficient to change B's choice of effort, communication is 
inefficient and will not occur in equilibrium.
Proposition 1  Suppose that A  > v. If the incentive problem is very weak so that
0 >O
or if it is very severe so that
neither agent will communicate in equilibrium: =  tt-® =  0 .
Proof: Suppose that tt^ =  tt"® = 0. Then communication will not occur in equilibrium if 
both agents exert high effort in the absence of communication, i.e. i îv  + ^{V  — 2v) > f or 
if communication by A  does not increase B's effort incentives sufficiently to induce higher 
effort even if A exerts high effort, i.e. if u -1- ^  [V — 2 u -f- tt (A — u)] < |  which can be 
rearranged to yield the second condition. ■
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Proposition 1 implies that communication by A  will induce higher effort by B  if and only
if
0 >( ^ > -7T0^ - - -, (4.7)
that is, whenever there are sufficiently strong increasing returns to communication. Condi­
tion (4.7) also represents a necessary condition for communication to be socially optimal.
The following proposition states the main result of the paper. It describes when a deviation 
from non-communication is profitable and when it will lead to an equilibrium in which both 
agents communicate.
Proposition 2  Suppose increasing returns to communication are sufficiently strong so that 
condition (4-7) holds. Then a deviation from non-communication is profitable for A if
Communication by both agents (tt^ =  tt-® = tt) will be a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium 
if, in addition
'^{0 -\-ô) — - + '^\kv  — 5 {y  — 2v)] > (f) > ^[ttv — Ô (V — 2v)]. (4.9)
If
0 > (j) > 7T {9 6) ^ 2 ^ + — 5 (y  — 2v)] (4.10)
then there are multiple equilibria including a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which 
each agent will choose communication policy n with probability p = ^ 6^+s '
In both cases, both agents will exert high effort in equilibrium: 9"^  = 6^ = 9.
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Proof: Suppose that A > v and that condition (4.7) holds, Furthermore, we assume that 
7T^  =  TT-® =  0  and that each agent expects the other agent to not exert high effort in the 
absence of communication so that 0"^  = 6^ = 6}^ We now construct an equilibrium in 
which both agents will communicate. First, we show when communication is a profitable 
deviation from the above strategies. Then we examine when communication is a symmetric 
Nash equilibrium strategy.
First, suppose that A communicates. Then =  tt will increase 6^ from 6 to 6 -\-5 under 
condition (4.7). Given that tt^ =  0, B's higher effort increases A's surplus by 6^ {V — 2v) 
while 7T^  =  7T lowers her surplus by —On [ |  +  (A — u)] . As a result, the net effect 
of communication by A  on her total surplus is non-negative if tt < so that
communication is a profitable deviation in this case. By symmetry, B  will also find it 
optimal to communicate in order to induce effort by A  when this condition holds.
Second, consider communication as an equilibrium strategy. Recall that, since A > u, A’s 
communication induces higher effort by B  which increases A's incremental return to effort 
under assumption 4. Then communication by both is a pure strategy equilibrium if this 
incremental return is not sufficient to induce high effort by A, i.e. if  ^ > r  -I- ^  {V — 2v) — 
7T [ | -f- (A — u)] and if the incremental return given communication by both is sufficient 
to induce high effort by both, i.e. if u -j- (V — 2v) — 7t |  > | .  Condition (4.9) summarises 
these two constraints.
If u -f {V — 2v) — TT [ | + ^  (A — u)] > j ,  then B's higher effort induces A to ex­
ert more effort in the absence of communication by B. Because of this complementarity, 
there are multiple equilibria over this range. In particular, there will be a mixed strategy
^®Note that because effort choices are strategic com plements there always exists an equilibrium for the parameter 
ranges that we consider in which both agents expect each other to exert high effort and, as a result, find it prof­
itable to exert high effort w ithout communication. This existance of m ultiple equlibria is standard in games with  
com plementarities. For the purpose of our existance analysis, we can ignore the above equilibrium.
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equilibrium in which both agents choose communication policy tt with probability
v + { e  + ^ ) { V - 2 v )
^  [v + (0 + 6) (A — «)]
Finally, in a symmetric equilibrium, both agents prefer communication to non-communication 
at t =  0  since it induces higher effort by both agents. ■
Proposition 2 describes the conditions under which communication is a symmetric equi­
librium strategy. Its main implication is that it may be optimal for an agent to commit at 
the ex ante stage to lowering her ex post bargaining power. Although such a commitment 
lowers the share of the surplus that she appropriates, it increases her partner’s effort incen­
tives and thus the size of the surplus. As such, it provides a role for communication pohcy 
as an incentive device and argues that communication may occur in partnerships even in 
the absence of any positive impact on the gross surplus generated.
Conditions (4.7) and (4.8) indicate that such an equilibrium will exist if there are increas­
ing returns to communication (A > v) and as long communication is not too perfect. When 
communication is too perfect, the reduction in the share of surplus due to communication 
outweighs the increase in the size of surplus. As a result, it is not profitable to deviate from 
non-communication and communication is not an equilibrium strategy. Figure 4.2 illustrates 
the equilibria described in Propositions 1 and 2. Finally, it follows from proposition 2 that 
communication is socially optimal whenever conditions (4.9) and (4.10) hold, i.e. whenever 
it induces high effort in equilibrium. This will be the case even if condition (4.8) were not 
to hold, so that socially optimal communication might not occur when the communication 
mechanism is too efficient ( tt is too high).
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Symmetric Pure-Strategy Equilibrium: 
Communication and High Effort
A - v
No Communication 
and 
Low Effort
V V -2v  
K  —  - 0
No Communication 
and 
High Effort
(!>
Symmetric Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium: 
Communication with Prob./? and High Effort
FIGURE 4.2. Equilibria as described by Proposition 1 and Proposition 2.
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4.4 Conclusions
This paper analyses a model in which two agents form a partnership, exert effort to acquire 
research knowledge and have the ability for an ex ante commitment to share research 
knowledge at a later stage. Such communication does not affect the surplus that can be 
achieved within the partnership but merely alters the agents’ bargaining power. As a result, 
communication by an agent reduces her ex post bargaining power and thus her ex ante 
expected surplus.
The main result of this paper is communication may nevertheless be ex ante optimal as 
it can serve as an incentive device for the other agent in the partnership. Communication 
to her increases her effort incentives and, if these are sufficiently important, the 5Ûe of 
the surplus created in the partnership increases sufficiently to outweigh the communicating 
agent’s loss of share of surplus. This will if there are increasing returns to possessing more 
information and if communication is not too perfect.
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4.A Foundations for the Payoff Structure
In this appendix, we provide a more detailed model of final returns that fulfills Assumptions 
1 and 2 .
Suppose that final research success at t =  2 is obtained if two separate interim research 
tasks, a and /5, are completed successfully. Each agent is equipped with the same initial 
ability to complete each task, h. At t = 1, each agent can acquire additional knowledge h 
in one of these tasks. We assume that h > 2h, i.e. that initial knowledge is low relative to 
the additional knowledge that can be subsequently acquired.
Without loss of generality, assume that agent A (agent B) can acquire additional know­
how that is relevant to task a (task p) only. However, at t =  1, agents can communicate 
their expertise in their respective task to each other. Denote by and the post­
communication knowledge of agent i in tasks a and respectively.
When agents decide to continue the partnership at t =  1 , a given task is pursued by an 
agent with the highest post-communication knowledge of it. If then one agent is
chosen at random. If agents separate, each agent pursues both tasks to his best ability.
Final research is worth P  to a sole innovator. If there are multiple inventors, Bertrand- 
competition ensures that profits are zero.
A partnership at t =  1 will be worth
V ’.= {h + hŸ P  if both agents have acquired additional knowledge
V := {h-\- h) hP if one agent has acquired additional knowledge
vq := J^P  if neither agent has acquired additional knowledge
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These payoffs conform to assumption 1 except that vq > 0. The assumption that h > 2h 
ensures that V > 2v.
When agents separate at = 1 , agent A  has expected returns of ^1 — P.
These that our reduced-form expected return definitions of section 4.2 are given by
(h + h f ( l - { h  + h) h) P = w ^ (‘lh ,h) {h + h ) h { l  -  {h + h f \  P = (h,2h)
{h + h)h{ l  — {h + h)h^P  = (/i, h) {h + h) h{ l  — h?) P  =  {h, 0)
(1 -  P =  w ^  (0,0) (1 -  (h-\-h)h) P =  w^ (0,h)
Payoffs for agent B  can be derived analogously. The agent’s payoffs are increasing in her 
own knowledge and decreasing in the other agents knowledge and thus fulfill the conditions 
of assumption 2 , with the exception that (0 , fi) > 0  and (0 , 0 ) > 0 .
Suppose that the final research stage requires a cost C = 1^ P. It follows that uq =  0 and 
that an agent without additional knowledge at either task will not enter final research, i.e.
(0 , fi) — C < 0  and (0 , 0 ) — C < 0 . As a result, assumptions 1 and 2 are entirely 
fulfilled by these payoffs.
Finally, note that
A := (2 fi, h) — (/i, 2h) = {h-\-h) hP
so that V > A  and A > u, thus fulfilling assumption 4 as well as exhibiting increasing 
returns to knowledge.
4.B Relaxing Assumption 4 139
4.B Relaxing Assumption 4
Suppose that Assumption 4 did not hold. In particular, assume that agents did not continue 
partnerships at t =  1 at all. Then agent A's expected return at t =  0 can be written as
=  0 ^ ' K ^ w ^  {h, h) +  9 ^  \y +  { w ^  {h, h) — (&, 0))]
+ 6 ^ 6 ^ \w ^  {h, h) — w  {h, 0) + ( w ^  {2h, h) — {h, h) )
+  7T^ ( / i ,  2h) -  ( / i ,  h)  -  ( / i ,  0 ) ) ]
+  6 ^ 9 ^ ' k ^ ' k ^  (2h, 2h) — {h, 2h) ) — { w ^  (2/i, h) —  {h, /i))] .
As a result, the incremental return to effort of agent A  is given by
5 \ y - \ - B ^  (/i, /i) — u)] +  Stt^ O ^  {w ^  (2/i, h)  — 2 w ^  (/i, h))
+5'k'^ { w ^  (/i, h) — {h, 0 )) +  {h, 2h) — (h, h) — (/i, 0))
+ (5 7 r^ 7 T ^ 0 ^  [{w"^ (2/i, 2h) — {h, 2h) ) — (u;^ {2h, h) — {h, h ))] .
The structure of this incremental return is very similar to that of (4.5). For the mechanism 
of Proposition 2 to work, we require that communication by the other agent has a positive 
effect on the incremental return to effort and that effort choices by the two agents are 
strategic complements.
Communication from A to B  has a positive effect on B's incremental return to effort 
absent B's communication if
{h, 2h) — (&, h) > {h, h)
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This condition requires that there are increasing returns to knowledge in the sense that the 
incremental effect of owning both agents’ knowledge over just that of one agent is greater 
than the incremental from knowing one agent’s knowledge rather than none.
Given that B  does not communicate, higher effort by B  reduces A's incremental return 
to effort by
6 {v — w {h,h)) > 0.
Hence, effort choices are not strategic complements absent mutual communication. If B  were 
to communicate as well as increase her effort, however, A's effort incentives are increased if
(2h, h )-w ^  (/i, h) > ^ {h, ■ (w^ (2h, h) — (2A, 2A))+-— ^(1—TTj 1 — 7T 7r( l—tt)
This condition holds when there are sufficiently strong increasing returns to communication. 
If this is the case, the mechanism described in Proposition 2 holds in a setting in which a 
partnership is never continued at t =  1.
References
Admati, a .  R., and p. P fleiderer (1994): “Robust Financial Contracting and the Role 
of Venture Capitalists,” The Journal of Finance, 44(2), 371-402.
Anand, B. N., and a .  Galetovic (2000a): “Information, Non-Excludability and Finan­
cial Market Structure,” Journal of Business, 73(3), 357-402.
----------  (2000b): “Weak Property Rights and Hold-Up in R&D,” Journal of Economics
and Management Strategy, 9(4), 615-642.
Anton, J. J., and D. A. Yao (1994): “Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents 
in the Absence of Property Rights,” American Economic Review, 84, 190-209.
---------  (1995): “Start-Ups, Spin-Offs and Internal Projects,” Journal of Law, Economics
and Organization, 11, 362-378.
(2002): “The Sale of Intellectual Property: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights
and Incomplete Contracts,” Review of Economic Studies, 69(3), 513-531.
References 142
---------  (2004): “Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property,” RAND
Journal of Economics, 35(1), 1-22.
Arping, s. (2002): “Cannibalization and Incentives in Venture Financing,” mimeo, Uni­
versity of Lausanne.
Baccara, M., a n d  R. Razin (2004): “From Thought to Practice: Appropriation and En­
dogenous Market Structure with Imperfect Intellectual Property Rights,” mimeo, NYU.
Bartlett, J. W. (1995): Equity Finance: Venture Capital, Buyouts, Restructurings and 
Reorganizations. John Wiley and Sons, New York.
Besen, s. M., and L. j .  Raskind (1991): “An Introduction to the Law and Economics 
of Intellectual Property,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, 3-27.
Bhattacharya, s., and G. Chiesa (1995): “Proprietary Information, Financial Interme­
diation and Research Incentives,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 4, 328-357.
Bhattacharya, S., J. Glazer, and D. E. Sappincton (1992): “Licensing and the 
Sharing of Knowledge in Research Joint Ventures,” Journal of Economic Theory, 56, 
43-69.
Bhattacharya, S., and R. J. R itter (1983): “Innovation and Communication: Signalling 
with Partial Disclosure,” Review of Economic Studies, 50, 331-346.
Biais, B., and E. Perotti (2003): “Entrepreneurs and New Ideas,” mimeo. University of 
Toulouse.
Binmore, K., a .  Rubinstein, a n d  A. Wolinsky (1986): “The Nash Bargaining Solution 
in Economic Modelling,” RAND Journal of Economics, 17, 176-188.
References 143
Block, Z., and I. MacMillan (1993): Corporate Venturing: Creating Businesses Within 
the Firm. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Mass.
Brooks, J. (1999): “Fund-Raising and Investor Relations,” in The Venture Capital Hand­
book, ed. by W. D. By grave, M. Hay, and J. B. Peeters, pp. 95-117. Prentice Hall, London, 
UK.
Brusco, s., and F. Panunzi (forthcoming): “Reallocation of Corporate Resources and 
Managerial Incentives in Internal Capital Markets,” European Economic Review.
Bygrave, W. D. (1999): “Returns on Venture Capital,” in The Venture Capital Handbook, 
ed. by W. D. Bygrave, M. Hay, and J. B. Peeters, pp. 307-342, London, UK. Prentice 
Hall.
Bygrave, W. D., and J. A. T immons (1992): Venture Capital at the Crossroads. Harvard 
Business School Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Casamatta, C. (2003): “Financing and Advising: Optimal Financial Contracts with Ven­
ture Capitalists,” Journal of Finance, 48(5), 2059-2086.
Cassiman, B., D. P erez-Castrillo, and R. Veugelers (2002): “Endogeneizing Know- 
How Flows Through the Nature of R&D Investments,” International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 20, 775-799.
Cestone, G., and L. White (2003): “Anti-Competitive Financial Contracting: The De­
sign of Financial Claims,” Journal of Finance, 58(5), 2109-42.
Chesbrough, H. (2000): “Making Sense of Corporate Venture Capital,” Harvard Business 
Review, 80(3).
References 144
Combs, K. L. (1993): “The Role of Information Sharing in Cooperative Research and 
Development,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 11, 535-551.
C O R N E L L I, F,, AND O. YoSHA (2003): “Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Debt,” 
Review of Economic Studies, 70(1), 1-32.
D ’A s p r e m o n t , C., s. B h a t t a c h a r y a , and  L.-A. G e r a r d -V a r e t  (2000): “Bargaining 
and Sharing Innovative Knowledge,” Review of Economic Studies, 67 (2 ), 2 5 5 -271 .
D’Aspremont, C., a n d  A. J acquemin (1988): “Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D 
in Duopoly with Spillovers,” American Economic Review, 78, 1133-1137.
De Bondt, R. (1996): “Spillovers and Innovative Activities,” International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 15, 1-28.
Dewatripont, M., and E. Maskin (1995): “Credit and Efficiency in Centralised and 
Decentrahsed Economies,” The Review of Economic Studies, 62, 541-555.
Egli, D., s. Ongena, and D. C. Smith (2004): “On the Sequencing of Projects, Repu­
tation Building, and Relationship Finance,” mimeo, Tilburg University.
Gallini, N. t . ,  and B. D. W right (1990): “Technology Transfer under Asymmetric 
Information,” RAND Journal of Economics, 21, 147-160.
Gandal, N., and s. Scotchmer (1993): “Coordinating Research Through Research Joint 
Ventures,” Journal of Public Economics, 51, 173-193.
Cans, J. S., D. H. Hsu, a n d  S. Stern (2002): “When Does Start-Up Innovation Spur 
the Gale of Creative Destruction?,” RAND Journal of Economics, 33(4), 571-586.
References 145
G A N S , J. S., AND S. Stern (2000): “Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale 
of Destruction,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 9(4), 485-511.
G a r i c a n o , L. (2000): “Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production,” 
Journal of Political Economy, 108(5), 874-904.
Gompers, p., a n d  j .  Lerner (2000): The Venture Capital Cycle. MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Mass.
Gompers, P. A. (1995): “Optimal Investment, Monitoring and the Staging of Venture 
Capital,” Journal of Finance, 50(5), 1461-1489.
Hansmann, H. (1996): The Oumership of Enterprise. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
MA.
Hellmann, T. (1998): “The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts,” 
The Rand Journal of Economics, 29, 57-76.
Hellmann, T., and M. P uri (2000): “The Interaction Between Product Market and 
Financial Strategy: The Role of Venture Capital,” Review of Financial Studies, 13(4), 
959-84.
---------  (2002): “Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start-Up Firms: Empirical
Evidence,” Journal of Finance, 57(1), 169-97.
Inderst, R., and C. Laux (2001): “Incentives in Capital Markets: Capital Constraints, 
Competition and Investment Opportunities,” mimeo, LSE.
Inderst, R., and H. Mueller (2004): “The Effect of Capital Market Characteristicson 
the Value of Start-Up Firms,” Journal of Financial Economics, 72(2), 319-56.
References 146
Jansen, J. (2001): “Strategic Information Revelation and Revenue Sharing in an R&D 
Race,” Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin Discussion Paper IV  01-06.
Kanniainen, V., AND C. Keuschnigg (2003): “The Optimal Portfolio of Start-Up Firms 
in Venture Capital Finance,” Journal of Corporate Finance, 9, 521-534.
Kaplan, S. N., and P. Stromberg (forthcoming): “Characteristics, Contracts and Ac­
tions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses,” Journal of Finance.
Katz, M. L. (1986): “An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development,” RAND 
Journal of Economics, 17, 527-544.
Kortum, s., and j .  Lerner (1998): “Stronger Protection or Technological Revolution: 
What is Behind the Recent Surge in Patenting?,” Camegie-Rochester Conference Series 
on Public Policy, 48, 247-304.
Lanjouw, j .  O., and M. Schankerman (2001): “Characteristics of Competition: A Win­
dow on Patent Litigation,” RAND Journal of Economics, 32(1), 129-151.
---------  (2004): “Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights,” Journal of Law and Economics,
pp. 45-74.
Lazear, E. p ., and s. Rosen (1981): “Rank-Order Tournaments and Optimum Labor 
Contracts,” Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 841-864.
Lerner, J. (1994): “The Importance of Patent Scope: An Empirical Analysis,” RAND 
Journal of Economics, 25, 319-333.
Lerner, J., and A. Schoar (2004): “The Illiquidity Puzzle: Theory and Evidence from 
Private Equity,” Journal of Financial Economics, 72, 3-40.
References 147
----------  (forthcoming): “Does Legal Enforcement Affect Financial Transactions?: The Con­
tractual Channel in Private Equity,” Quarterly Journal of Economics.
McLaughlin, K. J. (1988): “Aspects of Tournament Models: A Survey,” Research in Labor 
Economics, 9, 225-256.
Morrison, A. D,, and L. White (forthcoming): “Crises and Capital Requirements in 
Banking,” American Economic Review.
Navaretti, G. B., p. Bussoli, G. V. Graevenitz, and D. Ulph (1999): “Information 
Sharing, Research Co-Ordination and Membership of Research Joint Ventures,” mimeo, 
University College London.
Neher, D. V. (1999): “Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective,” Review of Economic 
Studies, 66, 255-274.
Pastor, M., and J. Sandonis (2002): “Research Joint Ventures Vs. Cross Licensing 
Agreements: An Agency Approach,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 
20, 215-249.
P erez-Castrillo, J. D., and J. Sandonis (1996): “Disclosure of Know-How in Research 
Joint Ventures,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15, 51-75.
P rendergast, C. (1999): “The Provision of Incentives in Firms,” Journal of Economic 
Literature, 37(1), 7-63.
Quindlen, R. (2000): Confessions of a Venture Capitalist. Warner Books, New York.
Rajan, R. G. (1992): “Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice Between Informed and Arm’s- 
Length Debt,” Journal of Finance, 47(4), 1367-1400.
References 148
Repullo, R., a n d  j .  Suarez (2004): “Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Ap­
proach,” Review of Finance, 8, 75-108.
Rosenkranz, s., a n d  p. W. Schmitz (1999): “Know-How Disclosure and Incomplete 
Contracts,” Economics Letters, 63, 181-185.
R o s e n k r a n z , S ., a n d  P . W . S c h m it z  (2003): “Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights 
in Dynamic R&D Alliances,” Games and Economic Behavior, 4 3 (1 ), 153 -173 .
Rotemberg, j .  j . ,  a n d  G. Saloner (1994): “Benefits of Narrow Business Strategies,” 
American Economic Review, 84(5), 1330-1349.
Sahlman, W. (1990): “The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations,” 
Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 473-521.
Schankermann, M., a n d  s. Scotchmer (2001): “Damages and Injunctions in Protecting 
Intellectual Property,” RAND Journal of Economics, 32(1), 199-220.
Schmidt, K. M. (2003): “Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance,” Journal of 
Finance, 58(3), 1139-1166.
Senge, p. (1994): The Fifth Discipline. Currency, New York.
Severinov, s. (2001): “On Information Sharing and Incentives in R&D,” RAND Journal 
of Economics, 32(3), 542-564.
Silver, A. D. (1985): Venture Capital: The Complete Guide for Investors. John Wiley and 
Sons, New York.
Stein, J. C. (2002): “Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralised versus 
Hierarchical Firms,” Journal of Finance, 57(5), 1891-1921.
References 149
Ueda, M. (2004): “Bank versus Venture Capital: Project Evaluation, Screening and Ex­
propriation,” Journal of Finance^ 59(2), 601-21.
Ulph, D., and Y. Katsoulacos (1999): “Endogenous Knowledge Flows and the Welfare 
Evaluation of Research Joint Ventures,” mimeo, University College London.
